DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 5, 2002

TO: K. Fortenberry, Technical Director

FROM: D. Grover and M. Sautman, Hanford Site Representatives

SUBJ: Activity Report for the Week Ending July 5, 2002

Mr. Sautman was on leave this week. Mr. Stokes was onsite Monday and Tuesday reviewing various topics associated with the Waste Treatment Plant. Mr. Grover was out of the office on Thursday and Friday.

Spent Nuclear Fuel Project (SNFP): The Cold Vacuum Drying Facility is preparing a Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) to resolve complications with TSR compliance due to the continued storage of Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) 63. The facility must enter the shutdown mode to perform several TSR required calibrations. However, the TSRs do not allow the facility to enter the shutdown mode while containing an MCO. The JCO is expected to allow a one time deviation from the second TSR condition to support the upcoming July maintenance outage, the MCO 63 leak test failure is expected to be resolved prior to initiating the October maintenance outage. (III-A)

T-Plant: DOE-Richland (RL) line management discussed their intention to require the contractor to demonstrate revised cleanliness controls and the fuel canister closure process for the DOE Operational Readiness Review (ORR) team. This is to increase confidence that the T-Plant process can produce a quality seal in light of recent problems with the MCO sealing process. The site rep discussed the advisability of simulating all crane movements needed to load four fuel elements so the amount of debris falling from the crane that could interfere with the seal is similar to operating conditions. In addition, it may be helpful to inspect the seal after these crane movements, but before the seal plug is inserted to obtain a better understanding of how this material accumulates on the canister sealing surface. (III-A)

Fluor Hanford Fire Protection Program: DOE-RL concluded an assessment of the Fluor Hanford (FH) fire protection program this week. The assessment identified that FH was using hot work permits and are inspecting, testing, and maintaining fire protection systems in accordance with NFPA and DOE requirements among the good practices. However, 9 issues with the fire protection program were also identified. Among these are that the facility documented safety analyses and fire hazards are not fully integrated, Fire Hazard Analyses (FHA) and FHA implementation needs improvement, combustible controls in facilities are often too vague or non-existent, some fire protection assessments are out of date (eg. K-East and K-West facility assessments), fire safety related exemptions and equivalencies are not reevaluated during periodic assessments to ensure that they are still valid, the master plan for site wide water system does not address future fire water demands, priorities, and vulnerabilities for fire suppression systems that are important to safety, and water supplies for fire protection systems are not controlled with the same formality as internal fire systems. (I-C)

cc: Board Members