

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 28, 2014

TO: S. A. Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and D. L. Burnfield, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending February 28, 2014

Board Visit: The Board and members of the technical staff visited SRS and reviewed safety issues with the management of the local Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration offices as well as the respective contractors.

Tank Farms: The Tank Farms DSA requires that Type I and II annulus ventilation systems be maintained as a safety significant confinement pressure boundary when in non-acidic chemical cleaning mode. The inlet HEPA filter forms a portion of that boundary during normal operation. Tank 12 has completed chemical cleaning, and a damper has replaced the inlet HEPA filters to form part of this confinement boundary. SRS used a lock maintained by the administrative lock control program to ensure this damper was in place. In order to install a portable ventilation system for maintenance, an operator removed the lock on the damper. Once the non-compliant condition was discovered, the contractor closed the damper and reinstalled the admin lock.

The Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) require that two control room operators (CROs) remain in the 241-2H Control Room. One of the two watchbill-designated CROs left the control room along with the other qualified operators who were present in order to participate in a shift turnover briefing in a nearby room. This left the control room manned with only one CRO, resulting in a TSR violation.

Defense Waste Processing Facility: SRR identified that operators had failed to perform two Technical Surveillance Requirement surveillances on numerous occasions. During operator rounds, there are four agitator power indication readings the operators are required to take if a transfer to the Sludge Receipt and Adjustment Tank (SRAT) in progress and the SRAT is in the operation mode. There are two other agitator power loop checks taken at the same time that are required any time the SRAT is in operation mode. While the operators were correctly noting the four readings for the former were not applicable (N/A) when the SRAT was in operation mode and no transfer was in progress, they were also incorrectly noting N/A for the latter two readings.

HB-Line: The SRNS Independent Assessment team conducted interviews and dry runs this week. The team identified level of knowledge weaknesses for the shift technical engineers and a first line manager. The team also questioned if the structural integrity program adequately addressed glovebox confinement verification.

Solid Waste Management Facility: SRNS is making the necessary preparations to receive three TRUPact III and one TRUPact II loaded containers back from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant because of the current inability to unload the containers there.

Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL): The site rep performed a field observation of the replacement of a manipulator in the hot cells of SRNL. While this procedure was somewhat different from the procedure that will be developed for the removal of the manipulators in 235-F, it would seem to be helpful if a more robust knowledge transfer system were in place between the two organizations.