

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 29, 2003

TO: K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: D. Grover and M. Sautman, Hanford Site Representatives
SUBJ: Activity Report for the Week Ending August 29, 2003

Messrs. Ogg and Winters were onsite reviewing the transuranic waste retrieval project.

Spent Nuclear Fuel Project (SNFP): At the end of July DOE Richland (DOE-RL) transmitted a letter to Fluor Government Group requesting information to support Fluor Hanford's approach to resolve problems with the Sludge Water System (SWS) in a manner that will not jeopardize the overall SNFP project baseline. This week DOE-RL transmitted a second letter to Fluor Government Group stating that the response to the previous letter was unacceptable in that the identification of issues and the recommended resolution were not adequate as well as a validated baseline schedule was not provided. DOE-RL has directed Fluor to develop plans to pause non-safety basis or safety related work on the SWS project as well as providing other information to support halting work on other aspects of the SNFP. (III-A)

In reviewing modification to the integrated water treatment system, it was identified that the controls for prevention of criticality identified in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) were not consistent with the criticality analysis. This represents another concern, along with the recent issues identified with the Fuel Transfer System and SWS, with the configuration management and technical bases development for the safety basis at the SNFP for existing operations as well as new projects. (I-C)

Tank Farms: The first batch of reacted oxalic acid/waste was transferred from C-106 to AN-106 and operators began adding the second batch of acid. Videos of the first additions showed minor off-gassing of carbon dioxide. Respiratory protection continued to be used in C Farm to address some of the organic vapors issues that were the subject of a stop work last week. (III-A)

Waste Treatment Plant: Based on testing results, Bechtel National Inc. (BNI) released the use of certain concrete mixes for upcoming placements. However, the placement planned for Wednesday night was cancelled after testing found approximately 0.75 percent fly ash in cement taken from the construction site. While this still met ASTM insoluble residue limits, the batch plant operator decided to remove the cement from one of their silos and replace it with cement direct from the supplier. Additional actions are being taken to reduce the chance of future cross-contamination. Finally, two 56-day test cylinders of 5000 psi compressive strength concrete were found to still be below 5000 psi.

The Site Rep accompanied BNI and Office of River Protection engineers on a walkdown to identify where core samples will be taken next week to evaluate subsidence. The locations chosen appeared to be appropriate based on the amount of visible surface cracking. (I-C)

cc: Board Members