

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

April 27, 2001

TO: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: Paul F. Gubanc and David T. Moyle, Oak Ridge Site Representatives
SUBJ: Activity Report for Week Ending April 27, 2001

Staff member Yeniscavich was at Y-12 to observe an NNSA/DP Quality Assurance review.

A. Y-12 Hydrogen Fluoride Supply System (HFSS): Late last week, BWXT attempted to finalize comment resolution on the HFSS process description section of the Building 9212 Basis for Interim Operation (BIO). A multi-disciplinary meeting was held and thoughtful comments were given. Most of the issues YAO raised, however, were deferred until a later date. Some of these items include the requirement for PC-2 versus PC-3 equipment on the dock, the use of welded tubing versus industry recommended flex hoses for cylinder connections, and the total number of HF cylinders that will be allowed on the dock. Furthermore, without the accident analysis and a final list of safety controls, the process description cannot be finalized. While the meeting was useful in engaging several different organizations in productive dialog, the HFSS sections of the BIO still require significant work, and the process description will likely require future revision. (2-A)

B. Y-12 Disassembly: This Tuesday, BWXT commenced their Readiness Assessment (RA) for the upcoming disassembly campaign. The RA team is very capable and should give a thorough review based on our prior experience with them. Performance demonstrations have been delayed by repeated difficulties with properly testing lifting fixtures and minor procedure changes. These problems are symptomatic of the lack of attention to detail identified during the recent Reduction ORR and BWXT ISM assessment. The same experienced manager who spearheaded the restart preparations for Reduction (through daily, personal involvement) has now been detailed to the equipment testing and inspection group to assist them. The BWXT RA is expected to run through next week. (2-A)

C. Y-12 Field Presence: The March 2001 BWXT ISM assessment concluded "where line management demonstrated a combination of accountability and technical competence integrated with supervision and presence, ISM performance and effectiveness were notable." A review of access records for Y-12 for January through March 2001, and discussions with management reveal:

1. The YAO Facility Reps continue to spend considerable time in their facilities and have a strong command of on-going activities and performance weaknesses. YAO has implemented a process of measuring field time of all its technical staff on a monthly basis.
2. Key EUO personnel (e.g., Manager, Ops Manager, Chief Engineer, Criticality Safety Officer) spent considerable time in the process areas; a fact recognized and appreciated by their staffs.
3. Safety and authorization basis managers rarely enter the areas where HEU is handled. Some enter the west end of the plant (i.e., where most production operations are) less than weekly.
4. The nine senior BWXT line, safety and quality managers spent less than seven hours combined in HEU areas over the three month period. (The YAO Manager alone had over four hours.)

While we strongly agree with management that these statistics are not sufficient of themselves and need to be understood in the context of assigned duties, we do believe this is an important indicator and that field observation can reveal much about the problems plaguing an operation. (1-C)

D. Y-12 Strategic Plan: BWXT recently issued a Y-12 strategic plan which extends out to 2015. We will review this plan with the headquarters staff in the context of Board issues. (2-A)
cc: Board Members