DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 22, 2000

TO: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: D. F. Owen, RFETS Site Representative
SUBJECT: RFETS Activity Report for the Week Ending September 22, 2000

Staff members R. Kasdorf and J. Troan were at RFETS reviewing work planning, and startup preparations for the Inner Tent Chamber and the Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System.

Work Planning. Kaiser-Hill has been working on a major revision to the Integrated Work Control Program (IWCP) Manual to streamline the process for planning work activities at RFETS. Board staff and the site rep. noted that revised work screening criteria allowed certain work on safety systems and equipment without the review and concurrence required under the current IWCP manual. In response, Kaiser-Hill management indicated that the criteria will be strengthened to require nuclear safety personnel concurrence with all work on safety systems and equipment.

Following an inquiry by the site rep. and Board staff, DOE-RFFO management stated that the IWCP revision will be formally reviewed by DOE-RFFO to ensure consistency with the RFETS Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) Description and prior ISMS Verification efforts. (1-C)

Inner Tent Chamber. Building 771 has been preparing the next generation Inner Tent Chamber (ITC) for startup. ITC Phase I, Series 2 is a modified version of the initial ITC design that replaces sliding doors with glove ports and has an integral waste box. Plasma-arc cutting will be the primary cutting technique. The Kaiser-Hill Readiness Assessment (RA) is to start on September 25, 2000. The site rep. and staff noted that Kaiser-Hill had not performed a tracing of safety controls from safety analyses (e.g., Fire Hazard Analysis, ALARA Job Review, Criticality Evaluation, etc.) through to floor-level implementation as intended by the planned revision to the IWCP. In response, Building 771 management stated such a tracing would be accomplished to support startup of ITC Phase 1, Series 2.

As the Building 771 authorization basis requires completion of a readiness review prior to preforming plasma-arc cutting, actual demonstration of plasma-arc cutting on a glovebox in the ITC will not be performed for the RA. At least four gloveboxes, however, will be size reduced following the RA under the controls and increased oversight required by the ITC Startup Plan. The increased oversight will include observation by members of the RA team. (3-B)

Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System (PuSPS). As noted last week, the PuSPS project stated that the sintered metal filter for the inner can bung may not confine contamination as had been assumed. This filter forms part of the contamination boundary between the inner can loading glovebox and inner can welding fume hood after the inner can is welded and cut. Actions to evaluate the potential contamination spread into the fume hood under anticipated differential pressure conditions are under development. (3-A)