

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 11, 2020

TO: Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and Z. C. McCabe, Resident Inspectors
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending December 11, 2020

235-F: The resident inspector (RI) observed SRNS remove the last seven drums of transuranic (TRU) waste. Two waste boxes containing air filters remain in 235-F, but assays have not conclusively determined if these are TRU or low-level waste. The RI also inspected where SRNS removed a leaking manipulator from Cell 1 and lead counterweights from most of the other cell manipulators (the lead is still needed for 3 manipulators to keep arms from swinging).

Emergency Preparedness: DOE-SR and NNSA have agreed to cancel or postpone all large scale drills and exercises until April 11, 2021. Tritium facilities will continue to perform drills that have minimum impact on site operations and conduct of operations drills will also continue. DOE requested that the contractor develop a schedule by January 19, 2021 to bring SRS back into full compliance with DOE Order 151.1D. The 2021 annual evaluated exercise will be conducted in September 2021. DOE is crediting the evaluated exercise conducted during the DOE Operational Readiness Review at the Salt Waste Processing Facility and an actual core Emergency Response Organization (ERO) activation for 2020's annual exercise. DOE expects the contractors will also utilize virtual ERO drills to ensure ERO qualifications are maintained.

Staffing: F/H Lab had one operator become unavailable last week. Subsequently, the remaining personnel on that shift including a shift operations manager (SOM), a SOM-in-training, two operators and two radiological control personnel became unavailable. F/H-Lab management was able to fill the positions of the unavailable staff over the last week with individuals on overtime. The original operator that became unavailable is expected to return to work next week.

Defense Waste Processing Facility: A lab technician began filling a 4 liter carboy with water inside an analytical cell. The worker became distracted and left the carboy unattended to go on a break. Normally, if the carboy was overfilled, the excess water would flow into a drain, but the hose fell out of the carboy allowing the water to flow through the transfer drawer tunnel, into a neighboring lab service room, and then into a radiological buffer area (RBA) corridor outside. When the worker noticed the spill ~1.5 hours later, the worker stopped the water flow, placed absorbent mats, and made notifications. The spill contaminated 3 shoes worn by the worker and a first line manager (3000 and 80,000 dpm $\beta\gamma$). The maximum contamination found in the RBA corridor was 500,000 dpm $\beta\gamma/100\text{ cm}^2$. Despite efforts to contain the spill and decontaminate, the floor will likely need to be replaced because contaminated water flowed underneath it.

The RI observed an oral board for a vitrification control room manager. Although the RI agreed with the board passing the candidate, the RI provided feedback on the oral board afterwards. The RI noted several instances where the candidate's first response was to read answers verbatim from the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) rather than to demonstrate their understanding of key concepts and facility facts on their own and to use references to confirm their answer afterwards. For example, while a candidate is not expected to memorize every TSR detail, they should be familiar with TSR violation criteria so they can recognize a violation.