

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

June 16, 2000

TO: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director

FROM: D. F. Owen, D. J. Grover, RFETS Site Representatives

SUBJECT: RFETS Activity Report for the Week Ending June 16, 2000

Building 371. Kaiser-Hill performed an evaluation to determine whether the multiple Administrative Control (AC) program deficiencies in Building 371 impacted the building's safety basis (see site rep. report of March 10, 2000). This week DOE-RFFO approved the Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) determination declaring a historical USQ because of the change to facility condition and inadequate compliance with AC programs. DOE-RFFO agreed that a current USQ does not exist due to recent actions taken by Kaiser-Hill. (3-A)

Radiological Alarm Response. There have been several recent contamination events where improper response to alarms resulted in a spread of contamination in the facility and to personnel. In Building 371, during a radiological air monitor alarm, workers walked around the perimeter of the room past two doors into the radiological buffer area (RBA) to the normally used exit. In this case, as well as another recent event, the contaminated workers then proceeded to remove anti-contamination clothing under the supervision of a similarly contaminated radiation control technician (RCT). In both cases, workers received skin contamination likely due to the doffing process. In Building 707, one of two salt residue workers received a positive alarm when monitoring his hands for contamination. The worker then removed the contaminated glove and both workers walked to the RCT stationed at the RBA entrance. These actions spread contamination along their path and into the adjacent RBA resulting in contamination of two other individuals' shoes. In discussions with DOE-RFFO, the site reps. noted the apparent need to reinforce proper radiological alarm response with personnel (i.e., immediately leave any hazardous areas, limit further movement, and wait for RCT response). (1-C)

Authorization Basis Revision Efforts. Kaiser-Hill has identified their intention to revise each of the major nuclear facility authorization basis documents during the next several months to better define required safety controls and key safety programs based on safety analyses consistent with the site closure mission. DOE-RFFO and Kaiser-Hill have come to agreement on the overall approach for safety analysis and identification of controls for these revision efforts using the key governing DOE Orders and Standards. DOE-RFFO issued a summary of these agreements and commitments this week. The site reps. and staff discussed use of these approaches for the Building 371 Basis for Interim Operation revision effort. (1-C)

Emergency Preparedness: The site reps. have observed two site-wide drills conducted in preparation for the RFETS annual emergency preparedness exercise, "READY 2000," scheduled for June 21, 2000. The drills involved a simulated fire and a drum explosion in Buildings 707 and 374, respectively. Improvements were generally evident in control of personnel in areas with potential airborne contamination (a problem noted last year during "READY 1999"). (1-C)

New DOE-RFFO Manager. Barbara A. Mazurowski reported on-site this week.