

**From:**  
**To:** <andrewt@dnfsb.gov>, <catherinef@dnfsb.gov>, <gloriaj@dnfsb.gov>  
**Date:** 7/30/2011 9:29 AM  
**Subject:** [Public Comments to DOE RESPONSE/Recommendation 2011-1/Safety Culture] Safety-Related procurements at WTP

George E. Ferriter sent a message using the contact form at <http://www.dnfsb.gov/website-tools/contact>.

As this is my second e-mail on this topic, I will not reintroducemyself, save by stating that I am a nuclear industry professional with over 30 years of service in various aspects of nuclear energy realated business. I have a very specific concern, that in a broader sense reflects directly on the issue of nuclear safety culture at WTP - from the DOE to principal subcontractors. The procurement of safety-critical equipment must be accomplished via deployment of the most rigorous standards of site safety evaluation, a technical analysis. While as a DOE site, Hanford may not of necessity need to comply with 10CFR50.59 directly, the essence and intent must certainly be applicable. As a case in point - a case where a lax safety culture has incrementall degraded site safety - centers upon the apparent selection ofGas Turbine Generators for Emergency Onsite Power supplies. While gas Turbine driven generators are remarkable machines, they are not suitable for an application where prompt and reliable power is necessary. The sluggish starting interval may be glossed over by specification revisions, but the fact remains that in certain casualty conditions, immediate power to critical safety systems is necessary. Introducing a 30 - 100 second lag in that response would certainly create multiple safety system impacts, and over-all represents the incremental degradation of site nuclear safety that is the matter of concern here. As voiced by several others on these pages, this decision was based fundamentally upon commercial issues. This is wrong, and potentially dangerous.

Best,,  
Feorge Ferriter  
Wisconsin