

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

June 8, 2007

TO: K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: R. Quirk and W. Linzau, Hanford Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Activity Report for the Week Ending June 8, 2007

Tank Farms: A locked and tagged shut valve was found out of position in the AW tank farm. The valve was tagged shut to fulfill a Technical Safety Requirement administrative control to prevent exposures to workers in the 242-A evaporator facility during maintenance. This valve and 11 other valves had their remote operators disconnected during maintenance activities last year, but 11 of the 12 operators were not correctly reconnected during system restoration. These errors were only discovered incidentally during an unrelated activity in the tank farm.

Independent reviewers, R. Kennedy and A. Veletsos, were in town to review the actions taken to address their previous comments and recommendations regarding the latest seismic analysis of the double-shell tanks (DSTs). They indicated that many of their previous comments were adequately addressed but some of their comments did not have complete closure. The reviewers are to provide a final report within 30 days, and the project has committed to address their remaining concerns prior to raising the existing operating level in any additional DSTs.

K Basins Closure (KBC): The Richland Operations Office (RL) determined that a Fluor Hanford, Inc. (FHI) management self-assessment with RL oversight is the appropriate level of readiness assessment for using divers in the basins. The site rep and members of the Board's staff reviewed a work package for using divers for debris removal and noted some inadequacies in the scope of work, hazards assessment, and selected safety controls.

Waste Stabilization and Disposition Project (WSD): RL sent a letter to FHI instructing them to revise the level of readiness review for burial ground 218-E-12B to a contractor Readiness Assessment (RA) from the previously planned DOE Operational Readiness Review (ORR). The RA is to be conducted by FHI with oversight from a RL line management review team. The basis cited by RL in the letter was the additional experience that the contractor has or will gain in related work activities. RL concluded that the start of work at the 12B burial ground no longer constitutes the "restart of a Hazard Category 2 activity following substantial modification" as RL wrote in a letter to FHI on February 5, 2007. The graded DOE ORR appeared to be the appropriate level of review per DOE Order 425.1C and the basis given in the letter does not appear to justify the reduced level of review. A DOE ORR can provide a valuable independent review that would be absent in a contractor RA.

A worker sustained a contaminated puncture wound through a glove in the drum repackaging glovebox at the Waste Receiving and Processing (WRAP) facility. The amount of internal contamination was minimal with initial readings of 0.04 nCi Americium. The puncture occurred when the worker was moving debris that had a shard of glass hidden within it. The glass shard penetrated the glovebox glove (30 mil thick) and two surgeon's gloves the worker was wearing. The project committed to reevaluate the hazards at this station in the glovebox and implement appropriate controls to prevent recurrence.