DRAFT – FOR DELIBERATION AT PUBLIC BUSINESS MEETING

This Request for Board Action (RFBA) directs the Technical Director to complete final design and implementation of the Systematic Safety Oversight (SSO) process. This RFBA replaces the previous Board direction contained in the October 11, 2016, RFBA 2017-300-004.

- The SSO goal is to conduct objective, risk-informed, understandable, and predictable evaluations of defined safety areas at defense nuclear facilities that provide input to the Board's safety oversight priorities and processes to support the overall mission of the Agency.

- The SSO methodology is meant to augment staff oversight and to provide input into the work planning process. The Technical Director will design the SSO process for internal communication.

- The SSO scope includes facility safety – accident prevention and mitigation, including the following three safety cornerstones: safety basis, safety systems and controls, and emergency preparedness and response.

- The SSO scope will begin with operating Hazard Category 2 defense nuclear facilities, with the exception of onsite transportation and some underground material storage areas (i.e., material disposal areas at Los Alamos National Laboratory). The exclusion of some defense nuclear facilities from the SSO process will not preclude or limit future Board oversight activities at any defense nuclear facility as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

- The technical staff will complete an Instruction defining the SSO process and methodology. This Instruction will be in lieu of a Directive that was previously discussed in the RFBA dated October 11, 2016. The technical staff will provide the Instruction to the Board members no later than July 31, 2017.

- The technical staff will brief the Board biannually on the results, effectiveness of the process, and any adjustments that were made or envisioned. The first brief will occur in September 2017.

- The technical staff will brief the Board weekly on progress and issues associated with SSO design and implementation, until initial implementation in September 2017.

- The SSO process should facilitate cross-cutting evaluations of nuclear safety areas within the scope described above. The technical staff management team should work closely with the SSO team to define techniques that identify cross-cutting issues and to prioritize oversight work accordingly.