

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 9, 2018

**TO:** Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director  
**FROM:** P. Foster and P. Fox, Hanford Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending November 9, 2018

**Hanford Advisory Board:** The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Waste and Materials Management briefed members of the Hanford Advisory Board (HAB) Tank Waste Committee (TWC) on the proposed change to the definition of High-Level Radioactive Waste (HLW). He also stated that, although DOE has proposed the change, they have not made any decisions regarding the implementation of the proposed definition. He further stated that DOE would involve appropriate regulatory stakeholders in the implementation process. After the briefing, the TWC members were provided an opportunity to ask questions. Most of the questions focused on DOE's intent for implementation of the HLW definition. In particular, although most of the TWC members did not appear to have a strong objection to the revised definition, they also noted that DOE has not provided clarifying information regarding their intended application of the definition, and how the application will affect the retrieval, treatment, and disposal of Hanford site waste. Consequently, a significant number of the HAB TWC members appeared to have concerns regarding DOE's intent to follow through with current agreements for processing and disposal of Hanford site HLW, as defined under the existing definition.

**T-Plant:** A "Leak Detected" and "Sump High Level" alarm occurred when a work team was placing a full Sludge Transport and Storage Container (STSC) into storage in cell 15L of the T-Plant canyon. Operators entered the STSC leak procedure and performed a visual inspection of the cell using the available camera system. They determined that the container was undamaged and was not leaking. However, they also discovered that a cable for the defense-in-depth leak detection system had been misrouted when installed and was slightly inside the container footprint. Consequently, the cable was crimped when the STSC was placed resulting in the alarms. The STSC was moved to a different location within the cell. The leak detection system can be repaired without further movement of STSCs. Plant management has issued formal direction requiring periodic visual monitoring of the cell until the system is repaired.

**105-KW Basin:** Contractor management held an In-Progress ALARA Review to discuss the void of a Radiological Work Permit contamination limit that occurred while maintaining the hoists that are used within the basin. Workers noted that sludge retrieval work is increasing the activity levels in the basin water, making contamination control efforts more difficult. In particular, they noted that a recent backflush of the retrieval system sand filter deposited cohesive material into the basin that is suspended on the surface and isn't being removed. They also noted that portions of the water treatment system were taken off-line because of the work. Contractor management is implementing additional contamination controls during maintenance work and is evaluating action that they can take to reduce activity levels in the basin water.

**Tank Farms:** The contractor Joint Review Group (JRG) met to evaluate a work package for sampling tank A-105. The Resident Inspector noted that the Field Work Supervisor was exceptionally well prepared and that the level of discussion during the meeting indicated that JRG members had thoroughly evaluated the work package.