DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 24, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: G.W. Cunningham, Technical Director

FROM: T. Dwyer and H. Waugh, Pantex Site Representatives

SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending July 24, 1998

<u>DNFSB Activity Summary:</u> H. Waugh was on site all week. T. Dwyer was on site all week with the exception of Wednesday-Thursday, when he attended W62 meetings at DOE-AL.

<u>W62 NESS Revalidation:</u> The W62 NESS Revalidation Team met to document issues (preliminary) to be provided to the Project Team during this Revalidation suspension. Over 15 specific areas were addressed, several of which will be difficult to satisfy, including failure of the SNL safety specification to address Pantex-specific abnormal environments, additional sensitive information concerning potential vulnerabilities to electrical energy, and the loss of confidence in the NEOP change control process by the NESS Team. At this point, no Team member was willing to fail the Revalidation. However, several members expressed doubt that the Project Team/Design Agencies could muster sufficient technical argument to allay their present concerns.

Electrical Equipment Control Program (EECP) Nuclear Explosive Safety (NES)

Master Study: Action items arising from last week's EECP NES Master Study Single Integrated Input Document (SIID) Validation Review were released this week. Aside from clarifications to certain sections of the SIID, additional information will be required to address such areas as:

1] roles of the NETOG; 2] control of items not on the MTL; 3] ensuring all items in an NEA are on the MEL; 4] abnormal events addressed by tester designers; 5] removal of equipment from MEL; and 6] PAL equipment relationship with respect to MTL requirements.

W79 Cell Dissolution: Dissolution of the 3rd W79 Dismantlement Program unit is now scheduled to begin Tuesday morning. An advance copy of the revised Weapon Safety Specification (WSS) has been received, along with a letter signed by LLNL and SNL and a more definitive letter from SNL, allowing M&H to make a negative determination on the USQD associated with the stoppage. Note that M&H has used this window of opportunity to complete a training sequence and increase the complement of qualified W79 PTs to 14.

Building 12-116: The Building 12-116 loading plan has been presented to AAO by M&H, although it has not yet been forwarded to DOE-AL for approval. It is now indicated that the facility will be used to store <u>national security assets</u>, which has been loosely defined as "strategic reserve," plus "enhanced surveillance," plus "other" pits. Note that the definition of the first and second terms has been extended to include a select number of pits from each family. This addition is important, because W48 pits, for example, are counted as national security assets. The Building 12-116 Authorization Agreement has also been presented to AAO by M&H. It contains no restrictions on types of pits to be stored in the facility, beyond a requirement that pits be "stored in accordance with the DOE approved Pit Loading Plan" discussed above.