In the Matter of:

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

November 23, 2015
Public Business Meeting

Condensed Transcript with Word Index

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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

PUBLIC BUSINESS MEETING

NOVEMBER 23, 2015

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
625 INDIANA AVENUE, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20004

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PUBLIC MEETING AND HEARING

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(1:00 p.m.)

MS. CONNERY: Good afternoon. My name is Joyce Connery and I am the Chairman of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. I will preside over this public business meeting. I'd like to introduce my colleagues on the Board. To my right is Ms. Jessie Roberson, the Board's Vice Chairman. To her right is Bruce Hamilton. To my immediate left is Mr. Sean Sullivan; and to his left, Mr. Daniel Santos. We five constitute the Board.

Having established a quorum of Board members, this public meeting will now come to order. Mr. James Biggins, the Board's Acting General Counsel, is seated o my immediate right. Mr. Biggins will serve as the parliamentarian for this meeting and will advise me on any points of procedure. Mr. Biggins, please present the meeting agenda.

MR. BIGGINS: Thank you, Madam Chairman. Good afternoon, Board Members, staff, and members of the public. This business meeting was originally noticed in the Federal Register on October 16th, 2015, as revised by a notice of November 5th, 2015. The meeting is held open to the public per the provisions of the Government and the Sunshine Act, the Board's regulations implementing

the Sunshine Act, and the Board's operating procedures dated August 2015.

The Board's operating procedures are posted on the Board's public website at DNFSB.gov. The Board is recording this proceeding through a verbatim transcript and video recording. The transcript, public notice, and video recording will be available for viewing in the public reading room here at our headquarters in Washington, DC.

In addition, an archive copy of the video recording will be available through our website for at least 60 days. The video recording will also be posted on the Board's YouTube channel. The Board previously posted on its public website a copy of the PowerPoint slides that will be shown in today's presentations, with an invitation to the public to provide e-mail comments back to the Board concerning those slides. Comments received from the public regarding the slides will be included in the meeting record.

The Board reserves its right to further schedule and regulate the course of this meeting to recess, reconvene, postpone, or adjourn this meeting in accordance with the provisions of the Sunshine Act, and otherwise exercise its authority under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended.

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A public business meeting agenda for a November 23, 2015, meeting was approved by the Board by notational vote on October 26, 2015. The agenda is posted on the Board's public website. This business meeting will proceed in accordance with that agenda. As stated in the agenda, the Chairman and the Board Members will provide opening remarks followed by presentations from the Technical Director and his staff concerning an overview of technical staff work plan activities for Fiscal Year 2016 and crosscutting technical issues.

The Board will then engage in discussions on these topics. The Office of the Technical Director staff will then provide presentations on technical staff work for Fiscal Year 2016 related to the National Nuclear Security Administration, or NNSA, and the Department of Energy Environmental Management, or EM, program issues and related technical staff oversight priorities.

The Board will again enter into discussions on these topics. The Board will then receive comments from the public followed by Board member closing remarks. The Chairman will then provide her closing remarks and adjourn the meeting.

I now yield the floor back to the Chairman for opening remarks.

MS. CONNERY: Good afternoon again. This is my

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first public meeting, so I wanted to take the opportunity to thank my fellow Board Members. I was sworn in in August, and since that time, the Board has been extremely supportive of me, helping me learn the ropes. So, I'd like to thank in particular Ms. Roberson, Mr. Sullivan, and Mr. Santos, who preceded me here, and Mr. Hamilton, who came shortly thereafter me.

I would like to also recognize the hard work of the staff, both the Office of General Counsel, the Office of General Management, and the technical staff for their continued support and work in getting me up to speed on all of their issues.

As those of you who were at the public meeting last year will notice that we've got a very specific agenda this time. It's focused on the work plan of the Technical Office, and our discussions will be restricted to those issues when we get to the discussion part.

I'd also like to make a quick note of introduction because we have two new senior managers here at the Board. Katherine Herrera has joined us as the Deputy General Manager, so welcome, Katherine. And as you've already seen, we have an Acting General Counsel, Mr. Jim Biggins, who comes to us by way of the NRC. So, we're very luck to have them here with us.

The only other comments I would like to make

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that since the last time we met we've done a lot of interesting work, some of which you'll hear about today, and intend to move forward with that. One of the other enterprises that we've engaged in is to adopt our core values, and I will give credit to Mr. Santos for working directly with the staff to do so. And you'll notice that they're on our lanyards: excellence, respect, and integrity. And that's how we intend to conduct the meeting this afternoon. So, with that, I will turn my remarks over to Ms. Roberson.

MS. ROBERSON: Thank you, Madam Chairman. I don't have any comments at this time.

MS. CONNERY: Mr. Sullivan?

MR. SULLIVAN: No comments.

MS. CONNERY: Mr. Santos?

MR. SANTOS: No comments.

MS. CONNERY: This is easy. Mr. Hamilton?

MR. HAMILTON:: Thank you, Madam Chairman. I have no comments.

MS. CONNERY: Well, this concludes the Board's opening remarks. At this time, I'd like to begin with our first order of business on the agenda. I recognize our first presenter, Mr. Steven Stokes, the Board's Technical Director. Mr. Stokes, please report to the Board with an overview of the Office of Technical

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Director's work plan for the activities of Fiscal Year 2016.

MR. STOKES: Good afternoon, Madam Chairman, Madam Vice Chair, and Board Members. My name, for the record, is Steven Stokes, and I am the Board's Technical Director. Today, I'm going to talk about and give an introduction into the planning process and how we essentially formulated the plan, which you'll hear in great detail throughout the remaining presentations.

I'm here to talk about the overall objective of the planning process, which, in summary, is really to provide a draft plan for the Board's approval that ensures that the Board's strategic goals are met and that the Board's technical staff resources focus on those activities that have the highest priority from a nuclear safety perspective. The Board's priority oversight responsibilities are derived from the Board's enabling legislation. Next page, please.

As I mentioned, the work plan is designed to ensure that the Board's strategic goals are met, and the planning process recognizes that we have to focus on those activities that are required by statute. These are, and as you can refer to the list on this slide, a review of the Department of Energy's progress resolving existing Board issues and open Board recommendations; its

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oversight of high-hazard nuclear operations at the Department of Energy's defense nuclear facilities -- and that is primarily focused to ensure that ongoing operations can be conducted safely; and a review of new design and construction projects to ensure that when those projects are built and operate that they will meet applicable design standards and can operate safely; and then, lastly, the review of DOE's directives. Next slide, please.

