

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 29, 2006

TO: K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: R. Quirk and W. Linzau, Hanford Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Activity Report for the Week Ending September 29, 2006

Mr. Linzau was out of the office this week.

K Basins Closure: Both Fluor Hanford, Inc. (FHI) and the Richland Operations Office (RL) declared that the hose-in-hose transfer system was ready for the DOE Operational Readiness Review. The contractor's manageable list of open items appeared to be acceptable.

The site rep noted that one of the two wire ropes used to suspend a heavy piece of debris in the K East basin had an annual inspection due date of June 2006. The inspection had not been performed and project personnel subsequently determined that of the 30 wire ropes in K East, six were past due for their inspections, five more would expire this week, and nine more will expire next month. FHI will develop a recall program for the slings to ensure future compliance with the annual inspection requirements of the hoisting and rigging manual.

300 Area: The site rep discussed the radiological hazards associated with the planned demolition of Building 327 with Washington Closure Hanford nuclear safety and operations personnel and the facility representative. The draft Documented Safety Analysis for the demolition was recently submitted to DOE. Plans are to begin demolition in 12 months. During a walkdown of the facility the site rep identified opportunities to improve both radiological and industrial safety.

DOE Headquarters' Oversight: In the outbrief for the Office of Safety and Security's review of environment, safety and health and emergency management of the waste stabilization and disposition activities, the inspection team concluded that only one of the Integrated Safety Management System core requirements, defining the scope of work, was fully adequate. The team noted that management attention was required for the other four core functions. The team also identified that the engineering design and authorization bases for T Plant were significant weaknesses. Both RL and FHI are evaluating the draft report and may challenge some of the preliminary conclusions during the factual accuracy process.

In the outbrief for the headquarters review of the FHI criticality safety program, the review team noted that the criticality safety program for the FHI projects had improved significantly since the last major inspection in 2003 and there were no findings. Both strengths and opportunities for improvement were noted.

Solid Waste Operations Complex: The site rep observed the safe retrieval of the last deteriorated 55-gallon drums from Burial Ground 218-W-4C (see Hanford Activity Report 8/11/06). Additional controls, such as larger clam-shells for handling the damaged drums, were used to ensure that the work was done safely. Several of the inner 30-gallon drums were also found to be significantly damaged, but none of the plastic bags in these drums were breached.