

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 10, 2020

**TO:** Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director  
**FROM:** B. Caleca and P. Fox, Hanford Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending July 10, 2020

**Tank Farms:** During routine radiological surveys, Health Physics Technicians discovered contamination that exceeded posting levels in a small area on a gravel roadway near TY Tank Farm. No contamination was found on equipment that has been using the road during recent work. Based on the lack of alpha activity, the contractor determined that the contamination did not spread from the Plutonium Finishing Plant worksite and was most likely legacy contamination from historical activities in the area. The area was covered with a layer of gravel and posted as an underground radioactive material area pending cleanup of the contamination.

**Central Plateau Risk Management (CPRM):** The contractor performed a mockup to demonstrate the grout conveyance, camera systems, and mix designs that they will use to stabilize three underground structures identified to have a high risk of a collapse (see 5/8/2020 report). Attendees included the field office representatives and members of the contractor's Hazard Review Board.

**Waste Treatment Plant (WTP):** The WTP contractor has finished start-up testing of the WTP Analytical Laboratory. The contractor will now focus on training workers, developing procedures, and maintaining equipment to support future operations. This week, there were two operational occurrences that highlight the need for deliberate entry into operations. In the first case, a worker improperly entered a laboratory room that, because of ongoing chemical activities, was posted "Restricted Access, Do Not Enter." In a second case, an audible flow detection alarm for a hood was found inoperable because of improper programming. The problem was discovered when a chemist observed visual indicators that showed ventilation for the hood was being disrupted. They subsequently determined that the cause of the disruption was the placement of a portable continuous air monitor that was not in use. In both cases, individuals within the affected laboratory room responded appropriately.

DOE requested that the contractor evaluate potential actions and develop or modify their plans and procedures to limit the potential of Low Activity Waste Facility melter failures due to extended losses of site power. The request focuses on using the facility's standby diesel generator as a source of electrical power for activities that can slow melter cooldown to provide more time to recover onsite power and re-heat the melters.

**Hanford Site:** DOE and site contractors remain in the first phase of their resumption plans and DOE continues to consult with regional leadership regarding DOE's intent to increase the onsite workforce. Next week, after four weeks of limiting onsite workforce increases because of concerns related to regional COVID-19 trends, DOE is permitting contractors to increase the onsite staffing by about 15%. This increase will place the onsite workforce near planned levels for the end of phase 1. DOE has also determined that available stocks of personal protective equipment, support services, and training capacity are capable of supporting increased activity.