

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

April 30, 2010

TO: Timothy Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: Donald Owen and David Kupferer, Oak Ridge Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Activity Report for Week Ending April 30, 2010

Building 9212. In response to the risks of operating Building 9212 noted in the Board's letter dated March 13, 2007, Y-12 management and B&W's Continued Safe Operating Oversight Team (CSOOT) briefed the Board on the third annual assessment of the safety of operations in Building 9212. The CSOOT concluded that no safety issues have been identified that would provide reason for limiting current Building 9212 operations. Key points discussed include:

- The inventory of uranium solutions in safe bottles has been kept near an operational minimum over the past year, thereby reducing the consequence of a facility fire.
- Among several maintenance efforts, B&W continues to replace aging electrical panels.
- B&W is establishing a new program to monitor and evaluate aging of electrical cables (a 2009 CSOOT recommendation stemming from prior staff observations). The cable aging program document is in final review after being delayed to evaluate a recent Nuclear Regulatory Commission document on monitoring electrical cables.
- The CSOOT recommended that additional funding for facility maintenance and the priority to fund a replacement to the Holden Gas Furnace as called for by the Building 9212 Facility Risk Review needs to be addressed. YSO had removed the replacement furnace from the Nuclear Facility Risk Reduction Project in December of 2008 (see the 1/2/09 site rep. report).

Uranium Processing Facility (UPF). Last month, B&W submitted a Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis (PDSA) to YSO for approval to support the first Critical Decision-2/3 package (see last week's site rep. report). Based on discussions YSO had with B&W while reviewing the PDSA, B&W is planning to revise the PDSA and re-submit the document as a Preliminary Safety Design Report (PSDR), which is the level of safety analysis commensurate with the current maturity level of UPF design. UPF project management expect that this PSDR submittal will address several of the observations identified by NNSA during the recently completed Independent Project Review.

Warehouse Operations. Based on reduction of nuclear material inventory, YSO has approved B&W to down-post the Material Access Area in the Warehouse (see the 4/9/10 site rep. report).

Building 9201-5 Deactivation. Based on an approved exemption (see the 2/26/10 site rep. report), B&W has been preparing to downgrade the 9201-5 Complex from Hazard Category 3 to a chemically hazardous facility. This week, B&W initiated a Readiness Assessment (RA) to verify that conditions provided in the exemption are met and that B&W is ready to operate Building 9201-5 as a chemically hazardous facility. The site reps. note that there is no specific requirement to perform an RA when downgrading a nuclear facility; B&W initiated this review as a best practice. B&W has previously identified the need to develop a documented process for deactivating nuclear facilities (see the 3/27/09 site rep. report). B&W is developing a deactivation procedure.