



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

MAR 29 2018

Mr. Steven A. Stokes
Technical Director
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
625 Indiana Avenue NW, Suite 700
Washington, DC 20004

Dear Mr. Stokes:

This is in response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) letter of March 26, 2018, describing the Board's concern that the final design documentation for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) safety significant confinement ventilation system (SSCVS) does not adequately address design requirements for the full integration of the underground safety significant continuous air monitoring (CAM) system.

While the Board did not request a response from the Department of Energy (DOE), the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) would like to take this opportunity to provide the following additional information and clarification regarding the SSCVS design:

- The SSCVS Project set the boundaries of the project scope at the surface of the WIPP site and did not include any portions of the WIPP underground including the CAMs, bulkheads, regulators, and dampers that control the air flow in the underground. The SSCVS Project scope did not include an upgrade to the CAMs.
- All alarm systems including CAMs, fire alarms, emergency evacuation, public address system, and security systems are tied into the Central Monitoring System (CMS) on the WIPP surface; these systems are existing at WIPP currently and were not part of the project scope other than a connection through the CMS. The CAMs in the underground provide a signal to the CMS that includes activation of alarms in the CMR, Emergency Operations Center, and relays a signal and alarms to the SSCVS Project for closing safety significant dampers on a bypass of the Salt Reduction System in the Salt Reduction Building, locking the flow control dampers in place, as well as for bypassing the high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter systems in the New Filter Building.
- The CAMs in the WIPP underground are controlled through the currently approved documented safety analysis (DSA) and technical safety requirements. (TSR). The safety function the CAMs provide is controlled by the DSA/TSR.

- For the SSCVS Project, the CAMS will continue to function per the DSA and TSR requirements and, if/when they are tied into the new project and new analysis identifies the need, the DSA/TSR would be upgraded to incorporate any new safety functions.

If you have any questions, please contact me, at (202)-586-0975 or Mr. Todd Shrader, Manager of the Carlsbad Field Office, at (575)-234-7300.

Sincerely,



James A. Hutton
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Safety, Security, and Quality Assurance
Environmental Management

cc: Steven Petras, AU-1.1
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