Since this plan that we formulated is a forward-looking plan, the planning process requires that a number of assumptions are made. First, we assume that the Department of Energy's work that they expect to perform will actually be performed. So -- and we work with our onsite representatives at the working level, and our cognizant engineers assigned to each site to maintain close contact with the DOE's representatives to understand their plans. This includes work from Fiscal Year 2015 that continues into Fiscal Year 2016 and new work that will be initiated in the Fiscal Year 2016.

And, lastly, our staff capability. We evaluate what our technical capabilities are and then review DOE's planned work, and then match our capability with their work to be able to -- and to identify the highest priority work that DOE will do so that what we end up

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doing is matching our capability with DOE's work to focus on the high-priority, high-hazard activities. Next slide, please.

In prioritizing these things, we have developed a process for being able to look at these things in a qualitative approach, something that without a tremendous amount of effort from a quantitative sense can be easily evaluated and compiled in a common-sense, very logical approach. So, we use a guide to prioritize each of the projects, subject to available staffing resources, and these -- what you see on this slide, in no particular order, are those things that we evaluate.

So, we look at the potential health impacts to the public, to the collocated workers, to facility workers, from an accidental release of radioactive material standpoint. We look at the consequences of their magnitude and the likelihood or the frequency of those things, accidents that could happen.

We look at the adequacy of their safety-related controls, both engineered and administrative, that are designed to prevent or mitigate postulated accidents. And then we look at the readiness of the operators, their management, and the DOE's oversight from the perspective of can they safely conduct nuclear operations. We look at the complexity of those operations, and we look at the

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adequacy of the documentation that they've put together to be able to manage their safety process. We always -- and, fundamentally, what we're asking is are all potential accidents properly identified and controlled.

What we actually -- what we actually -- are we back to normal? What we really do is, using this qualitative approach, we attempt to inform ourselves about the work being conducted at DOE and recommend a plan to the Board that uses our available resources as efficiently and effectively as possible.

In the presentations that will follow this introduction, the distribution of technical staff resources will be discussed, and the high-priority activities will also be discussed. This ends my remarks.

MS. CONNERY: Thank you, Mr. Stokes.

Do any of the Board Members have any clarifying questions for Mr. Stokes? But, again, we're going to save substance for our conversations amongst ourselves.

Mr. Sullivan?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes. Mr. Stokes, we don't have a final budget for the year yet. We don't have a full year appropriation yet. I don't think any federal agency does. And, so, I think our appropriation could end up being what is in the current authorizing bill or it could end up being something lower such as a sequestration

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value, and I think there's about a 10 percent difference between those two numbers.

If we end up at the lower number -- well, let me just ask you this. Did you assume a particular budget level when you put this plan together? And, if so, what happens if we don't get that?

MR. STOKES: The budget level that is assumed is more a function of our available staff resources. Can you hear me?

MR. SULLIVAN: I just think you need to speak as closely as you can into that microphone.

MR. STOKES: Okay, thank you. Our approach to this and the assumption that we made is we used available staff resources. The basic assumption that was made is that we would be fully funded for the existing level that we currently have onboard for the year so that if there are reductions in the -- I can back up, I think.

If there are reductions in the size of our budget throughout the fiscal year, then we would have to have a RIF to be able to lower the amount of work that we could do. If --

MR. SULLIVAN: Can I just -- we have somebody trying to adjust the volume. Maybe we ought to just -- Madam Chair, maybe we ought to just take a minute or two and try to get this right.

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MS. CONNERY: We can. We can pause for technical difficulties.

(Brief pause.)

MR. STOKES: Is this working?

Okay. I forgot where we had left off, but basically we assume that the current staffing level is existing throughout the entire year. If, in fact, that is not the case and there is a reduction in our overall forces, we would accommodate those reductions in an incremental fashion based upon the reality of whatever the budget numbers that presented at the time we did get a budget.

Similarly, if we received a higher amount and we add staff, those staff will be added to the plan as their capability to be able to execute our procedures and participate in the work load, essentially an onboarding process, once that process is done, we would add those resources to the -- to the planning process and increase the amount of output that we would do in a fiscal year.

Does that answer your question, Mr. Sullivan?

MR. SULLIVAN: I think it does. Let me just add, though, for additional clarity that if I'm taking your answer, you did this plan to the current staff. My knowledge of the budget request would allow us, if approved, would allow us to add about 10 more technical

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staff members onto a staff that's currently about 80 people. So, that would be at least a 10 percent increase in staff members, which would mean if we get our budget, we hopefully could do more than what's actually in your plan.

MR. STOKES: That's correct.

MR. SULLIVAN: All right, thank you.

MS. CONNERY: Any other questions from Board Members?

Mr. Santos?

MR. SANTOS: Yes. As you go through the presentation, if you could help explain to the public how DOE work activities and schedules factor into your prioritization and the link between your work and DOE's work at the various sites.

MR. STOKES: Okay. I'll give it kind of a response and in an overview fashion, and then as specific examples come up, the following presenters can either illustrate that or you can follow it up with questions.

The way that we prioritize work with respect to ongoing DOE activities, it's essentially in two ways. One is if it's a timed DOE activity, for example, if DOE is going to initiate operations at a particular facility, they will precede those activities with a series of readiness activities. So, in our planning process, what

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we do is we identify, based on DOE scheduling, when those activities would occur and then allocate resources to be able to perform those oversight activities at the time DOE believes that those activities would be conducted. That's one way.

The other way is we look at our understanding of the maturity of particular products that DOE produces as a part of, say, the design process. So, if they are going to produce a critical safety document at a specific time, we align our oversight activities with DOE's activities to be able to perform those in a timely fashion. So, that's another example of how we do those kinds of things.

As we -- as you will see in the following presentations, you'll see those kinds of priorities being -- and approaches being identified.

MS. CONNERY: Mr. Stokes, I'd like to ask you a followup question to something Mr. Sullivan asked. What is the onboarding schedule for new employees? How long does it take to get them fully up to speed so that they could actually participate and perform work?

MR. STOKES: They can participate and perform work almost immediately, but we have a one-year onboarding process to fully familiarize the folks with the DOE way of doing nuclear safety and those kinds of

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things, depending upon the individual. For example, if we were to be hiring somebody with 25 years of DOE experience, certain aspects of the onboarding process wouldn't be as applicable, and they would be able to start sooner.

