

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 16, 2022

**TO:** Katherine R. Herrera, Acting Technical Director  
**FROM:** A. Boussouf and D. Gutowski, Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Los Alamos Activity Report for the Week Ending December 16, 2022

**Onsite Transportation:** Last Friday, Triad submitted their response to the NNSA Field Office regarding incorporating compensatory measures to increase the safety of onsite shipment of nuclear material while DOE reevaluates its approach for developing transportation safety documents complex-wide (see 10/14/2022 report). The Field Office's letter included a copious list of potential compensatory measures to evaluate for feasibility and impact. Triad's response stated that they completed an evaluation of potential compensatory measures and concluded that, in their opinion, they already perform such actions as part of normal transportation activities. Therefore, the response stated that the only change needed is to elevate such items into the controls in the Transportation Safety Document. The Field Office is evaluating the response.

**N3B–Stop Work:** Last Thursday, N3B management stopped work on all hoisting and rigging activities. While following up on questions from a DOE Headquarters assessment, N3B personnel determined that their program was not compliant with the DOE standard on hoisting and rigging. N3B personnel are currently reviewing job hazard analyses for activities using hoisting and rigging and performing a review of their program.

**Plutonium Facility–Criticality Safety:** On Thursday, facility personnel held a fact-finding meeting to discuss a Tuesday incident where glovebox workers introduced an item into a glovebox exceeding the mass limit on the criticality safety posting. Meeting participants noted there was a miscommunication when switching one glovebox worker with another who then assumed the glovebox contained no fissile material. Also, another worker transferring material from the intro hood into the glovebox line accidentally touched the receiving glove and their personal protective equipment was contaminated. Criticality safety personnel determined this was an analyzed upset condition, and workers restored the glovebox into compliance and returned it to operations. In order to prevent recurrence of similar events, facility personnel are evaluating corrective actions including splitting up cold entries from special nuclear material entries, using more senior persons in charge for jobs, and treating this entire glovebox train as one area for future moves.

**Emergency Management:** On Thursday, there was an emergency preparedness training drill at the emergency operations center. This served as a proficiency drill for several new emergency response organization personnel. The scenario involved a flanged tritium waste container (FTWC) transport vehicle accident caused by the driver taking an evasive maneuver to avoid a herd of elk in the road. The truck flipped over, and the contents of the FTWC were released into the atmosphere. The driver of the vehicle suffered injuries, including lacerations and a broken arm, and two elk were killed. Participants identified potential improvements including ensuring the proper identification of affected facilities for shelter-in-place actions (two were missed) and performing accountability of N3B personnel in the vicinity of the accident location.