

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 1, 2006

TO: K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: R. Quirk and W. Linzau, Hanford Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Activity Report for the Week Ending December 1, 2006

Washington Closure Hanford (WCH): The site reps attended a critique of an event in which a lapel air sampler used during mechanical disassembly activities in Building 327 indicated elevated contamination levels. The air sampler worn by one worker indicated that the airborne contamination level would result in 87 DAC-hrs. The workers in the area were not wearing respiratory protection because radiological planners anticipated minimal airborne contamination and local HEPA filtration (HEPA vacuum) was employed during cutting operations. Bioassay samples of the involved worker are being analyzed to check for internal contamination and the results should be available in about 10 days. The work consisted of disassembly of tubing and cutting of shafts attached to the exterior of the hot cells in the facility and it appears appropriate monitoring for contamination was performed. The source of the airborne contamination has not yet been determined but the project plans to conduct extensive surveys of the work area and the tools used to do this work. The project has not submitted an Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS) report yet because management wants to wait for the results of the bioassay, but it seems appropriate to submit a report in the interim as a management concern.

Waste Treatment Plant (WTP): The Office of River Protection (ORP) conducted an assessment of the life-safety requirements and fire sprinkler installation in the Low Activity Waste (LAW) facility. The LAW facility recently had the exterior siding installed and ORP took this opportunity to verify adequate protection of the construction workers and the installed capital assets. A number of observations were noted, including the lack of a periodic test of emergency lighting. In October the site rep questioned if emergency lighting was adequate to allow safe egress during a loss of normal power. During the ORP assessment the project conducted and ORP observed a qualitative test of emergency lighting and found it to be acceptable.

New Hanford Contracts: The draft Request for Proposals (RFPs) for the three new prime contractor contracts have been released for comment. The draft Plateau Remediation and Mission Support contracts do not list DOE M 450.4-1, Integrated Safety Management System Manual, as an applicable directive. In addition, the draft Mission Support contract does not list DOE O 425.1C, 433.1, or 5480.20A Change 1. The site rep queried Richland Operations about these omissions and was told that DOE M 450.4-1 will be added but the others were not required because the Mission Support contract does not include the operation of any nuclear facilities.

K Basin Closure: The project continues to experience problems with the hose-in-hose transfer system (see Hanford Activity Report 11/24/06). Container suction pump P-113 appears to be working correctly after removing the debris last week but there was inadequate suction pressure at the downstream K East booster pump, P-112. Debris was flushed from the hose between these pumps. The project collected floating debris from above open sludge containers 101 and 102 but has yet to establish an adequate foreign material exclusion program.