On average, our expectation is is takes about one year to be able to have a staff member that has no previous DOE experience or previous nuclear safety experience to be able to be a fully contributing member of the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board Technical Staff.

MS. CONNERY: Thank you. Any other question?

(No response.)

MS. CONNERY: Okay, thank you, Mr. Stokes.

I would now like to introduce the Board's Group Lead for Performance and Assurance and Acting Group Lead for Nuclear Safety Programs and Analysis, Mr. Chris Roscetti. Mr. Roscetti will provide a presentation on the Office of Technical Director's Fiscal Year 2016 Crosscutting Issues.

And just a note, so we asked the staff to provide this presentation in a way that would be most accessible to the public, so we have the crosscutting issues and then we've divided the world up into the environmental management programs and NNSA, National

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Nuclear Security Administration, programs for ease of understanding, but that's not necessarily how our technical staff is divided. So, I thought I'd just clarify that.

With that, over to you, Mr. Roscetti.

MR. ROSCETTI: Thank you. Good afternoon, Madam Chairman, Board Members, staff members, members of the public. My name is Chris Roscetti. I am the Group Lead for Performance Assurance and the Acting Group Lead for Nuclear Programs and Analysis.

Thank you for the opportunity to present the crosscutting issues portion of the Office of the Technical Director's Fiscal Year 2016 Work Plan. Slide 7, please.

I will briefly cover the Board's strategic objectives and performance goals as they relate to crosscutting issues and how we determine our priorities. I will discuss the estimated manpower for crosscutting issues and how it is used. I plan to review open Board recommendations that cover crosscutting issues. And, finally, I will discuss other planned crosscutting oversight activities and discuss uncertainties in our plan. Slide 8, please.

The Board established two strategic objectives that cover crosscutting issues. Strategic objective 2.1

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is to accomplish independent oversight to strengthen the development, implementation, and maintenance of DOE regulations, requirements, and guidance for providing adequate protection of public health and safety at defense nuclear facilities.

Strategic objective 2.2 is to accomplish independent oversight to improve the establishment and implementation of safety programs at defense nuclear facilities. The technical staff provides oversight of Department of Energy directives and their safety programs across the complex, hence the crosscutting nature. Slide 9, please.

The Office of the Technical Director establishes priorities based on the following: the safety issues communicated to the Department of Energy via recommendations or correspondence; the Board's enabling legislation, meaning our review of the Department of Energy's directives; the risk a particular issue presents to the public and workers; the role the program plays in protecting public and workers; the type and quantity of nuclear material that is at risk; and the complexity of the particular operations and activities. Slide 10, please.

The Office of the Technical Director plans to use just over 20 percent of the technical staff's

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available resources on crosscutting issues. This is shown by the green bar labeled on the X axis as Nuclear Programs. Slide 11, please.

This slide shows the different areas of work that the Nuclear Programs and Analysis Group plans to focus on in Fiscal Year 2016. As can be seen by the pie chart, we plan to spend a large portion of oversight activities on Board recommendations 2014-1, 2011-1, 2010-1, and also reviewing Department of Energy directives. Slide 12, please.

The Board's currently open crosscutting recommendations include 2010-1, Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers; 2011-1, Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant; and 2014-1, Emergency Preparedness and Response. Slide 13, please.

For Board Recommendation 2010-1, the Department of Energy has two actions that are outstanding: revising Department of Energy Standard 1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process; and evaluating facility safety analyses against certain enhanced requirements from DOE Standard 3009-2014.

The technical staff plans to continue its oversight of the Department of Energy's revision to Standard 1189. We also plan to review DOE's gap analyses

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of facility safety analysis when they are completed. Slide 14, please.

For Board Recommendation 2011-1, the Department of Energy has completed the majority of the implementation plan deliverables. These actions included Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant assessments and corrective actions and completing complex-wide extent-of-condition reviews and developing sustainment plans for other defense nuclear facilities.

The technical staff plans to continue to provide oversight of the implementation of the remaining open actions of this recommendation in Fiscal Year 2016. Slide 15, please.

For Board Recommendation 2014-1, Emergency Preparedness and Response, the Board recommended the Department of Energy make improvements in its emergency planning and response program, including standardizing and improving implementation of its criteria and review approaches and updating its emergency management directive.

The technical staff plans to continue its oversight of emergency preparedness and response and DOE's implementation of this recommendation in Fiscal Year 2016. Slide 16, please.

In addition to the Board's open

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recommendations, this slide lists the additional crosscutting issues that I will discuss in a little more detail in the upcoming slides. Slide 17, please.

The technical staff plans to provide oversight of the Department of Energy's implementation of DOE Standard 3009-2014, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety -- excuse me, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis. This standard is a safe harbor for new facilities, major modifications to existing facilities, and existing facilities with mitigated public doses above the evaluation guideline of 25 rem total effective dose equivalent.

As I mentioned when discussing slide 13, DOE plans to conduct gap analyses of existing facilities against this set of requirements from DOE Standard 3009-2014 that pertain to protecting the public from radiological hazards. The technical staff plans to provide oversight of these analyses. Slide 18, please.

The technical staff plans to conduct oversight of quality assurance and software quality assurance by performing reviews of Department of Energy sites and projects, including at the Nevada National Security Site, the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant, and the Pantex Plant.

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The technical staff plans to continue to provide oversight of the Radcalc commercial grade dedication process. Finally, the technical staff plans to review revisions to quality assurance, software quality assurance related directives such as Department of Energy Guide 414.1-4. This is the Safety Software Guide.

The technical staff also plans to participate and contribute to requirements development and requirements maintenance of the NQA-1 standard as committee members. Slide 19, please.

With respect to Department of Energy's emergency planning and response capabilities, the technical staff plans to focus on oversight of drill and exercise programs, technical planning bases, capability to interface with offsite organizations, and self-assessments and corrective action effectiveness. The technical staff plans to review site-specific implementation of DOE's emergency management directives at Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.

Finally, the technical staff plans to observe site-wide and facility-specific drills and exercises as resources and schedules permit. Slide 20, please.

The technical staff also plans to continue to

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provide oversight of the Department of Energy's criticality safety program by performing reviews of criticality safety programs at Savannah River Site, Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Nevada National Security Site, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Slide 21, please.

The technical staff also plans to provide oversight of the Department of Energy's implementation and nuclear facility safety bases. This includes reviewing technical safety requirement controls and their implementation. Technical safety requirements ensure operating parameters are maintained and that safety systems, structures, and components are available to perform their stated safety function.

