

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 2, 2015

**TO:** S. A. Stokes, Technical Director  
**FROM:** M. T. Sautman and D. L. Burnfield, Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending October 2, 2015

Mr. Jerold Lipsky has taken over the duties previously held by Mr. Michael Mikolanis as the Chief Engineer. In this position, his duties include many of the same responsibilities as those performed by senior technical advisors at other sites. Mr. Lipsky has a wealth of experience at other sites, including being the representative of EM-40 at SRS for the last three years.

**SRNS Operations:** In light of recent issues with Technical Safety Requirement surveillances (see 9/25/15 report), SRNS is requiring a review of the latest completed procedures used to perform all surveillances to ensure they were completed correctly. This week, the Solid Waste Management Facility and Savannah River National Laboratory transitioned from an operational pause to deliberate operations. In conjunction with management field observations (MFOs), the facility representatives are also conducting a second check of the work that is being performed. The facility representatives have found a few cases where procedural lapses have occurred, and where items of concern in the MFOs were not appropriately rolled up and documented as issues in the site commitment tracking system. The site manager requires the direct reports to update the status of the facility oversight on a daily basis.

**K-Area:** The K Area Interim Surveillance project has a procedure for handling, unpacking, inspecting, and assaying 3013 plutonium oxide containers stored in 9975 shipping containers. In order to provide operational flexibility, the procedure has a mixture of sections that are required every time the procedure is used and those that are optional. SRNS identified that procedural steps used to implement packaging and transportation requirements were sometimes included in the optional sections. Furthermore, in order to save time, K Area personnel inappropriately used temporary immediate procedure changes (IPC) to tailor this procedure to support a special task, rather than develop a new procedure. This use of IPCs to support special activities is similar to an approach used in HB-Line (see 9/11/15 report). In addition, past Unreviewed Safety Question reviews of this procedure and its modifications did not identify required steps could be skipped. When this modified procedure was used in the field, some first line managers did not consistently implement portions of the procedure.

**H-Area New Manufacturing:** The site rep observed a drill, which simulated a mix tank glovebox deflagration, tritium release, and medical emergency. In general, the emergency response was good; although, public address announcements for protective actions were delayed, as was the response to a tank containing high oxygen concentrations and tritium gas.

**Software Quality Assurance:** SRNS incorrectly included the RADCALC software in a category that precluded it from being considered safety software. While SRNS was performing calculations to confirm the results obtained from RADCALC, SRR was completing a commercial grade dedication of the software to verify that it performed its safety function. DOE-SR has taken steps to have SRNS properly categorize the software in site procedures and to ensure that it is not improperly used by the contractors.