

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 27, 2017

TO: S. A. Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and Z. C. McCabe, Resident Inspectors
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Resident Inspector Report for Week Ending Oct. 27, 2017

Board Member Visit: Board member J. Roberson was on site October 24 and 25. Ms. Roberson performed walkdowns of K-Area and the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF). Ms. Roberson met with representatives from DOE-SR, NNSA-SRFO, SRNS, and SRR to discuss various safety topics including atmospheric dispersion modeling, the H-Canyon Exhaust (HCAEX) Tunnel, high mitigated collocated worker (CW) dose at Tritium Facilities, and technical safety requirement implementation.

HCAEX Tunnel: SRNS submitted a justification for continued operations (JCO) of H-Canyon while the ability of safety class HCAEX Tunnel to perform its safety function is indeterminate (see 6/30/17 report). Upon DOE-SR approval, the JCO would allow the receipt and processing of two specific spent fuel types. The proposed JCO compensatory measures are preventative with the exception of administratively controlling the release from the transfer line rupture and subsequent spray of process solution during an earthquake by tasking an operator to manually shut down select transfers if seismic activity is detected.

SWPF: Parsons notified DOE-SR of their intent to authorize work release for Phase 3 work starting Monday of this week. Phase 3 covers the resumption of testing with water and associated operations, maintenance, and construction activities. While DOE-SR believed Parsons met their expectations for Senior Supervisory Watch and Deliberate Operation Plan, DOE-SR did not believe the initial response met their direction regarding shift operations manager (SOM) qualifications (see 10/6/17 weekly report). Parsons believed their SOM interviews could have been conducted in a more consistent and formal format, but that they satisfied the intent of their corrective action plan. That being said, Parsons is implementing compensatory measures to enable their SOMs to gain proficiency. These include a SOM Proficiency Plan, the use of one-on-one mentors for each SOM starting next week, and dedicating 3 days out of each 28-day shift rotation to specialized SOM training. Phase 3 will include three stages. The first stage includes resumption of low risk system operational tests (SOT) that have little or no impact on plant configuration. No more than two testing field work activities would be performed simultaneously and management field observers would oversee all testing activities. Stage 2 would include the resumption of the remaining SOTs and the operational check of the Temporary Tank Farm. Stage 3 includes the resumption of SOTs with outstanding issues and integrated SOTs.

Meanwhile, Parsons personnel committed another lockout violation on Thursday when they failed to properly lock out a bridge crane before constructing a scaffolding around it. The issue was identified when a manager performing a walkdown questioned whether the bridge crane was in a safe state before construction was completed. Parsons performed an apparent causal analysis that determined multiple causes including poor work planning and coordination between work groups. DOE is planning to review the completion of the corrective actions Parsons identified prior to agreeing that Parsons should initiate Phase 3.