The technical staff has reviews planned at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the Pantex Plant. Slide 22, please.

As I previously mentioned, the Department of Energy is revising DOE Standard 1189 in response to Board Recommendation 2010-1. Part of this revision will align DOE Standard 1189 with DOE Standard 3009-2014. It will also incorporate best practices and the lessons learned over the past six to seven years from using Department of Energy Standard 1189. The technical staff plans to continue to provide oversight of this revision of DOE

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Standard 1189. Slide 23, please.

The technical staff also plans to provide oversight of the Department of Energy's revision of other directives. On average, the technical staff will review approximately 25 Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration directives. These include policies, orders, manuals, guides, technical standards, and NNSA supplemental directives.

RevCom is the term commonly used for Department of Energy's review and comment process. We plan to review directives during the pre-RevCom, initial RevCom, and final RevCom or concurrence RevCom phase. Slide 24, please.

This slide lists eight directives that the technical staff anticipates reviewing in Fiscal Year 2016, including DOE Order 435, Radioactive Waste Management. This order also has a companion manual and series of guides that will likely also be revised.

I previously mentioned DOE Guide 414.1-4, the Safety Software Guide. And we also plan to review DOE Standards 1186, 3014, 1095, and 1020 as shown on the slide. Slide 25, please.

There are uncertainties associated with the technical staff's planned oversight of crosscutting issues. These include having the technical expertise

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available for the current set of planned reviews. Our reviews of Department of Energy directives occur when the Department of Energy revises its directives, thus we follow the Department of Energy's time-line and our workload increases based on the number and timing of directives we receive.

There is also the possibility than an unplanned event will occur that will divert necessary technical resources from crosscutting issues, or a higher priority issue will require the technical resources planned for a crosscutting item. Slide 26, please.

This slide lists the acronyms that were used in the slides I just presented. Thank you for the opportunity to present the crosscutting issues portion of the Office of the Technical Director's Fiscal Year 2016 Work Plan.

MS. CONNERY: Thank you, Mr. Roscetti.

Are there any clarifying questions for Mr. Roscetti at this time? Mr. Sullivan.

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes. If we could go back to the uncertainties slide, which was right there, 25. Thank you. So, the first bullet, meeting staffing requirements, are you aware of some staffing issues or is this a catchall, who knows what could happen to our staffing?

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In other words, are you telling us -- well, do you have the staffing that you need right now in order to execute your plan? Let me ask you that in a simple and direct manner.

MR. ROSCETTI: For crosscutting issues, yes, sir, we have the staffing we need to execute the plan that I just presented.

MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. So, I will take it that this bullet implies who knows what could happen in the future. Is that all it says?

MR. ROSCETTI: That is what it says. It also was written a few weeks ago, when we had some turnover in particularly important positions, such as emergency planning and response, sir.

MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. Are you asking this Board for more assets in order to do what needs to be done?

MR. ROSCETTI: No, sir, I'm not at this time, no.

MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. Thank you.

So, you gave us three crosscutting issues, and there's three different slides if you want to go back through them one at a time. But you had QA; you had emergency planning; and you had criticality safety. Do you have site-specific priority lists for each one of those? In other words, take one at a time, quality

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assurance, is there a place that you're going to go first for quality assurance? How are you organizing that part of it? The slide is up there. It was slide 18.

MR. ROSCETTI: Yes, sir. For quality assurance, we're planning reviews at Nevada National Security Site, the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant, and the Pantex Plant.

MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. And are those based on the criteria that you gave me earlier about -- you gave us earlier about the different factors that you're using? In other words, is Nevada first just because -- I mean, what makes Nevada -- is Nevada first on the list, and, if so, why?

MR. ROSCETTI: Yes, sir. We actually -- because we're already in the fiscal year, we've actually already accomplished a review at Nevada. The reason that was first is because of the resources we had and when the sites could support our reviews.

MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. Is there anywhere in particular where we're worried about quality assurance? You know, in other words, we already think it's deficient at some place in the complex?

MR. ROSCETTI: We are working on exploring where software quality assurance is deficient, so that would fall under quality assurance. And information at

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these particular sites will help us better make a conclusion as to what level of deficiency we think software quality assurance has.

MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. So, let me just generally ask the same question about emergency preparedness and then criticality safety. Are there places you're going first because you're worried about them? Or are the next things on your list just part of the general sequence of events in trying to get around the complex?

MR. ROSCETTI: So, with respect to emergency planning and response, we're planning to go to Los Alamos National Laboratory at the end of the second quarter, in the February time frame. That's based on observations that we've had doing -- observing drills and execute -- drills and exercises executed at Los Alamos National Laboratory.

MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. And for the public, you've recently been to Pantex and Savannah River. Is that -- so you've already got those accomplished in FY15; is that correct?

MR. ROSCETTI: Yes, sir.

MR. SULLIVAN: All right, thank you. And for criticality safety?

MR. ROSCETTI: So, again for criticality safety, we were planning reviews at Savannah River Site,

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Los Alamos National Laboratory, Nevada National Security Site, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. That's based on the priorities that I had put up earlier on the slide, but also when we have resources available and when sites potentially could support reviews, sir.

MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. And I recall some recent issues that occurred at Savannah River in criticality safety, which -- not actually issues that we uncovered, but it sounds like a -- it sounds like a prudent place to go take a look. Thank you.

MS. CONNERY: Any other questions for Mr. Roscetti? Mr. Santos?

MR. SANTOS: Yes, ma'am. Hi. As you know, we recently celebrated our 25-years as a Board, and as you know, we are -- we and also the Department were facing a lot of transition and an aging workforce. Going with this that the Board throughout its history has issued several recommendations that have been already closed. Does your group periodically relook at closed issues to see if they are relevant, given today's context and difference in workforce?

MR. ROSCETTI: Yes, sir. We do look at issues that the Board has raised to the Department of Energy's attention via recommendation. For instance, the Federal Technical Capability Program, we have personnel who

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provide oversight of that program and the FTCP panel. We look at the Department of Energy's directives that they've written in response to that, closed recommendation. We're continuing to provide oversight of quality assurance, software quality assurance. That was covered in a Board recommendation, also. So, yes, sir, we do look at closed recommendations and the issues that were brought up by the Board on an ongoing basis.

Does that answer your question, sir?

