

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

TO: Steven Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: William Linzau and Rory Rauch, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Oak Ridge Activity Report for Week Ending September 25, 2015

Staff member R. Oberreuter was at Y-12 to observe a site emergency exercise that was designed to test the site's response to a nuclear criticality event. In addition, Z. McCabe was on site shadowing site rep activities.

NNSA Production Office (NPO): The NPO Manager announced a realignment of the NPO organization that splits the Operations Management group into two site-specific operations organizations at Pantex and Y-12. Each of the new organizations will be led by an Associate Deputy Manager for Operations (ADMO), who will be located at the site under his or her scope of responsibility and will manage the facility representatives already dedicated to oversight at that location. The NPO Manager made the new ADMO position part of the NPO Manager's Office, which will elevate the responsibilities of the position relative to other Assistant Managers (AMs). This change is intended to provide a greater site-specific focus on operational performance and improve the integration of information from all AM field oversight activities. In addition, the ADMO position better aligns with the CNS organizational model that has a single operations manager at each site. NPO will select the new ADMOs in the coming months.

Work Planning and Control (WP&C): This week, the site reps observed portions of a maintenance activity to replace the induction coils in one of the casting furnaces in Building 9212. This was a high-hazard maintenance activity that had not been performed in several years. The site reps did not identify any safety concerns during the performance of work, but communicated several concerns with the maintenance work control documentation to Infrastructure Management (maintenance) personnel. Most notably, the work control documentation failed to incorporate the scope of work for the Production tasks supporting the job. This type of omission increases the likelihood that required hazard controls are not implemented prior to performing work. Last spring, following a series of events for which this issue was a common contributing factor (see 4/17/15 report), the Production organization prepared a plan with specific actions to improve the integration of Production and Infrastructure Management activities (see 6/5/15 report). Certain aspects of the Production and Infrastructure Management coordination for this job were improved as a result of these actions. For example, Production operators were present for the pre-job briefing and the maintenance supervisor addressed the task-specific hazards for the Production scope of work. However, a review of the Production and Infrastructure Management procedures governing WP&C integration between the two organizations indicates that additional clarifying language is needed to ensure that work control documentation contains the proper level of detail and sequencing of work steps from both organizations. Other concerns with the work control documentation for this job included the identification of safety-related action steps in information-only tables, the identification of non-applicable or generic hazards, and work steps that were not written in sufficient detail to support hazard identification for the task.

Special Nuclear Material Vehicle (SNMV): CNS Y-12 Readiness Assurance personnel completed a readiness assessment (RA) on the implementation of a change to the software governing the loading of drums on the SNMV. The change in the software was made to allow the number of on-site shipping containers (DT-200 drums) loaded in the SNMV to vary based on factors that affect nuclear criticality safety. The RA team verified that the appropriate software quality assurance processes were applied to the change, and operators were trained and proficient in the use of the revised software. The team had three minor observations but no findings.