

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

TO: Steven Stokes, Acting Technical Director
FROM: William Linzau and Rory Rauch, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Oak Ridge Activity Report for Week Ending May 10, 2013

Building 9204-2E/Conduct of Operations: Assembly/Quality Evaluation Production (A/QEP) management conducted a fact-finding meeting to evaluate events associated with personnel entering an area without respiratory protection, as required by radiological posting. The workers did not follow the applicable radiological work permit (RWP), which required them to contact the radiological control technician (RCT) to ensure that radiological conditions were unchanged prior to entering the area. In addition, once conditions allowed the area to be down-posted, the supervisor and workers finished their tasks prior to conducting an evaluation of the breakdown in the process. A number of corrective actions are being considered including: improving pre-job briefings to add hold points for changing radiological conditions; evaluating RCT participation in pre-job briefings; and training personnel on the lessons learned from this event, such as the importance of reading and understanding all RWP requirements. This event is similar to the event at the Technology Development Building discussed last week (see 5/3/13 report). In both cases, an adequate discussion of the radiological requirements during the pre-job briefing could have reduced the likelihood of this type of event.

This week, A/QEP workers discovered that they had initiated use of a superseded revision of a container refurbishment procedure. The workers recognized that a potential problem existed when they arrived at steps in the procedure that process engineering personnel had planned to remove. Though workers did not perform any of the steps that were modified in the new procedure revision, it appears that there were two breakdowns in the A/QEP process for procedure control. First, A/QEP administrative support did not issue an updated working copy of the procedure to the line upon notification that a new procedure revision had become effective. Second, the responsible supervisor failed to verify that the working copy of the procedure matched the controlled revision during a required weekly check.

Uranium Processing Facility (UPF): B&W has responded to the UPO's March 25, 2013, letter that expressed concerns about configuration management of the facility design (see 3/29/13 report). The response lists actions B&W is taking to address the concerns, including: preparing a project-specific process that implements the requirements from DOE's configuration management standard, performing assessments of the effectiveness and timeliness of recent corrective actions, and developing a project-specific procedure to govern evaluating changes to the code of record.

Contractor Assurance System (CAS): Last week, B&W issued the CAS performance report for the second quarter of fiscal year 2013. The report addresses two new key initiatives to track performance in the implementation of criticality safety controls (see 4/5/13 report) and maintaining a safety-conscious work environment. The latter key initiative was added in response to NPO's latest Quarterly Issues Management Meeting report, which indicated that B&W key initiatives were not tracking systemic issues at other sites, such as safety culture. Other notable key initiatives include efforts to improve performance in work planning and control, maintenance backlog management, and continuing training. In addition, the Feedback and Improvement Working Group, while analyzing several recent events for broader trends, identified an area of concern that management's expectations for approval, concurrence, and review of documents are not consistent or well understood by all personnel.