

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 19, 1999

TO: G.W. Cunningham, Technical Director

FROM: Paul F. Gubanc, Oak Ridge Site Representative

SUBJ: Activity Report for Week Ending February 19, 1999

Staff members M. Helfrich, D. Moyle and J. West visited Y-12 this week to review preparations for the restart of Enriched Uranium Operations (Phase-B). The office was closed Monday in observance of the President's Day holiday.

A. HEPA Filter Test Facility (FTF): As of Friday, the restart status of the FTF is as follows:

1. On February 8, DOE Oak Ridge formally directed Bechtel Jacobs (BJC) to resume filter testing on February 15 based on a chargeback system. DOE expects to formally amend the BJC budget to restore funding to the FTF by February 24.
2. On February 19, BJC sent a memo to all FTF users that the FTF would resume receipt and testing of HEPA filters at an estimated cost of \$250/filter. (This "per filter" cost is based on an average annual throughput of 2000 filters/year and is expected to fluctuate with FTF usage. If demand drops to 1000 filters/year, the testing fee will rise to about \$500/filter.)
3. BJC and DOE intend to subcontract or privatize operation of the FTF later this year.

B. Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations (EUO) Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) System: The original EUO HF system has been replaced with a new system incorporating equipment enclosures and secondary containment piping to enhance safety. Completion and preparation of the new HF system is identified as the controlling path for Phase-B (wet chemistry) restart preparations. LMES originally conducted only visual inspections of the HF piping system field welds. After the identification of defective welds by DOE (LMES inspectors had already accepted these welds) LMES agreed to perform the technically superior radiographic inspections of the primary system welds.

1. The new HF system has now had all 37 of its primary piping system field welds radiographed. Of these, seven had rejectable indications. Two have been replaced and have acceptable radiographs. The remaining five welds are awaiting repair and reinspection.
2. After each primary weld is made, the secondary containment piping is closed around it (employing six separate field welds). LMES visually inspected only 20% of these welds (on the basis that it was not a primary system boundary). During radiography of primary system welds, secondary containment welds were incidentally caught on film. Though the shots were not set up for the secondary welds, several images reveal what could be rejectable indications. LMES is developing a technical proposal on how to disposition these indications and justify or amend its inspection plan for the secondary containment piping.
3. EUO started their hazard evaluation of the HF system on Monday. This review is expected to continue through next week. (I-A.3 & II-B.2)

C. ORNL Integrated Safety Management (ISM) Verification: DOE has delayed the ISM Phase 1 verification of ORNL from March to late April. The review team leader has been identified as Mr. Peter Gross, DOE-OR ES&H. A review plan and team composition (including how the team will address ORNL Building 3019) has not yet been identified. (I-A.2)

cc: Board Members