

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 2, 2024

**TO:** Timothy J. Dwyer, Technical Director  
**FROM:** L. Lin, Z.C. McCabe, and E.P. Richardson, Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending August 2, 2024

**H-Canyon:** During heavy rain, a truck driver deviated from normal protocol and backed up with the truck's hoist raised. The hoist impacted and pulled down an energized electrical cable which fell on the truck and a nearby skid, after which the driver exited the vehicle. A nearby construction worker observed the incident and made initial notifications. Responding personnel isolated the area and secured power to the live cable by opening the feeder breaker. No personnel were injured during this event.

**Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF):** An operator failed to stop the Decontamination Waste Treatment Tank (DWTT) transfer pump at two procedural stopping points (expected final level and high-level stopping criteria). This caused the Recycle Collection Tank (RCT) to reach the high-level alarm point, which tripped the pump interlock and secured the transfer. Prior to the transfer from the DWTT, operations personnel also performed a different transfer into the RCT after the final volume for the DWTT transfer was determined, which invalidated the previous calculation and contributed to the issue.

**L-Area:** L-area personnel committed a series of administrative errors while performing surveillances on calibrated measurement equipment. These errors resulted in the work being re-performed three times to ensure associated documentation was correct prior to satisfactorily meeting the surveillance requirement. In addition, the team conducted an informal pre-job brief due to not understanding the requirement to conduct a formal pre-job brief for technical safety requirement (TSR) surveillances.

**Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF):** SWPF has two portable plant air compressors that perform a credited safety function upon loss of normal plant air. During the day shift, the shift manager (SM) entered a Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) limiting condition for operation (LCO) for one of the air compressors being out of service while work was to be performed on it to adjust a fitting. Maintenance informed the SM that they had completed the work. The SM dispatched operations personnel to perform a surveillance on what they believed to be the adjusted compressor and then exited the LCO. During the night shift, SWPF personnel planned to adjust the fitting on the other compressor. However, maintenance found that this had already been completed. They took a timeout and received permission from the SM to proceed with the work on the unadjusted compressor. SWPF personnel did not change the work package and were in LCO condition A for one air compressor being out of service. Since both compressors were out of service at this time, SWPF personnel should have entered LCO condition B. The SM entered LCO condition B later and all completion times were met. Though each compressor was labeled, maintenance had performed work on the wrong air compressor during the day shift.

**Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL):** SRNL personnel implemented revision 3 of the Documented Safety Analysis and Technical Safety Requirements. SRNL management have instituted a plan for a period of deliberate operations for selected new safety basis controls with varying levels of oversight based on the expected frequency of performance and complexity.