

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 28, 2017

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** S.A. Stokes, Technical Director  
**FROM:** R.K. Verhaagen and J.W. Plaue  
**SUBJECT:** Los Alamos Report for Week Ending July 28, 2017

**DNFSB Staff Activity:** On Thursday, B.K. Caleca, Y. Li, P.J. Migliorini, and L. Schleicher conducted a teleconference with LANL personnel to review the design for the seismic retrofit of the RANT Shipping Facility. The team also discussed the risk associated with proceeding with the retrofit prior to revising the safety basis to better understand the overall seismic control strategy.

**Plutonium Facility–Infrastructure:** On Tuesday, the west diesel firewater pump failed its weekly surveillance due to an issue with packing. Operations staff entered the appropriate limiting condition for operations, initiated troubleshooting, and returned the pump to service on Friday. Last week's firewater pump issue concerned the east diesel firewater pump (see 7/21/17 weekly).

Recently, facility staff received and placed the new diesel electric generators intended to support the electric firewater pumps at each pump house. Once installation is complete and associated safety basis changes are approved and implemented, the electric firewater pumps will eliminate dependency on the diesel pumps that have proven problematic in recent years. Unfortunately, placement of the east generator was hindered by an alignment problem between cast-in-place bolts and the anchor points on the base of the generator. Engineering personnel believe that the bolts shifted after the concrete was placed and was not caught because a confirmation measurement was not performed. Engineering is now developing a solution to ensure the attachment meets the required safety class, performance category 3 functions.

**Transuranic Waste Facility (TWF):** On Thursday, the NNSA Field Office approved and forwarded to NNSA Headquarters for final approval LANL's requested changes to a previously approved exemption request regarding the safety class seismic switches. The original 2013 exemption request against requirements in DOE Order 420.1B, *Facility Safety*, specified a certain separation distance between the switch enclosures and a prohibition on combustible materials between the enclosures that the TWF project did not meet with the as-built configuration. Additionally, the original request relied on the project installing safety significant fire suppression in the utility buildings; however, the fire suppression system is not currently scheduled to achieve this status until February 28, 2018, with the potential that the facility will commence nuclear operations prior to that date.

On Thursday, LANL management transmitted to the NNSA Field Office their closure package from the Contractor Operational Readiness Review (see 6/23/17 weekly). The causal analysis codes identified included: adequate means not provided to assure quality procedures; resources not provided to assure adequate training; management expectations not well-defined, understood, or enforced; written communication content incomplete; and management monitoring of activities did not identify the problems. The Federal Operational Readiness Review is scheduled to commence on Monday.

**Inappropriately Remediated Nitrate Salt (RNS) Waste–Treatment Activities:** Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility workers successfully treated the 20<sup>th</sup> RNS drum, including the first pipe overpack container. On Thursday, operators paused work when they noticed a tear in the containment bag between the glovebox and a debris drum. Radiological control technicians located and cleaned up small amounts of contamination in the vicinity of the debris drum.