

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 1, 2019

**TO:** Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Zachery S. Beauvais and Miranda McCoy, Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending November 1, 2019

**DNFSB Staff Activity:** D. Andersen, J. Anderson, and P. Foster were onsite this week to provide resident inspector augmentation and participate in training. D. Andersen and J. Anderson participated in walkdowns of a recent high pressure fire loop coupler failure and seismic upgrades to a loading dock, and conducted discussions with engineering personnel regarding schedules for false ceiling replacements in nuclear explosive areas.

**Formality of Operations:** The resident inspectors met with representatives from CNS engineering and production support to discuss the results of their recent conduct of operations performance evaluation (see 8/16/19 and 10/18/19 reports). The CNS team stressed that they focused their evaluation and conclusions on the areas where they could have the greatest impact and did not intend for their evaluation or recommended actions to comprehensively address all potential conduct of operations breakdowns. They also stressed that discrete actions to address their recommendations will be developed by other CNS organizations. The resident inspectors found the evaluation to be insightful and agreed with many of its conclusions, particularly those related to engineering support of operations and deficiencies in causal analyses. Additionally, the resident inspectors noted that recommendations did not address some noteworthy concerns discussed during personnel interviews, including the over-reliance on administrative controls. This week, two additional events involving formality of operations errors occurred.

Subcontractor personnel supporting a high pressure fire loop lead-in replacement project damaged an overhead door while moving a hydro-vac truck across a section of ramp that can be used for nuclear material and nuclear explosive moves. They successfully passed through an overhead door on the west side of the ramp, but contacted the doors on the east side of the ramp. Both a subcontractor worker and a CNS security police officer were stationed as spotters when the contact occurred. During the fact finding, the CNS security policer officer noted that the overhead door was known to droop after opening. Participants at the fact finding were unaware whether a work order had been previously initiated to address this.

CNS crafts workers were performing maintenance and repair activities in a facility requiring two-person controls. During the course of their work, other workers entered and exited the facility, creating the false impression that the facility had adequate personnel coverage. When a crafts worker left the facility, personnel performing work nearby noted the requirement wasn't met and notified management. Management paused operations in the facility until a material accountability review could verify all materials to be present.

**External Assessment:** At the request of NPO, DOE Office of External Assessments personnel were onsite the past two weeks to evaluate the CNS corrective action plan (CAP) for quality issues with the Pantex documented safety analysis (see 10/12/18 report). The assessment was scoped to the closure status of actions in the CAP. DOE Office of External Assessments personnel provided an initial outbrief of their evaluation, and are drafting their report.