

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

January 23, 2015

**TO:** S. A. Stokes, Technical Director  
**FROM:** M. T. Sautman and D. L. Burnfield, Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending January 23, 2015

**Building 235-F:** SRNS has performed de-energization of Building 235-F as part of the actions being taken to meet the commitments of the implementation plan (IP) for Recommendation 2012-1, *Savannah River Site, Building 235-F Safety*. In the IP, DOE committed (commitment 2b-1) to deliver a letter to the Board "... defining the criteria, scope and schedule for de-energization of components and the process for control of the resultant configuration." DOE subsequently delivered this letter on 3/22/13. The plan attached to the letter stated, "In summary, de-energization of rooms will be accomplished by removing the breaker that supplies the room when feasible. When not feasible, the room will be de-energized by placing lights off and closing and locking doors."

Letters recently sent from the Secretary of Energy (November 24, 2014) and the SRS Site Office Manager (December 31, 2014) indicated that the de-energization actions had been completed. However, the project engineer for the Building 235-F risk reduction effort, recently found that several breakers associated with the lighting circuits in the hot cells were closed, even though it was feasible to de-energize them; because of the lack of clarity in the above plan SRNS had turned off the light switch.

During a walkdown of portions of the facility, the site rep observed that these breakers have now been opened and administratively controlled to preclude closure; however, they have not been removed. In addition, other breakers have been opened but are neither removed nor under administrative controls. Furthermore, it appears SRNS did not evaluate the de-energization of the power to some of the panels in room 1002 that formerly provided controls to operations inside the cells. The site rep has provided these observations to the responsible parties for DOE and SRNS.

**Emergency Preparedness (EP):** The site representative met with K-Area, L-Area, and EP management to discuss the roles, responsibilities, and training of K-Area Emergency Coordinators (AEC) with regards to L-Area emergencies (see 12/19/14 weekly report). K-Area management will provide periodic training to their AECs on L-Area and incorporate L-Area topics into their tests/oral boards. The site representative also met with the SRNS Radiological Protection Department (RPD) Director to discuss the actions they are taking to improve the proficiency of RPD emergency responders (see 11/7, 11/14, and 12/12/14 reports).

**H-Canyon:** DOE-SR sent SRNS a letter noting two activities where their facility representatives observed that conduct of operations requirements were not followed and requested a corrective action plan.

**Defense Waste Processing Facility:** Refrigerant leaks in both chemical process cell (CPC) purge air dryers appear to have caused the low pressures seen in the CPC purge header (see 1/9/15 report). The site representative met with engineering personnel to discuss the current options being pursued to address the unreviewed safety question regarding melter feed rate temperature correlation (see 11/26/14 report). A new option being considered is the means to physically restrict the melter feed rate using either orifices or an air displacement slurry pump.