

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

January 7, 2022

TO: Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director
FROM: L. Lin, Z. C. McCabe, E. P. Richardson, Resident Inspectors
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending January 7, 2022

K-Area: In November 2021, personnel performing the initial testing of the new crane on the Criticality Control Overpack Pad for handling Transuranic Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACT-II) packages identified that the crane hook height was insufficient and did not offer enough clearance to complete the task. The modification traveler and statement of work were prepared back in 2017 and specified a crane hook height of 21 feet. This was discussed with both the Mobile Loading Unit that supports the National TRU Program and E-Area personnel. The intent was to design a crane based off the crane in E-Area that is also used for handling TRUPACT-II packages. SRNS personnel confirmed that the 21 feet design height was consistent with the minimum hook height design requirements in a National TRU Program document that specified a minimum crane hook height of 20.5 feet. However, this document had been superseded by guidance that stated the minimum crane hook height should be 20 feet and adjusted accordingly when using an inline load cell, which they would be using. After the issue in K-Area was identified, SRNS reviewed the E-Area as-built drawings and found that the actual E-Area crane hook height was 24 feet. SRNS personnel were unable to determine how they came to use dated guidance for the design of the new crane in K-Area. K-Area personnel are pursuing options for adjusting the crane hook height and load cell, planning to evaluate the modification traveler process to ensure the appropriate reviewers are included, and identifying any other gaps in interfaces, especially in instances where the criteria or procedures are from an outside organization.

Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF): While observing daily rounds at DWPF, a resident inspector noted that the barricades to the air compressor room were inconsistent. Each entrance was roped off with a sign that listed personal protective equipment (PPE) requirements for entering the space, but the signs listed different PPE requirements. The operator performing the rounds received clarification from the building manager that the PPE requirements on the barricade were only for when work was in progress, which was not occurring at the time, and was able to complete the rounds. The resident inspector discussed the different PPE requirements for entering the same space with the operator and the Shift Operations Manager.