

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 19, 1999

**TO:** G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director

**FROM:** R. Arcaro and M. Sautman, Hanford Site Representatives

**SUBJ:** Activity Report for the Week Ending November 19, 1999

A. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP): Polycube testing has fallen 5 weeks behind schedule. PFP intends to focus near term testing on surface area and carbon monoxide issues to support a “go/no go” decision in December. An additional 4-6 weeks of testing would then be performed to optimize process parameters. Hopefully, PFP will be able to generate enough data to resolve any safety issues. However, the adequacy of their testing strategy is hard to determine since criteria like “adequate but limited number of testing” are vague. (3-A)

B. River Protection Project: Mr. Arcaro met with representatives from the Office of River Protection to discuss waste feed delivery and the integration between the Lockheed Martin Hanford Company (LMHC) responsible for feed and BNFL, Inc. responsible for waste processing. Integrated Product Teams (IPT) and Interface Control Documents (ICD) provide the basis by which integration activities are accomplished. As a result, LMHC is kept informed of feed requirements as BNFL progresses in their design of waste processing facilities. Likewise, BNFL is informed when feed requirements could be better optimized from the perspective of LMHC. Project logic diagrams, whose development began while responding to Board Recommendation 92-4, include the activities of both LMHC and BNFL. A new integration tool currently being developed is the ICD Bridge Schedule where activities or milestones that have prerequisite activities by one contractor and successor activities by the other contractor are flagged such that each contractor’s impact on the other can be managed. These integration activities will be challenged in the near future. Acceleration of the low activity waste vitrification facility design by BNFL has caused them to consider a major revision to the feed requirements imposed on LMHC. (3-A)

C. Spent Nuclear Fuel Project (SNFP): DOE completed its combined Phase I and II Verification of the SNFP’s Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS). The verification team recommended to the DOE-RL Manager that the SNFP ISMS Description be approved pending correction of findings. Primary among the findings was how construction projects were incorporated in the SNFP ISMS. Additionally, the project’s chemical management system requires significant improvement in the areas of storage and inventory control. (1-C)

D. Meeting with General Accounting Office (GAO): Mr. Arcaro met with representatives from the GAO who were at Hanford evaluating the ISMS programs. Mr. Arcaro described the staff’s review activities and discussed concerns with the pace and effectiveness of ISMS implementation at Hanford.

cc: Board members