

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

TO: Steven Stokes, Technical Director  
FROM: William Linzau and Rory Rauch, Site Representatives  
SUBJECT: Oak Ridge Activity Report for Week Ending May 9, 2014

**Uranium Processing Facility (UPF):** Last week, NNSA released the report that captures the results of the UPF “Red Team” evaluation led by the ORNL Director (see 1/24/14 report). Key recommendations from the report include the following:

- To resolve confusion related to the project-related roles and responsibilities of various NNSA headquarters entities, the ownership of the project and the overall enriched uranium mission should reside with a senior career executive from the DOE/NNSA Defense Programs Office (NA-10).
- To reduce project costs, design efforts on the current “big box,” single structure UPF concept should be stopped while a reevaluation of program requirements and applicable design standards is undertaken. Design efforts for the new concept should be focused on segregating operations by hazard and security category in multiple facilities.
- To support the actions needed to reduce safety and operational risk in aging facilities, NNSA must aggressively reduce material-at-risk and make significant infrastructure investments.

NNSA has not yet formally accepted the recommendations from this report, though the UPF Federal Project Director has recently given direction consistent with the recommendation to stop design on the current single structure UPF concept (see 4/18/14 report). Further, B&W has submitted to NNSA a draft Enriched Uranium Infrastructure Strategy (see 2/14/14 report) that should provide the framework for addressing the Red Team’s recommendations related to the actions needed to sustain safe operations in aging Y-12 nuclear facilities. Of note, the Red Team expressed concern that it will be challenging for NNSA to meet the objective to replace Building 9212 capabilities no later than 2025 unless NNSA adopts the revised management approach recommended in its report.

**Conduct of Operations:** Following the recent round sheet issue in Building 9204-2E (see 5/2/14 report), the site rep reviewed the implementation of round sheet preparation and use requirements, as codified in Y14-001, *Conduct of Operations Manual*. The review approach consisted of an evaluation of completed round sheets supplemented by discussions of round sheet preparation and use practices with shift managers from Buildings 9212 and 9204-2E. Based on the limited scope of this review, it appears that the processes at both facilities are generally compliant; however, the site rep observed several inconsistencies between the requirements in Y14-001 and work as performed. These observations ranged from outdated language (e.g., a reference to Operational Safety Requirements, which have not been in effect at Y-12 since 2007) to the Building 9204-2E Operations Manager inappropriately delegating periodic round sheet reviews to shift managers. In addition, Y14-001 does not discuss the roles and responsibilities of B&W supervisors, who have a key role in the round sheet processes for some facilities. For example, some supervisors need to review process equipment round sheets in order to make timely decisions related to equipment status. The site rep communicated these observations to B&W Nuclear Safety Operations and Building 9204-2E personnel, who plan to address them in a forthcoming update to Y14-001.