

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

TO: Timothy Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: Rory Rauch, Site Representative
SUBJECT: Oak Ridge Activity Report for Week Ending August 10, 2012

Operational Suspension: The suspension of nuclear operations that resulted from last week's security stand down continued through the week. Late in the week, the B&W General Manager issued a plan for the phased resumption of operations. The plan includes training to reinforce proper conduct of operations principles prior to restart and enhanced management oversight of operations during the restart. The plan will be implemented when the B&W General Manager gives the release to restart operations.

Disassembly Operations: Last week, a product engineer discovered that a component had been processed in an unintended manner in Building 9204-2E. This component was part of a batch of components scheduled for non-destructive evaluation. However, due to a miscommunication and a lack of formality in the processes used to ensure that components are processed in the manner intended, material handlers delivered this batch to an area that performs disassembly operations. Operators completed the disassembly of the first component before pausing work after observing a marking on the second component that was atypical for that disassembly area. The disassembly supervisor contacted the product engineer, who confirmed that the component should not have been disassembled. The Building 9204-2E production manager identified a series of near-term corrective actions, a subset of which must be implemented before operations in the affected processing areas can resume. These include developing a system for marking components such that their intended process stream can be verified visually, retraining assembly and material movement personnel on formal communications, and identifying specific personnel that are authorized to initiate material movements in Building 9204-2E.

Safety Basis Improvement Plan: The production facilities and safety analysis engineering departments recently developed a safety basis improvement plan after observing an increase in issues that demonstrated weaknesses in the quality of various safety basis processes. The plan identifies several focus areas, such as common causes of recent potential inadequacies in the safety analysis (see 11/25/11 and 8/3/12 reports), the adequacy of technical safety requirement surveillances to prove safety system operability (see 3/30/12 and 4/6/12 reports), inconsistencies between the safety analysis report and supporting documentation, and incorrect supporting calculations (see 5/4/12 report). The corrective action plan for each focus area is due in early September 2012.

Uranium Processing Facility (UPF): The DOE Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) issued the results of its assessment of the safety culture at the UPF project on July 27, 2012. The external safety culture experts who performed the assessment for HSS identified a mix of positive observations and areas of improvement within the organizational behaviors evaluated. The review team concluded that NPO recognizes many of the behaviors that need to be improved and should identify ways to hold the contractor accountable to improve them. Finally, the review team recommended that the federal and contractor project organizations develop a formal safety culture policy for the UPF project that would facilitate the development of a healthy safety culture and safety-conscious work environment.