

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

March 28, 2014

TO: S. A. Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and D. L. Burnfield, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending March 28, 2014

The Board's Deputy Technical Director, Richard Tontodonato, was on site this week.

Emergency Preparedness: The site representative observed a drill involving a third level fire in HB-Line. This drill was also being used to requalify a first line manager (FLM) as a facility emergency coordinator (FEC). The FLM had to be repeatedly prompted to perform several basic actions during the drill. In response to this weak performance, facility management removed the FEC qualification from all HB-Line FLMs. (SRNS had previously ended the practice of allowing FLMs to act as shift operations managers based on weak level of knowledge interviews during the recent independent assessment). The site representative checked with other facilities to determine if they had similar issues. At H-Canyon, the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF), and tank farms, a control room manager (CRM) is allowed to fill in as the area emergency coordinator (AEC) or tank farms FEC if the shift operations manager is unavailable. At tank farms and DWPF, the CRMs have acted as a FEC or AEC in recent drills, but SRNS was not able to find any evidence that the H-Canyon CRMs had acted in the AEC role in the last two years. The H-Canyon AEC is responsible for coordinating protective actions for all of H-Area.

Maintenance: In February following the calibration of pressure switches, the HB-Line maintenance FLM noticed a cap was still in the work area. Without notifying anybody or verifying the required configuration, he installed the cap where he thought it belonged. Unfortunately, he placed it on a pressure switch vent line. Last weekend, workers conducted ventilation interlock tests involving this equipment. When they tried to restore the system, the H-Canyon exhaust tunnel low-low vacuum alarm alarmed and would not clear. This was caused by the cap being installed in the wrong location. In response to this and another event where maintenance mechanics worked on the wrong equipment, the F and H-Area maintenance organization will have a stand down next week.

Tank Farms: The site rep observed SRR personnel reconnect jumpers in F-Pump Pit 1 in preparation of restoring the ability to transfer waste between F-Tank Farm and H-Tank Farm. During this evolution, the SRR person in charge (PIC) noted that the SRR rigging personnel were about to work the procedural steps out of order and that the jumpers could not physically be attached if this were done. The PIC recovered from the error, but in the process failed to call a time out and reset the expectations of the team. While no specific nuclear safety concern was observed during this observation, the site's expectations for conduct of operations was not strictly followed. Similar missed expectations have resulted in nuclear safety concerns in the past.

SRR Integrated Independent Review: An independent review team primarily composed of reach back from the corporate partners began a review of the SRR operations. Much of the emphasis of this team is focused on safety and specifically on lessons learned from the recently issued Accident Investigation Board report from the fire at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP.)

K-Area: The site rep observed an oral board led by the K-Area Facility Manager of a Destructive Evaluation Supervisor. The board was conducted professionally and the candidate passed without any significant problems being noted.