

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 14, 2000

TO: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: D. F. Owen, D. J. Grover, RFETS Site Representatives
SUBJECT: RFETS Activity Report for the Week Ending July 14, 2000

Work Planning and Control. Our report of June 30, 2000 noted several occurrences indicating continued problems with conduct of operations and work control at RFETS. One example discussed was a worker inadvertently cutting and rupturing a branch line for a fire sprinkler system during demolition of a wall to support removal of a pump in a cooling tower facility. It was revealed that the hazard analysis done for the job addressed general hazards only and neither defined the basic steps of the work nor analyzed specific hazards and controls as required by the RFETS Integrated Work Control Program (IWCP). This work was being performed under the direction of the Kaiser-Hill Construction group.

Following inquiries on this occurrence by Kaiser-Hill management, DOE-RFFO and the site reps., Kaiser-Hill concluded that hazard analysis and development and implementation of controls as required by the IWCP were suspect for the activities under the Kaiser-Hill Construction group. Management and supervision in the Kaiser-Hill Construction group had demonstrated a lack of understanding of IWCP requirements. As a result, Kaiser-Hill called for a stand-down of these construction activities on July 12, 2000. Kaiser-Hill has directed immediate IWCP training for management and supervisors and has developed the criteria by which existing work planning packages will be assessed for adequacy prior to allowing individual activities to proceed. (1-C)

Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System (PuSPS) Construction. During a walkdown in preparation for installation of several components into the PuSPS, it was discovered that one of the components, a helium isolation valve, had already been installed. This installation was performed without completion of the work package governing the installations as required by the IWCP. The Kaiser-Hill Construction group (noted above) is also responsible for this work. Follow-up by Kaiser-Hill revealed that this may not be an isolated case. DOE-RFFO and Kaiser-Hill management are determining the extent of such failure to follow established work control processes including the degree of supervision/management involvement and any implications to configuration management of the PuSPS. The site reps. will follow this issue closely. (1-C)

Recommendation 94-1 Milestones. The site reps. reviewed the Kaiser-Hill 2006 Closure Project Baseline schedule submitted to DOE-RFFO in late June 2000 to assess incorporation of milestones in the DOE Implementation Plan for Recommendation 94-1. The completion dates given for several Recommendation 94-1 activities in the Baseline schedule did not align with the DOE Implementation Plan milestones. Kaiser-Hill management stated that a change to the closure project completion date in the scheduling software had shifted all the interim activity dates and that Kaiser-Hill did not check these dates against the milestones. Kaiser-Hill management stated that the Baseline schedule will be revised to correct this oversight. (3-A)
cc: Board Members