MR. SANTOS: Yes. And for the benefit of the public, can you tell us how your group, or throughout the Technical Director's groups' operating experience, not only at DOE but from other sectors and even international, these factor as a crosscutting issue that drives some of our work?

MR. ROSCETTI: So I make sure I understand your question, you want to know how we take Department of Energy's operating experience and operating experience throughout the industry, how we factor that into our oversight, sir?

MR. SANTOS: Correct.

MR. ROSCETTI: So, the Department of Energy puts out different types of operating experience. We have an individual who follows the information that the Department of Energy puts out. He reviews that

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information and distributes it to the technical staff so that we can take that into account in our planning process and in the oversight that we provide on an ongoing basis.

We also subscribe to industry journals that we read on a daily basis that then factors into the annual planning process and then the oversight we provide on a daily basis. Does that answer your question, sir?

MR. SANTOS: Yes.

MS. CONNERY: Ms. Roberson?

MS. ROBERSON: Thank you, Mr. Roscetti. Just one clarification on slide 17. On the new 3009 standard, evaluate the balance of facilities against a select set of new requirements. Does DOE have a plan for doing that that we're using or we know they're going to develop a plan this year? If you know.

MR. ROSCETTI: My understanding is that they have a basic plan. I don't think this is due until October of 2016, so they have an entire year to do that.

MS. ROBERSON: Okay, okay.

MR. ROSCETTI: Does that answer your question?

MS. ROBERSON: It does.

MS. CONNERY: I've got one for you, sir. Can you go to slide 22? So, this is just a clarifying question. It says that 2010-1 IP has Standard 1189-2008

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entering RevComm, by 12/15. Do we know if that's on target to actually go into RevCom next month?

MR. ROSCETTI: I don't know if that's on target, ma'am. I do know the Department of Energy has had specific working groups working on this. We've had staff members attend those working groups to provide oversight, and I don't have information to say that they're not going to meet that deadline because they've been on track with the working groups. But I can follow up and get the Board an answer, ma'am.

MS. CONNERY: Appreciate that.

Any other questions? Anyone? Anyone?

(No response.)

MS. CONNERY: Thank you, Mr. Roscetti.

So, in accordance with the agenda, the Board's going to discuss issues arising from the presentations that we just heard from Mr. Stokes and Mr. Roscetti. And in the interest of time, I'm going to guestimate, unless we get very carried away, that this will take about 20 minutes, not to cut anyone short. And at that time, I'd suggest that we take a short break for a recess in case anyone has to take a small break.

But, so, opening up to the Board for discussion. I realize this table is a little bit awkward for this, but are there any conversation starters that

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folks would like to enter into regarding the presentations that we just heard? Mr. Sullivan.

MR. SULLIVAN: I always have something.

MS. CONNERY: I knew it would be you.

MR. SULLIVAN: I always -- I can always be counted on to have something to say. Specifically with respect to crosscutting issues, I'll just state my observation. I've now been on the Board for three years. I find these issues to be vexing for us as a Board. I don't -- I haven't found a good way for us to impact the safety around the Department of Energy complex. Because of the way these crosscutting issues work, typically -- well, let me just take a concrete example.

A concrete example was the Board's Recommendation 2010-1. It resulted in an implementation plan from the Secretary that said the Secretary would have DOE's Standard 3009 revised. So, it was a standard that was dated in 1994, if I recall correctly, and now they -- it has been revised to one that was -- it's dated in 2014. It took four years for that standard to get revised, which was quite a long time. And part of the problem was that the -- well, we have a statute and the Secretary has certain responsibilities under our statute to create an implementation plan. The Secretary -- and then the Department attempts to carry out that

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implementation plan.

But they have this other thing which has been referred to here. It's RevCom, which is revision and comment. And they have a process for doing revision and comment. And the process for revision and comment in the Department of Energy does not require that the output match what the Secretary told us in the implementation plan the Secretary was going to do.

So, my short summary of the four years of the revision of 3009 was there was an awful lot of back-and-forth between our staff and their staff because our staff would ask the Department of Energy's staff to do essentially what the Secretary had committed to do in the implementation plan; and they would write that into a draft version of this new 3009; they would send it back into the RevCom process; and it would come back out of the RevCom process and it wouldn't do that anymore. And then we'd do this again and again, and each one took several months.

We have another example of a similar process that will be necessary for our Recommendation 2014-1 on emergency preparedness, so we have an implementation plan now from the Secretary. The Secretary said he's going to revise their Department of Energy Order 151 -- currently version C, charley, going to revise it to a version D,

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delta, but it will end up being the -- a similar thing, I'm afraid, where a revised version of that directive will go -- I'm sorry, that's an order -- a revised version of that order will go into their RevCom process and who knows what comes out, whether the product of the RevCom process will be anything similar to what we were hoping would be accomplished with the recommendation. And what I understood the Secretary to commit to when he gave us an implementation plan.

So, I'm just voicing frustration, but at the same time, while we have to comment on their directives by our statute, where we find deficiencies in the complex, I would just encourage this Board to point out the specific deficiencies at specific places in the complex and advise the Secretary to fix those.

And then if we do that -- so, for example, on quality assurance, we could tell the Secretary -- let's assume that we found many quality assurance -- this is just all hypothetical. Assume we found several quality assurance deficiencies. Well, we could try to tie them all up in one package, put a bow on it and say to the Secretary, you really need to take a hard turn on your quality assurance program everywhere, starting with your directives and what you do in-house in the Forrestal Building. And that would -- I would think that would get

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us in another one of these several-year revision -- and meanwhile, the question is, well, what's getting better specifically around the DOE complex in quality assurance.

The alternative would be if we go -- I forget where Chris -- Mr. Roscetti told us we were going to go first -- Nevada. But if we go to Nevada and we find some problems, if we find big problems, well, we just tell them to fix the big problems in Nevada. And then we go next wherever we go, and we say, okay, fix the problems we find there.

And, eventually, the Secretary being a smart individual, will do his own analysis to put together the common threads and figure out what he has to fix, but meanwhile, if we made some recommendations to fix specific issues at specific places, they might actually fix those. So, this is just a discussion that I encourage my fellow Board Members to consider on these crosscutting issues.

It's really a question of when we find these deficiencies, as we have, we found with the issues raised in 2010 on how safety analyses -- document safety analyses were done around the complex, as we have with 2014-1 with how emergency preparedness is done across the complex, that we actually consider trying to approach them in a different manner than we have on several

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occasions in the past at this Board and focus more on specific issues on specific places and then let the Department do their own root cause analysis as they -- as they need to.

