

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 8, 2002

TO: K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: D. Grover and M. Sautman, Hanford Site Representatives
SUBJ: Activity Report for the Week Ending November 8, 2002

Spent Nuclear Fuel Project (SNFP): The DOE Operational Readiness Review (ORR) for the Fuel Transfer System to remove fuel from K-East to K-West Basin commenced on November 6, 2002. The primary activity this week was a emergency preparedness drill. The site rep observed the Incident Command Post operations and noted that the responders were not the individuals identified in the facility's approved emergency response watchbill for that shift. In the post drill critique it was identified that the SNFP had developed an alternate watchbill specifically for the drill rather than use the normal shift staffing. It should be noted that the primary drill watchbill responders were the same used during the contractor ORR. The individual acting as the building emergency director was the most experienced shift operation manager (SOM) who now acts as the facility work control manager and the facility radcon manger acted as the hazard assessor. Normally these positions are held by the on-duty SOM and the shift radcon supervisor. The ORR team is aware of this situation and is evaluating the staffing of previous drills. (III-A)

Unreviewed Safety Questions (USQ): As a result of recent inadequate USQ determinations and Board staff concerns with implementation of the USQ rule and guidance (see 10/18/02 report), the Department of Energy (DOE) - Richland directed Fluor Hanford (FH) to develop a corrective action plan and integrate FH's guidance document into the DOE-approved procedure. (I-C)

A recent revision of the Central Waste Complex (CWC) Fire Hazards Analysis (an action from their Phase II Assessment) led to the declaration of a Potential Inadequacy in the Safety Analysis since the presence of combustible liquids and plastic absorbents in lab pack containers could impact the consequences of a fire. This is the same configuration used for the Plutonium Finishing Plant's plutonium organic solution item which EM-1 assured the Board as recently as November 1 could "be safely stored there [at CWC]." A USQ evaluation and a fire surveillance have been initiated. (I-C, III-A)

Rec. 2000-2: As a result of the staff's meeting with DOE-RL senior management last week, FH is making major revisions to their systems engineering program. (I-B)

Rec. 95-2: The Site Rep met with FH senior management to discuss their FY2002 Integrated Safety Management System review and FY2003 performance objectives. While FH's program is improving, the various assessment programs could be better integrated so that crosscutting issues could be identified easier (especially since FH still has not developed their collective significance process yet). Furthermore, the program would benefit from more emphasis on reviewing the quality of their assessments and the effectiveness of their corrective actions. (I-C)

Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP): PFP began thermally stabilizing Pu alloys. (III-A)