

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 24, 2018

**TO:** Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director  
**FROM:** P. Foster and P. Fox, Hanford Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending August 24, 2018

**DNFSB Staff Activity:** M. Sautman was onsite to perform resident inspector support activities.

**Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP):** The independent Management Assessment team completed its review of the corrective actions taken by the contractor prior to the resumption of PFP low hazard demolition work (see 8/17/2018 report). During the out brief, the team communicated three findings (one pre-start) related to the training of field personnel and the documentation of corrective action activities. The team also noted a number of opportunities for improvement related to radiological surveys, training, and drill execution. The contractor addressed one post-start finding during the course of the assessment, leaving two open. DOE-RL personnel both observed the assessment and performed a parallel review activity, primarily focusing on the implementation of radiological controls. They noted a number of preliminary findings, as well, and are in the process of finalizing their report.

**Building 324:** While performing continuity checks, a worker discovered unexpected electrical power in a panel after the completion of the safe-to-work check. The worker properly stopped the work activity, secured and exited the area, and notified management. During the critique, it was determined that the system had been isolated using a previously approved methodology, but an undocumented source had been used to power a circuit in the panel. A number of follow-up actions were discussed including how the expectations of the Hazardous Energy Control procedure are being flowed down to the workforce and subcontractors.

**Emergency Preparedness:** The resident inspectors observed limited-scope drills at Tank Farms and the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility. The first drill involved a fuel truck driver who suffers a medical emergency and crashes into C-Farm. The flipped truck then spills fuel into the tank via a severed breather filter. The second drill involved a simulated seismic event that causes a cover block to drop into a radiological cell. In general, the emergency responses for these drills were adequate. Facility response was timely and the Incident Commander established clear objectives for both response teams. However, in the first drill, the controllers noted that some emergency responders did not don their position vests in a timely manner and the Building Emergency Director did not use their checklist for some of the Incident Command Post (ICP) briefings. In addition, the resident inspectors noted that during both drills the ICP briefings could have gone beyond discussing simply what happened and what data was known and been more forward looking by discussing what tasks needed to be completed, who was responsible for them, and ensuring that past tasks and checklists had been completed.

**105-KW Basin:** The contractor completed loading the third sludge transportation and storage container (STSC). The resident inspectors observed the final sludge transport to the STSC and noted that the revised line flush times that were established to address the hold-up concerns observed on the previous container (see 07/27/18 report) appear to perform as expected. The contractor will confirm the effectiveness during the next entry into the Annex.