

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

March 11, 2022

**TO:** Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director  
**FROM:** L. Lin, Z. C. McCabe, E. P. Richardson Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending March 11, 2022

**Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL):** The resident inspectors (RI) observed the formal pre-job brief and the evolution associated with the removal of radiological material from a glovebox via a radiological hood. The pre-job brief showed improvements from past observations, specifically with the thoroughness of the reverse pre-job briefing technique; however, there is still room for improvement. For instance, the work group did not discuss the technical work document they used for the actual evolution (a technical reference procedure) or the precautions and limitations listed within. After the pre-job brief had concluded, the manager present identified this weakness.

**H-Canyon:** The RI observed the removal of process blanks from the recycle water header as part of Accelerated Basin Deinventory preparations on 3/7/2022. Removing the process blanks required two gaskets to be removed from each of the existing flanges. The gaskets could not be confirmed to not be asbestos. Therefore, the work package was written to take the most conservative approach and implement full asbestos controls. Both work package construction and procedural compliance could be improved. The First Line Manager (FLM) stated that they knew that the gaskets were Teflon, and they shouldn't have to take asbestos controls; but since that was their current direction and the package was written that way, they would. However, they did not follow the "wet method" as is required twice in their package for the removal of any of the potential asbestos containing gaskets, though they were properly bagged and labeled. After the fact, the FLM stated that they should have sprayed the gaskets with water during removal. Additionally, one step was performed out of order, though it did not impact safety of the evolution in this case. Furthermore, the inspection of flange faces prior to gasket re-installation (as required by the work package and engineering guide) was cursory by both mechanics present. A DOE Facility Representative was present and shared the same concerns.

Over the course of the pandemic, many individuals became qualified for emergency response organization positions and were unable to participate in field drills. This presents a unique issue for the site regarding the lack of hands-on experience. This week, the resident inspector observed an emergency preparedness drill involving a process vessel vent explosion. This drill was part of the recently renewed effort reincorporating field play. The drill was successfully completed; however, the controller organization identified some areas for improvement. For instance, the Area Emergency Coordinator (AEC) had never used the Selective Signal Transmitter (SST) to communicate with the SRS Operations Center and did not know how to use the device. The controller organization took advantage of this coaching opportunity and others.

**L-Area:** The RI attended a pre-job brief for cask handling in the stack area. A previous shift started the evolution, but a timeout was called when an operator noticed an error in the procedure. The pre-job did not cover the pre-requisite steps that would need to be re-performed or the precautions and limitations in the procedure. The RI spoke with a DOE Facility Representative who noted that these were covered in the task preview just prior to the pre-job.