

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 21,1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: G.W. Cunningham, Technical Director

FROM: T. Dwyer and H. Waugh, Pantex Site Representatives

SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending August 21, 1998

DNFSB Activity Summary: H. Waugh was on site all week. T. Dwyer was on Military Leave. M. Forsbacka and J. Deplitch were on site observing the B61-7 SIRR and the NES Electrical Tester Master Study Part I, respectively.

W79 Cell Dissolution: W79 dissolutions continued this week. Unit 5 was started Sunday night and was completed Tuesday afternoon. Unit 6 followed and dissolution was completed in about eight hours. Removal of this pit from the workstation was delayed when the air line to the hoist failed. Following replacement of the air hose the pit was removed, cleaned up, and packaged. Dissolution of the next unit (7) will complete the backlog of subassemblies on hand. Mechanical disassembly is scheduled to resume next Monday to provide additional subassemblies for cell activity. The LLNL position -- that the Teflon components in the dissolution Workstation are not a problem -- remains unchanged. It was reaffirmed by Glenn Mara, LLNL DTE Division Leader to M&H senior management (H. Berman) on his visit here last week.

NES Electrical Tester Master Study Part I: The Electrical Equipment Control Program (EECP) Nuclear Explosive Safety (NES) master study continued this week. M&H and SNL completed their presentations on Thursday and the NES Study Group began its deliberations. At the completion of the presentation on the results of the EECP Hazard Analysis, M&H presented its response to the hazard analysis team's recommendations. This response was limited to indicating an intent to institute, develop, and improve programs and requirements. The main issues identified were related to: master tester list (MTL), master equipment list (MEL), and pink sticker equipment not meeting DOE Explosive Safety Manual and National Electric Code (NEC) requirements; and monitoring and checks for deliberate unauthorized acts (DUAs). It appears that the NES Study Group is interested in pursuing the possibility of DUA to equipment prior to its receipt from Allied Signal or other sources.

B61-7 SIRR: A Single Integrated Readiness Review (SIRR) was conducted in support of the B61-7 ALT 920 weapon rebuilds for the inactive stockpile. Since the B61-7 has an approved NESS, this SIRR serves as a final tune-up of the NEOPs associated with rebuilding B61-7 units. The review process, conducted jointly by AAO and M&H, was a sufficiently rigorous evaluation of the adequacy of the NEOPs required to reassemble the primary and preflight subassembly. Other NEOPs were not reviewed, as they are common to other B61 activities that are routinely accomplished. A possible pre-start finding may be issued regarding two-man control during primary buildup. This is due to the collocation of the HE hemispheres and the pit in the work area and the proximity of the PTs as they work on individual hemispheres. This issue is pending further interpretation of the two-man rule from the M&H Nuclear Explosives Safety Department.