

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

May 6, 2022

**TO:** Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director  
**FROM:** L. Lin, Z. C. McCabe, E. P. Richardson Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending May 6, 2022

**Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL):** The resident inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill at SRNL that consisted of a newly developed scenario involving a breached radiological waste container and a downed telephone pole. Several new BSRA personnel participated in the drill, which provided a valuable learning experience, however, the controller organization and the resident inspectors noted several areas for improvement. For instance, it took Radiological Protection Department nearly 40 minutes to arrive on the scene and set up the hot, warm, and cold zones for doffing the SRS Fire Department (SRSFD) of their bunker gear. Several things contributed to this delay. The players that reported the breached container to the shift operations manager (SOM) were new employees and did not recognize that the material was coming from a radiological waste container, a B-25. As a result, the SOM initially miscategorized the event. More probing questions by the SOM about the material on the ground, the container, and the location could have avoided this delay. Once the controller organization interjected about the contents of the waste, it still took nearly 15 minutes to establish the SRSFD doffing area. The cause for this additional delay stemmed from confusion in the Operations Support Center between the coordinator and the Radiological Protection Department (RPD) first line manager regarding who should dispatch RPD and concern over the number of RPD technicians available. The Technical Support Room experienced delays in receiving the emergency classification but was eventually able to verify the classification and to correct the information from a chemical to a radiological breach. They attempted to refine the source term but did not obtain enough information on the waste container to do so.

**L-Area:** While processing the first 20 Ton cask from the latest foreign reactor fuel campaign, a Time-out was called when the team realized, after beginning the movement, that the cask would impact the superstructure if they continued the approved path. Since the last time this type of cask was moved in 2009, crane components have been changed, resulting in a different cask height for the allowed crane height. The event, in addition to the numerous previous issues with this campaign (see 3/17/22, 3/25/22, and 4/8/22 reports), resulted in management declaring an ORPS 10(1)1 Management Concern and stopping all related work pending a fact finding.

The resident inspector observed a drill on 5/3/2022. The casualty response was satisfactory, but the facility was unable to complete full accountability due to errors made at the Central Alarm Station. The responding fire fighters were not able to communicate with the Incident Scene Commander outside of the building which indicates the need for radio repeaters in the building.

**Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF):** On 4/27/22, a Crane Operator was installing cell cover #24 over the Strip Effluent Feed Tank (SEFT) when it disengaged from the east hook of the yoke and fell approximately four feet into its normal position. The two crane operators performing the move used only one of the three available cameras for ensuring full engagement of the east hook. The event was declared as an ORPS 10(1)1 Management Concern.