DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 22, 2002

TO: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director

FROM: D. F. Owen, RFETS Site Representative

SUBJECT: RFETS Activity Report for the Week Ending February 22, 2002

Board members J. T. Conway, A. J. Eggenberger and J. E. Mansfield and staff members J. J. McConnell, R. E. Tontodonato and R. E. Kasdorf visited RFETS this week. Staff member C. M. Coones and outside expert D. Boyd also visited RFETS to observe the conduct of safety system assessments being conducted in response to Recommendation 2000-2.

Board Visit. The Board members reviewed the progress of plutonium processing activities being conducted under Recommendation 94-1, RFETS efforts to sustain and improve implementation of Integrated Safety Management under Recommendation 95-2, and the increased use of engineered controls for RFETS nuclear facility decommissioning activities. The Board members also observed operation of the Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System in Building 371. (1-C)

Recommendation 2000-2. DOE-RFFO started the detailed (Phase II) assessments of the confinement ventilation and fire protection systems in Building 371. During the confinement ventilation system walk-downs, the Phase II assessment team identified several small (up to 0.5 inch) holes in the ventilation system duct-work between the last stage of credited filters and ventilation exhaust fans. During the fire protection system walk-downs, the team identified that several sprinkler heads were incorrectly installed; the downward oriented (or "pendant") design sprinklers heads were installed in an upright orientation and vice versa. For both safety system deficiencies, Kaiser-Hill suspended operations in the affected areas, issued external reports, and initiated repair actions. Kaiser-Hill is also taking action to determine any further incidence of these deficiencies at RFETS. At week's end, the team was pursuing other issues and intends to complete the Phase II assessments during the week of February 25th. The site rep. and staff will continue to follow these assessments. (1-C)

Inner Tent Chamber (ITC) Development. As previously reported on November 2, 2001 Kaiser-Hill had been developing third-generation ITCs for use in Building 771 and in Building 776 to perform size reduction of highly contaminated gloveboxes and related equipment. These ITCs are larger and provide enhanced confinement and ventilation features over the second generation ITC to ensure further reduction of the airborne contamination environment for workers. This week, Board member Mansfield, the site rep. and staff observed size reduction operations on the first contaminated glovebox in the new ITC in Building 771. (3-B)

cc: Board Members