You know, we can do a root cause analysis and advise. I'm just trying to suggest that if we point out specific things then hopefully we'll get those fixed and at least make that progress while people are also looking at how they fix the overall structural issues that may exist in directives or other oversight programs.

Thank you.

MS. CONNERY: Thank you, Mr. Sullivan. It looks like Mr. Santos would like to respond, so turning it over to Mr. Santos.

MR. SANTOS: Thank you, Madam Chair. You raise an interesting point, Mr. Sullivan. From my perspective, I think we need to have a little bit of both. An example I would like to offer is on the Board's recommendation on safety culture, specifically Hanford Waste Treatment Plant. That was very specific to that site. My understanding is that the Department also conducted an extended review of safety culture in other sites, but it's not clear to me that the same level of follow-on actions or intensity was applied to just WTP has been done on the other sites. So, that's an example where we

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can identify something specific and then make the assumption that it's going to get carried through everywhere. That might not happen. So, that way, we might need a little bit of both the specific and the overall to drive emphasis from both directions, just to offer that.

MS. CONNERY: Ms. Roberson?

MS. ROBERSON: I was just going to chime in. Yeah, I'm not disputing what Mr. Sullivan said or Mr. Santos. I do think we could, in our work, probably sharpen up on when we have requirement deficiencies and when we have implementation deficiencies. I think that's an area where we could improve our view that will help on both counts.

MS. CONNERY: Mr. Hamilton, do you have a comment?

So, I'll throw in my two cents. I think, Mr. Sullivan, I worked at the Department of Energy for a long time, so I understand your frustration with the bureaucracy and the RevCom system; however, I also think that it's -- it's our obligation as a defense board to look at the orders, and if we see them as being deficient and eventually causing safety problems because they in and of themselves are deficient, we have to go after those, as well as the specific. So, I wouldn't want to

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be derelict in that duty, because I think that is actually part and parcel of what we're obligated to do as the defense board, just from my standpoint.

Mr. Santos?

MR. SANTOS: Yeah, I want to go back to the overall of the crosscutting issues, just as a matter of discussion that I understand that for FY16 the staff is focusing on three. We heard QA, safety basis, and EP&R. But as we all know, there are other -- several very important crosscutting issues.

I'll just give an example: conduct of operations, training and qualifications, Federal oversight, that we always must remain vigilant because any deficiency in other crosscutting issues could completely swamp or direct us to other priorities. So, I just want to make sure we don't lose sight of crosscutting issues. That's all.

MS. CONNERY: So, I'll add a comment to that, because I think you're right. I think sometimes we neglect the general crosscutting for the specific because it's easy to understand that things take place in places. So, when we ask our staff to give us the things that worry us -- worry them the most, they often give us very specific examples of the alligator closest to the boat, where they might actually be not informing us of the

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larger crosscutting issues that -- the trends that they see. And, so, I think we need to encourage a little bit more perhaps open crosstalk in the boardroom with ourselves and staff to make sure that those come to the surface.

Other comments?

(No response.)

MS. CONNERY: Seeing none, if there's no objection, I would propose just a five-minute break and then resume at 2:00 to hear our next presentation. If anyone -- nobody objects to that?

(No response.)

MS. CONNERY: Okay, so we'll resume at 2:00 promptly. Thank you.

(Brief recess.)

MS. CONNERY: Okay, welcome back. We're going back on record. Are there any other comments from the Board concerning the technical staff crosscutting issues? Or did we exhaust those in our last session?

I just have one comment for the record. Mr. Roscetti caught me during the break about my question about whether or not DOE was onboard for 2015 for -- let me find the issue -- for 1189-2008 for the RevCom. And he said that indeed they checked, and they are on track to complete that in December of 2015. So, I just wanted

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to note that for the record.

So, I'd like to turn to the next order of business on the agenda. I'd like to recognize our next presenters, Mr. Timothy Dwyer, the Board's Group Lead for Nuclear Weapon Programs, Dr. Adam Poloski, the Board's Group Lead for Nuclear Facility Design and Infrastructure.

Mr. Dwyer and Mr. Poloski, please report to the Board concerning the Office of Technical Director's work plan activities for Fiscal Year 2016 and those issues related to the NNSA programs. Thank you.

MR. DWYER: Yes, ma'am. Good afternoon, Madam Chair, members of the Board, members of the public, and the technical staff. My name is Timothy Dwyer. I'm the Group Lead for Nuclear Weapon Programs. With me is...

DR. POLOSKI: Adam Poloski. I'm the Group Lead for Nuclear Facility Design and Infrastructure.

MR. DWYER: We are paired together because there is some design and construction work going on at nuclear weapon sites, and Adam will be speaking to those slides as they come up. Next slide, please.

So, briefly, the Nuclear Weapon Programs Group is part of our strategic goal number one, to improve safety of operations, to ensure public and worker health and safety. In this case, because it's the NWP group,

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we're focusing on the National Nuclear Security Administration's defense nuclear facilities, so that includes Los Alamos, Pantex, and Y-12, where we maintain a near-continuous presence; Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories; the Nevada National Security Site; and the SRS Tritium facilities. We are also conducting oversight of nuclear explosive safety, which for purposes of our work plan we treat as a site, even though it is not really a physical location.

As part of strategic goal number one, we have a strategic objective to perform independent and timely oversight to strengthen safety of operations, and we're -- in doing that, we're looking at the nuclear weapon stockpile and in weapons-related R&D and testing. Next slide, please.

Both the Technical Director and the Nuclear Programs and Analysis Group Lead have already discussed how we prioritize. I've grouped them a little bit closer here because now we're looking at operational facilities for the most part. So, the factors that we're focusing on are the risks. That's to the public or the workers. In general, that has a component that involves types and quantities of the nuclear and hazardous material at risk, as well as where we're doing the work and how complicated or how unique the work might be.

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So, for practical purposes, that generally means that the material at risk and proximity to the public make Los Alamos our site of most concern, followed by Y-12 and Pantex. In general, Y-12 and Pantex are neck and neck, and one might be a higher priority one year and the other the next year based on what is happening at the site at that time.

The nuclear explosive safety category generally falls next in line of our priorities, and then I hesitate to characterize them this way, but the lesser sites -- Nevada, Lawrence Livermore, Sandia, and the Tritium facilities -- are definitely our lower priorities. We do not maintain continuous presence there, but let's not forget that they are a significant part of our manpower budget. Next slide, please.

