

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

May 5, 2023

TO: Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director
FROM: B. Caleca, P. Fox, N. Huntington, and P. Meyer, Resident Inspectors
SUBJECT: Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending May 5, 2023

Fuels Facilities: The contractor conducted a Joint Evaluation Team (JET) meeting to identify proposed approaches for startup of the Capsule Storage Area (CSA) facility for receipt and storage of cask storage system assemblies, and for the welding of multi-cannister overpacks at the Canister Storage Building (CSB). The JET determined that a DOE operational readiness review is required for the CSA facility. The JET did not reach a conclusion on a proposed start-up approach for the welding activities at CSB. The decision will be made after additional analysis is performed.

Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR): A work team was replacing a pressure safety valve (PSV) and discharge hose in the TSCR process enclosure after a leak was found on a fitting (see 3/24/23 report). After the hose was disconnected, caps were installed on the exposed joints for contamination control purposes. This inadvertently caused a decrease in sweep air, resulting in a limiting condition for operation action entry. To place the area in a safe configuration, the work team removed the caps and installed the new hose and PSV per the work instructions. An event investigation was held by the contractor and determined that the work package did not provide the steps to install the caps. In addition, at a previous team planning meeting, direction was provided to not place a cap on the ion-exchange column hose, however there were changes in team personnel after that meeting was held, including the field work supervisor.

During a DOE review of a technical evaluation of a flow indicating transmitter, the tank operations contractor (TOC) discovered a technical safety requirement for ignition controls within the TSCR process enclosure had been violated. A worker had previously observed that the transmitter installed in the TSCR process lacked markings for the appropriate rating under NFPA 70[®], *National Electrical Code*[®]. The subsequent technical evaluation misinterpreted an exemption to the equipment rating and, as a result, the TSCR process continued to operate with an inappropriate flow indicating transmitter. After learning of the error, TOC management restricted access to the process, de-energized the transmitter, and intends to replace it with a compliant spare unit while they investigate the violation.

PUREX 205A Facility: A stop work was declared by contractor personnel performing asbestos abatement inside the 205A cold chemical building after workers questioned whether chemical compatibility evaluations had been made for the fixative called out in their work instructions. Management held a critique to formally address the issues with the job and worker concerns. The concern was initially raised because one work package for removing biohazards only allowed the use of water, while the one for asbestos abatement allows fixative to be used. That day, only the asbestos abatement work was performed, and only the use of water on the asbestos panels was discussed at the pre-job brief. However, the workers subsequently applied fixative as allowed by the work instructions resulting in the question regarding chemical compatibility.