

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 23, 2021

**TO:** Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Z. C. McCabe Resident Inspector  
**SUBJECT:** Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending July 23, 2021

**H-Canyon:** H-Canyon personnel were completing the weekly Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) surveillance on the safety class water monitor table. When H-Canyon personnel tested a low flow alarm on Table A, the alarm activated at 0.89 gallons per minute. The procedure required set point is 1.0 gpm with a range of +/- 0.1 gpm (more conservative than the TSRs). Although the actual value was recorded, the operator, quality assurance inspector present, first line manager, and shift technical engineer failed to identify that it was out of range. The shift operations manager (SOM) was reviewing the surveillance for completeness prior to exiting the limiting condition of operation (LCO) when he identified the issue. The issue review identified that “group think” and complacency associated with a weekly surveillance that is typically within range contributed to the error. H-Canyon personnel are developing corrective actions.

**L-Area:** L-Area personnel were lowering a spent fuel cask into the transfer pit using the crane when a piece of the cask contacted one of the empty fuel buckets. Prior to the job, the buckets were staged in the transfer pit for efficiency purposes; however, it is not necessary to do so, nor is it procedure directed. Just before the impact occurred, L-Area personnel stopped lowering the cask to move the bucket out of the way from contacting another piece of the cask. Discussions during an issue investigation revealed that several spotters were in-use, but several had their views obstructed by bubbles coming from the cask. Additionally, the underwater camera was in use, but the view of part of the bucket (a support ring just below the top) was obstructed by the top of the bucket. The actual damage to the cask was minimal if any. L-Area personnel are developing corrective actions which will likely include not pre-staging the buckets prior to placing the cask into the transfer pit. Additionally, L-Area management have noted the importance of line of sight to confirm travel paths are clear for suspended loads.

**Tank Farms:** SRR began the implementation verification review (IVR) of the Tank Closure Cesium Removal (TCCR) 1A this week. The scope of the IVR includes a field walkdown of several design modifications to the TCCR unit and interviews with facility personnel. The resident inspector observed the field walkdown. Planned TCCR operation is several months out.

**Emergency Management:** The SRNS Emergency Response Training & Evaluation Group held several training sessions with the Savannah River Site Fire Department on the new drill props and fire simulator equipment (smoke machine, weighted hose, and fire extinguisher). The group plans to use this equipment to improve the realism of future drills and exercises involving fires.

**Savannah River Tritium Enterprise (SRTE):** The SOM was adding a work package to an established lockout (L/O) when they realized that the electrical portion of the existing L/O had not been determined. Although, there was no electrical work included in the package, an electrical L/O of nearby equipment was included as a conservatism. The mechanical L/O was properly determined. No one had signed on to perform work at the time of discovery. When the SOM identified the issue, they called a timeout and notified the appropriate personnel.