In developing this work plan, we did account for the programmatic issues that Chris discussed. Emergency preparedness and response, as Chris said, remains an overriding Board priority. Major reviews at Los Alamos are planned. At Pantex, we are basically close to completing some of that review activity. We also will have opportunities to observe at Livermore, Sandia, and Nevada. And in general, at all the nuclear weapon sites, we do try to observe, as the opportunities arise, any exercises that they are running at the sites.

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As Chris mentioned, actually -- twice, once as in general we're concerned with safety basis, but also as part of implementing the new 3009 standard, we have made it a point to have at least one safety-basis-related review at each of the sites. At several of the sites we have more than one.

At Los Alamos, we're concerned, of course, with the Plutonium Facility. At Pantex, when you fold in the nuclear explosive safety activities, there are several aspects of the safety basis that we approach from different directions. And then at Y-12 we're concerned because of the aging facilities, concerns that we all have there.

And then we have, again, opportunities to observe ongoing activities. The National Criticality Experiments Research Center at the Nevada Nuclear site is one of the key ones. Also, implementation of TSR, so that's going one step beyond what's in the safety basis and down to how are they putting the controls in play at the field level. And, of course, the Sandia Annular Core Research Reactor facility, we do have the opportunity actually to observe an external review by EA at headquarters, and that, we hope, will yield some interesting data. Next slide, please.

I'll touch just briefly on these. As Chris

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mentioned, both quality assurance, and software quality assurance are important to us. You already had a bit of a discussion on that earlier. Nuclear criticality safety: Savannah River, of course, is a concern. John Pasko will be talking to that a little bit, but on the nuclear weapons side, the Plutonium Facility at Los Alamos is still in the midst of recovering from their pause in operations.

And then conduct of operations, conduct of maintenance is a programmatic issue that we find, actually, carries a little bit of weight at the operational facilities. And lastly, at the Board's direction, we will spend some time this year planning for a review that will occur in 2017 that has to do with the process by which the design agencies provide weapon response information to Pantex. Next slide, please.

Lastly, we factored in some lessons learned from events at WIPP. We conducted a lessons-learned review internal to the staff to see if there were some things that we could do differently -- you know, make sure that the Board is up on the step for the unknown-unknowns that are out there.

And in this case, we decided that we could, in fact, formalize the planning regarding the minimum level of site visits that we would conduct at unmanned sites.

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And we have developed monthly site reporting mechanisms. In fact, if you go to the Board's website, you'll find that starting this past July we have put monthly reports up for these sites. And we've put a higher emphasis on making sure we have access to internal database and tracking programs that are at each of the sites. Next slide, please.

You've seen this chart. I'm highlighting the section of the chart that talks to the NNSA focus. We have slightly less than one-quarter of the Office of the Technical Director resources focused on NNSA sites and facilities. One clarification I would like to make, there was a discussion about -- I believe Mr. Sullivan asked the question about how long does it take to bring someone on board, and one thing that I would like to throw into that is security clearances can be a problem.

The process by which clearances are gained is taking much longer based on more recent process controls that have been put in place. And, so, it is -- there are some sites and facilities where you don't have to have a clearance, but in general, if you're working at an NNSA site, a clearance is required. That can make it difficult for a newly arrived staff member to be thrown into the mix at NNSA. Next slide, please.

This is just: given the slightly less than 25

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percent of the resources, where do I spend them? As you can see, LANL gets the lion's share of the pie. Y-12 and Pantex are neck and neck -- in the same category, though. Those are the three largest consumers of resources. Nuclear explosive safety, as I said, is kind of a category all its own. And then in the lower tier we have both Nevada, Livermore, and Sandia, also. Some times is involved with interactions at the headquarters level and the followup on Recommendation 2009-2, which is the Plutonium Facility at Los Alamos.

So, I will talk a little bit in more detail about each part of that pie chart. Next slide, please. No, you went two slides. Back up one, please. Thank you.

So, at Los Alamos, as I said, we're focused on emergency preparedness. We will also continue to work on the confluence of events at the Plutonium Facility. They are still resuming operations following the pause for criticality safety and conduct of operations issues. They are executing the plan to conduct readiness assessments and bring the specific operations back online. In fact, they completed another one just this past -- just this past week.

We're also continuing to work with NNSA headquarters on how are we going to resolve the seismic

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concerns with the Plutonium Facility. And we are also -- as you recall, we just recently issued a technical report on material at risk on the first floor of the Plutonium Facility to the Department, and we understand that the responsibility for that has been given to NA-10, so we will be interacting, staff to staff, with NA-10 to see what they're going to pursue -- what they can take out of the information that we provide them on material at risk.

Operations at LANL are also complicated by a recent development at Area G, which is where they take care of transuranic waste. Essentially, they have four open potential inadequacies in the safety analysis in Area G that are causing them to also have difficulty conducting operations. They are in a condition right now where they're still trying to get a handle on what exactly is the hazard and the risk. We are interacting closely with them, and that is actually taking a lot of our resources.

If you fold that in with the issues that the Board is already on record with the RANT facility and the WCRR facility, they really have a problem processing, storing, and moving transuranic waste. And that has an impact on all operations at the site. Next slide, please.

At this point, Adam is going to discuss the

design and construction issues at Los Alamos.

DR. POLOSKI: Okay. For the nuclear facility design and infrastructure scope at Los Alamos, we try to focus in on designing in the safety early in the process and having that be an integral part of the design process and identify safety issues as early as possible so that they can be corrected and before they are finalized are actually concrete or steel.

So, there were three major areas that we were focusing in on at LANL. The first one is plutonium infrastructure, and there, we're focusing in on the oversight of NNSA activities to transform operations out of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility.

The Transuranic Waste Facility at LANL, we are focusing in on followup reviews to resolve open Board issues from a project letter that was issued a couple of years ago. That includes also review of new documented safety analyses as the project nears completion of construction activities and transition to the Nuclear Weapons Program Group for startup operations of the Transuranic Waste Facility.

The last project that we're looking at is the Transuranic Liquid Waste Facility, and we're reviewing the new preliminary safety design report for that facility that's under design right now.

MR. DWYER: Next slide. Shifting now to Y-12, as I noted, we would be looking at multiple safety basis reviews at some sites. This is one of those sites. We're looking at both the Beta 2E and the 9215 safety bases. We're also -- although it says Area 5 De-inventory, what that really means is they want to consolidate the uranium storage to the HEUMF facility, and so in order to execute the de-inventory as planned, they have to make changes to the HEUMF safety basis. That's what we're interested in.

