

# DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 4, 1998

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director

**FROM:** T. Dwyer and H. Waugh, Pantex Site Representatives

**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending December 4, 1998

**DNFSB Activity Summary:** T. Dwyer and H. Waugh were on site all week. D. Burnfield and M. Helfrich were on site Tuesday-Wednesday, observing the W62 hazard analysis process. J. Deplitch and OE L. McGrew were on site Tuesday-Friday for the W56 NESS.

**W56 Dismantlement Program NESS:** The W56 Dismantlement Program NESS continued this week. About 20 issues or concerns, many of which are already closed, had been listed for deliberation. None of the more significant issues were identified by NESS Group members; rather, they were identified by 2 of the advisors and the observers. The NESS Group asked few questions, as if they had determined already that W56 operations were safe. For example, the hazards of DMSO operations were not presented to the NESS, yet the Group had no DMSO-related questions, even when the issue was initially raised by an observer. (Persistent questioning by the observer ultimately resulted in the NESS Group adding DMSO to the list of issues or concerns.) Board observers contributed at least half of the issues or concerns to the list for deliberation. The NESS Group will reconvene next week to conclude their deliberations.

Revision 2 to the W56 ABCD has been issued, and it represents a significant change, omitting many of the controls in the original ABCD. However, this does not necessarily mean it is inadequate. The ABCD includes those "TSR-like" controls that will be approved by DOE. The remainder of the controls from previous revisions of the ABCD are now in a Flowdown Document (or Shop Floor Documents List). The policies and procedures for the flowdown process, change control, and the treatment of lightning protection controls are potential concerns.

**W62 D&I Program:** The W62 D&I Project Team continued to meet this week to perform a hazards analysis (HA) of the W62 D&I process. Board staff observers concluded that the HA process did not adequately meet its objective – it did not provide systematic assurance that the hazards associated with the W62 D&I were identified in a manner that would allow development of an integrated set of controls. In particular, the scope of the HA was not adequately defined. For example, operations that take place in special purpose bays, as well as the transportation of units to and from the D&I bay to the special purpose bays, were not included. Other observed shortcomings included: (1) the procedure for performing the HA was not documented; (2) the HA team did not have a predefined leader; (3) the HA team did not make appropriate use of the W62 PTs and available safety personnel in identifying of hazards; (4) the HA team frequently attempted to restrict the number and scope of the hazards being postulated, discounting scenarios if a single team member voiced an opinion that the scenario might be incredible; and (5) the HA team did not attempt to integrate the effort with other HAs, such as a job hazards analysis or the ongoing upgrades to the BIO in the areas of transportation and lightning protection. Of note, the lack of a site wide change control process may have contributed to the confusion that existed during this HA. As a separate issue, it was noted that an HA of training bay operations is needed to reduce the likelihood of injuries during training and demonstrations.