

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 5, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR: G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director

FROM: T. Dwyer and H. Waugh, Pantex Site Representatives

SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending February 5, 1999

DNFSB Activity Summary: H. Waugh was on site all week. T. Dwyer was on site Monday - Wednesday, and Friday. Thursday he was participating in Recommendation 98-2 staff-to-staff discussions at DNFSB Headquarters.

W87 Life Extension Program (LEP): The Engineering Evaluation for the W87 LEP continued slowly forward this week. Unit 1 was processed through the LINAC and began mechanical assembly today, but unit 2 has had a series of problems with bubble formation in a silastic potting material, and has fallen behind in the process. Assembly on this unit was therefore discontinued, and a fresh start will begin next week with new HE components.

W56 Dismantlement Program: W56 activity has been on hold awaiting completion of the fire protection upgrade to Building 12-99. The contractor performing the upgrade work has fallen behind schedule, in large part due to inadequate attention to the requirements of developing a test plan suitable for a critical safety system. As of today, Building 12-99 acceptance testing is approximately 40% complete. On Wednesday, AAO approved a "Temporary Exception to CSSM Requirements for Building 12-99, Bay 1," giving M&H relief from specific requirements for a facility in "repair" mode to allow preparatory work for the W56 Dismantlement Program to proceed concurrent with the ongoing facility upgrade work. By initiating the W56 tooling layout this week, the Program Manager believes he can meet the February 16th deadline for resumption of the suspended W56 Readiness Assessment.

Procedure Issues: On February 2nd, M&H formally reported discovery of an occurrence [ALO-AO-MHSM-PANTEX-1999-0006] involving use of an improper procedure during operations on a W80 JTA. The occurrence was brought to light during the final documentation reviews after completion of the JTA build. Specifically, a superceded version of an Engineering Instruction (EI) was used during operations on January 24th. Although the use of the wrong EI on this JTA ultimately had no safety impact, during the critique of this occurrence it became apparent that, in contrast with the configuration controls on O&Is, NEOPs, and NEEPs, the PTs do not have a mechanism by which they can determine which revision of an EI is effective.

B53 End Cap Program: Contrary to previous reports, the End Cap portion of the B53 Program has not been cut off. However, the path forward hinges on diverting LANL analysis resources (currently dedicated to W76 work) to completing 3 specific Zone 4 storage analyses. A draft recovery schedule for End Cap Assembly moves has been issued and distributed to the project team for review. PT training on the End Cap cover changeout was conducted this week, and a demonstration to the local NES community will be provided next Tuesday.