

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

March 10, 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director

FROM: T. Dwyer and H. Waugh, Pantex Site Representatives

SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending March 10, 2000

DNFSB Activity Summary: T. Dwyer was on site all week. H. Waugh was able to work part-time Thursday and Friday. C. Coones, J. Deplitch, J. Fingerlos, M. Forsbacka, C. Martin, and OE R. West were on site Tuesday-Thursday reviewing W76/W88 safety bases. W. Andrews was on site Tuesday-Wednesday for staff discussions on Recommendation 98-2. D. Burnfield and W. Linzau were on site Wednesday-Thursday for the ISMSV Team Orientation.

W76/W88 Program Safety Bases: On Tuesday, AAO approved the *W76 D&I Operations HAR* (Revision 1) and *ABCD* (Revision 1), with 4 Conditions of Approval. The first 3 conditions have to do with combustible loading and use of combustible liquids. [The 4th condition involves use of electrical isolators during W76 hoisting operations.] This is significant, since fire in a bay or cell is one of the dominant accidents scenarios evaluated in the weapons specific safety bases. Inadequacies in the controls developed to deal with W76 D&I Program fire hazards included the fact that combustibles associated with weapon components are not routinely included in the analyses. Additionally, combustibles considered were conservatively estimated to consist of a “one day supply” for use on a unit -- yet the process is designed to allow disassembly of 2 or 3 units at a time. Other combustibles may also be in the bay, equipment interlock, cell, or vestibule, but controls to limit the amounts of material present or to keep them separate from process combustibles appear limited. Similar issues exist with the [draft] revision to the W88 HAR/ABCD, so M&H postponed delivery to allow for rework.^[II.A]

Readiness Issues: The W76 D&I Program contractor Readiness Assessment is scheduled to begin on Monday. However, the Plan of Action (POA) for this review has yet to be approved by DOE-AL, and the Implementation Plan for this review therefore remains to be completed. The Conditions of Approval on the W76 authorization basis, as imposed by AAO [see above], do not have to be satisfied until initiation of the DOE Readiness Assessment. Finally, W76 demonstrations will not take place in the bay in which WR operations will actually occur. In total, these may impair the quality of the W76 Readiness Assessment.^[II.A]

Sitewide Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs): Monday morning, March 13th, at 0001 CST, site operations will shift from *Pantex Critical Safety Systems Manual* (MNL-1101) control to Sitewide Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) control. The last of the 21 pre-start findings identified in the M&H Readiness Assessment were closed today, and corrective actions plans have been developed to address the 6 post-start findings. The AAO review of operations under the new TSRs will be conducted in 2 parts. Beginning March 27th, a subset of the AAO review team will dedicate the week to validating the closure packages and corrective action plans from the M&H Readiness Assessment. The following week, the full review team will validate contractor implementation of the new TSRs under a Readiness Assessment format.^[II.A]

Lightning Issues: The latest version of the Lightning Basis for Interim Operations (BIO) Module was delivered to AAO this week. A copy has been obtained for Board's staff review.^[II.A]