

AFFIRMATION OF BOARD VOTING RECORD (VOICE VOTE)

September 26, 2017 Public Business Meeting, 12:00 p.m. - 3:00 p.m.

Subject: Motion to close Recommendation 2014-1.

Document Control #:2017-200-026

The Board, with Board Member(s) Sean Sullivan, Bruce Hamilton, Joyce L. Connery, Jessie Roberson and Daniel J. Santos voting as indicated below, has voted to **approve** the above question on September 26, 2017.

The votes were recorded as:

	APRVD	DISAPRVD	ABSTAIN	NOT PARTICIPATING*	DATE
Sean Sullivan	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	9/26/17
Bruce Hamilton	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	9/26/17
Jessie Roberson	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	9/26/17
Daniel J. Santos	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	9/26/17
Joyce L. Connery	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	9/26/17

*Reason for Not Participating:

This Record contains a summary of the voice voting on this matter by the Board Members

Notes: The Board decided via unanimous consent to hold the record open for 3 business days for Board Member written comments.

Recorded By:

James P. Biggins
General Counsel

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board



DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
NOTATIONAL VOTE RESPONSE SHEET

FROM: Jessie H. Roberson

SUBJECT: Motion to close Recommendation 2014-1
Doc Control#2017-200-026

Approved X Disapproved Abstain


Recusal – Not Participating

COMMENTS: Below X Attached None

Recommendation 2014-1, Emergency Preparedness and Response, was designed to require readiness assurance evaluations, corrective actions, and a better prepared and trained work force in defense nuclear facilities in response to design basis and severe/beyond design basis events. It was designed based on lessons learned from the emergency response at Fukushima nuclear facilities during an earthquake followed by a tsunami in 2011 and the DOE's own complex wide review, during 2012, conducted in response to lessons learned from those events. The emergency response at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant further validated the need for the Recommendation based on the response during two February, 2014 events in the underground.

DOE issued an updated Order, Comprehensive Emergency Management System in 2016, incorporating needed changes. Actual operational performance and assurance activities are lagging the Department's scheduled plan developed in response to the Recommendation.

I support closing this Recommendation at this time because it is being viewed as a general programmatic catch all and not being used as a tool to drive specific actions proposed to effect emergency response readiness assurance in defense nuclear facilities.



Jessie H. Roberson



Date

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
NOTATIONAL VOTE RESPONSE SHEET

FROM: Joyce L. Connery

SUBJECT: Motion to close Recommendation 2014-1

Doc Control#2017-200-026


Approved _____ Disapproved X _____ Abstain _____

Recusal – Not Participating _____

COMMENTS: Below X Attached _____ None _____

I strongly disapprove of the proposal to close Recommendation 2014-1. During the public meeting, it was opined that keeping the Recommendation opened would not address the issues enumerated in the Recommendation regarding the Emergency Preparedness and Response capabilities at Defense Nuclear Facilities. When pressed, however, the clearer answer was that the implementation plan that the Department of Energy was following would not lead to the improvements necessary to address the issues and that the areas of concern raised by the Recommendation are still valid. Abandoning this Recommendation before the final deliverable and before the Board has had an opportunity to hold the hearing it had planned with Department of Energy officials and field offices is a missed opportunity to get to the heart of the structural issues that the Board, the Board staff, and even elements of the Department itself have observed in this area over a number of years.

Nevertheless, the Secretary of Energy is required by the Atomic Energy Act to carry out and complete the implementation plan. It is therefore my expectation that despite the decision of the Board to close the Recommendation, that the implementation plan will be completed and that, pursuant to the Board's oversight authority, the Board will continue to evaluate any additional outcomes.


Joyce L. Connery

provided 10/2/17
Date vote taken 9/26/17