

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

June 10, 1999

TO: G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director
K. Fortenberry, Deputy Technical Director

FROM: M. T. Sautman

SUBJECT: RFETS Activity Report for Week Ending June 10, 1999

Conduct of Operations. A near miss occurred when the incorrect Zone 1 exhaust fan was locked-out/tagged-out (LO/TO) by maintenance electricians in B707. When the control room SOE observed a standby fan come on-line, he realized that the wrong fan had been locked-out and notified the configuration control authority (CCA). While the CCA tried to find the electricians and get the fan back on line, he did not take any immediate actions to notify the machinists that the fan was still energized and stop the maintenance activity. The correct fan was identified during the pre-evolutionary brief and on the LO/TO permit, but the LO/TO Isolator referenced an uncontrolled, difficult to read drawing on which the incorrect fan had been identified for LO/TO by the maintenance foreman. Neither the LO/TO Isolator nor the Verifier noticed the discrepancy between the tag and the actual location. The machinists only found out about the mistake when they checked in with the control room SOE prior to beginning work. Bob Card has requested that a top notch root cause analysis team be formed to investigate this occurrence. In addition, disciplinary actions have been taken against four workers. (I-A)

Building 771 Deactivation. The technical staff had several meetings with design engineers and senior K-H managers to discuss specific requirements of the first generation birdcage as well as the overall design process. Although the radiological engineers have developed a reasonable test plan with acceptance criteria, the technical staff still have concerns with the adequacy of some of the ventilation criteria (or lack thereof). Another continuing problem has been that K-H Closure Projects, RMRS Engineering, and B771 Operations personnel have different expectations for the two birdcages. After reviewing staff concerns, K-H has acknowledged several flaws in their design process:

- the design was performed independently of any hazards analysis or control identification,
- functional requirements were not defined for the birdcage, and
- a systematic approach was not taken.

These issues have been previously communicated by the Board and its staff to DOE and the contractors. In order to prevent making the same mistakes again, Allan Parker has stopped procurement of the second generation birdcage until the above issues have been addressed in the design. K-H has already started identifying the hazards and how they will be controlled. Parker also stated that he will not issue the design package for the second generation birdcage until it incorporates test and operational data from the first generation one. (III-B.1.a)

Recommendation 94-1. Tapping and draining of actinide solutions in B371 was completed last week. The remaining 1800 liters of solution should be processed by late June. (III-A.1.a)

Year 2000. The last two health and safety systems (Radio and Fire Alarm, Detection, and Suppression System), have now been fully implemented. The radio system is to be validated this summer. (I-A.2)

Interactions with the Public. The Site Rep met with David Abelson, the Executive Director of the Rocky Flats Coalition of Local Governments, to discuss recent Board activities and initiate interactions with this new organization. Mr. Abelson indicated a desire for the two agencies to meet monthly. In addition, he expressed concern over the possible radiological exposures that might result from converting part of B460, RFFO's main office building, into a waste storage facility.

cc: Board members