

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

June 27, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director
FROM: J. Kent Fortenberry / Joe Sanders
SUBJECT: SRS Report for Week Ending June 27, 1997

H-Canyon Authorization Agreement - WSRC expects to receive authorization to restart H-Canyon by July 22, 1997. The proposed authorization agreement specifically identifies the following controls:

- * the Standards/Requirements Identification Document (S/RID),
- * the Authorization Basis (which consists of the Basis for Interim Operation, the Technical Safety Requirements, and the Double Contingency Analysis for criticality),
- * the USQ process to maintain the Authorization Basis,
- * the H-Area Emergency Preparedness and Planning Program,
- * the H-Area Fire Protection Program,
- * the state Water Pollution Control Permit, and
- * the state Air Quality Control Permit

The H-Canyon Technical Safety Requirements, in addition to Limiting Conditions of Operations, identifies administrative requirements for:

- | | |
|---------------------------|--|
| * independent assessments | * facility self-assessments |
| * written procedures | * emergency response |
| * fire protection | * nuclear criticality safety |
| * configuration control | * installed instrumentation and M&TE |
| * radiation protection | * quality assurance |
| * maintenance | * other process controls that address specific hazards |

The proposed authorization agreement limits the scope of H-Canyon activities to the dissolution of only 60 of the ~1800 spent fuel assemblies (i.e., the K-14 charge). Further activities would be authorized following successful completion of preparations for Phases II and III of the H-Canyon restart. Currently, the proposed agreement also authorizes HEU blend down operations, which have not yet been reviewed by the staff. In response to this comment, DOE and WSRC are assessing whether the blend down activity should be included in this authorization agreement.

Vitrified Americium-Curium at ORNL - There have been uncertainties in the glass form that would be acceptable to ORNL as well as ORNL's capacity to store vitrified Am-Cm from SRS. Attempts are being made to resolve both of these issues with formal communications (probably this week) between SRS and ORNL on the glass form and between EM and ER on storage capacity. The expectation is that ORNL will accept a leaded glass form and will also provide storage for all of the vitrified Am-Cm through modification of an existing vault. Other issues that may be addressed in these communications include the path forward for the Mk-18 Am-Cm targets currently stored in RBOF and the identification of all NEPA actions needed to support transfer of Am-Cm to SRS.