

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 23, 1999

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director  
J. Kent Fortenberry, Deputy Technical Director  
**FROM:** C. H. Keilers / R. T. Davis  
**SUBJECT:** SRS Report for Week Ending December 24, 1999

**Recommendation 94-1:** On Tuesday, DOE-SR directed WSRC to cease all support for stabilizing Rocky Flats and Hanford fluoride residues in F-Canyon. This material's disposition path has been uncertain for about 4 months, primarily because of low funding, shipping container certification issues, and the emerging possibility of disposal at WIPP (site rep weeklies 10/22/99, 11/19/99). DOE-SR considers this an interim decision, since it is being made in advance of formal DOE-EM direction. It is based on the Rocky Flats determination that disposing of this material as transuranic waste in WIPP is a viable alternative. WSRC was requested to redirect its efforts to accelerate stabilizing other 94-1 materials. (3.a)

**Work Controls:** On Monday, the President, WSRC, responded to last month's DOE-SR letter concerning the need for improvements in conduct of operations (site rep weeklies 6/4/99, 11/19/99). WSRC stated that the recent trend does not meet management's expectations for excellence. WSRC also identified several initiatives for improving operations in the long-term. These include manager and supervisor training on performance improvement initiatives; personnel training on positive reinforcement concepts and developing proper attitudes about safety (i.e., behavior-based safety); first-line supervisor training on leadership and management concepts; and detailed training on implementation of the revised hazardous energy control procedure. In addition, WSRC has developed a plan for addressing issues identified during the recent DOE-EH assessment of ISM implementation (site rep weeklies 7/30/99, 11/26/99).

Much of the recent attention to conduct of operations stems from the FB-Line contamination event (9/1/99) and follow-up investigations. WSRC stated that the investigations will likely help identify improvements applicable across the site. FB-Line is expected to complete shorter-term corrective actions within a few weeks. The WSRC Facility Evaluation Board, an independent assessment group, is scheduled to conduct a formal assessment of FB-Line operations in mid-January. This should provide a measure of whether the corrective action plan has been effective. (1.c, 3.a).

**HB-Line Readiness Assessment:** Based on satisfactory completion of the Readiness Assessment, DOE-SR has authorized the resumption of the low-assay plutonium campaign using the alternative transfer route from HB-Line to H-Canyon (site rep weekly 12/10/99). Pre-start findings included the needs for more training on criticality safety and for updating the linking database. Currently, WSRC expects to leak-check the transfer route and possibly begin transfers on Monday. (3.a)

**F-Canyon Readiness Assessment:** The DOE-SR Readiness Assessment team concluded that F-Canyon 2<sup>nd</sup> plutonium cycle operations can be safely started following resolution of 4 pre-start findings related to conduct of operations and the pre-operational checklist (site rep weekly 12/10/99). WSRC plans to implement corrective actions during the next two weeks and expects to begin operations during the second week of January. (3.a)