And then we'll be looking at pieces of the vital safety systems. So, several fire suppression system reviews and confinement ventilation system reviews. Those also dovetail nicely with some work that's going on with the design and construction group.

We also are looking into the oversight of contractor programs. In particular, you'll see that we're looking into the oversight provided by the NNSA Production Office. The review at Y-12 is actually linked to a review at Pantex since NPO controls both sites. And a key feeder of information into the NPO oversight systems is the contractor assurance system that is used by CNS at Y-12 and Pantex. So, we'll be looking at that.

And the staff has already talked to the Board about the disciplined operations. That's formal conduct

of operations and maintenance, concerns that we have at Y-12. We'll be continuing our look at that this year and heavy interaction with the staffs of NPO and CNS.

Looking at the design and construction operations at Y-12 -- Adam.

DR. POLOSKI: Yeah, there are two main areas that we're going to look at for the FY16, and that includes the uranium processing facility. They're currently in preliminary design, and so we're going to review their design information as it's generated. And that includes a new preliminary safety design report that's scheduled to be produced this year.

Also, direct electrolytic reduction and electro-refining project. There was a recent project letter that the Board had issued on that project. They had to deal with the facility that it's being located in and some extended life concerns with that facility. And, so, we would be reviewing the response to DOE's response to that Board letter. And considering that the staff found that the project itself consisted of low-hazard activities. And that's it.

MR. DWYER: Next slide. At Pantex, as the Board is already aware, emergency preparedness and response is a major focus. We're also continuing our look at the various pieces of the safety basis that

support both facility and weapon operations. We are concerned with the USQ and the new information processes, and the dispersion calculations that they have executed there. We're continuing to follow up on issues with the special tooling and the implementation of technical safety requirements. And then all of this is rolled up into the documentation that controls how they process these pieces of information.

We also are, as I said, looking into NPO oversight, so Pantex is the mirror image of Y-12, since it's the same field office. As Chris had mentioned, quality assurance/software quality assurance is a focus at Pantex. There was some question about prioritization. We had actually intended for the Pantex QA review to happen last September. We could not execute it because Pantex was on strike at the time. So, we kicked it back down in the order, and Nevada came up next.

Also, conduct of maintenance, as the Board is aware -- we had some concerns with the lack of improvement between the last review about three years ago and the review we just executed. And the Board has sent a letter to NNSA in the past month.

A particular item of interest at Pantex is nuclear explosive safety. Next slide, please. Thank you.

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There is actually for the next two years a very heavy schedule of nuclear explosive safety studies that NNSA will be attempting to execute. What that means is we expect that there will be three major weapon family nuclear explosive safety studies occurring this year. I'm not naming the programs in the interest of security. The interesting thing is last year the Department of Energy issued the new -- the revised nuclear explosive safety orders. That means this will be their first attempt to implement the two new revised NES standards. So, these are going to be an important milestone. We'll be closely involved in that effort.

We also are expecting that they will attempt to put in play the new special tooling that they have had onboard for several years that we've been waiting for them to implement on another particular weapon program. And all of these will culminate in appropriate readiness activities.

And we also expect that the normal NES change evaluation process will be occurring. That will give us several new opportunities to watch them use the new NES standards there. Next slide, please.

Turning to the Nevada site, we have an ongoing list of maladies at the Device Assembly Facility. They are still trying to get things in order on their fire

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suppression system. And that's been a difficult problem for them to wrestle to the ground. Also, they have been making ventilation system modifications based on some ongoing contamination issues that they had with the criticality machines there.

Again, as we mentioned, they have a QA/SQA review that we already executed there, and there are several opportunities that we have had to observe some external assessments. For example, they just did the quadrennial evaluation of technical qualification program certification. So, we had an opportunity to shadow that review and learn some more lessons about how federal qualification is being maintained.

I also note that there is a facility at the Nevada site, U1a. It's a tunnel. It's important that they learn the lessons that the rest of the complex is learning about WIPP, and we'll be interacting with them, but we believe that they are taking onboard some of the lessons that are important to learn there. Next slide, please.

And now down to the lesser priority (for us), sites. At Lawrence Livermore, we have had the opportunity to watch their emergency exercise just recently. We have been doing a thorough scrub of the ventilation systems, and as the Board should recall, we

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are at the tag end of the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis 10-year review that they've been doing. They did work with us to resolve some of the lingering discrepancies we had there. I believe we will be closed out on that issue fairly soon.

At Sandia, another chance to watch the emergency exercise. You should detect a theme there. We're observing emergency exercises wherever we can. And also we've been able to look at the research reactor safety bases. And then at Tritium, as the Board is aware, we have provided you with an issue report on the documented safety analysis review that we've been conducting for the last 18 months there.

That's, a really broad brush, the spectrum of work we have proposed for this fiscal year for the Nuclear Weapon Program. Next slide, please.

Where are we uncertain about whether we can execute this? Well, the first place that we're uncertain is that our programs, our reviews of operational programs, are very heavily dependent on the schedule that NNSA keeps. So, our observations of readiness reviews, our interactions on nuclear explosive safety are directly tied to any slippages in NNSA schedule. We adapt to those as best we can.

I would also point out that the cascading

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impacts of these can cause us to have, at least internal to the staff, resource conflicts, but we try to resolve those, for example, when we shifted the Pantex QA review from September to next March.

And then the unknown-unknowns. Emergent events may cause us to have to shift resources. I would point out that those are not necessarily restricted to events at NNSA sites. The event at WIPP actually caused several of my resources to be shifted to John because it was all-hands-on-deck for that.

Subject to any questions, that completes the statement that I had for today.

MS. CONNERY: Thank you. Following form, we're going to see if there are any questions for either Mr. Dwyer or Mr. Poloski -- Dr. Poloski, based on the presentation that they just gave.

Clarifying questions? Mr. Sullivan.

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes. First, just as the acronym, please. I see you have an acronym list here, but I think you -- for the public you used three that aren't on this list, and you may have used more. But EA, that's enterprise assessments. That's -- can you explain what that is?

MR. DWYER: Yes, sir. That's an NNSA headquarters office that basically does programmatic

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assessments, if you will, across the complex.
MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. HEUMF?
MR. DWYER: Oh, Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility.
MR. SULLIVAN: Yeah, you used that acronym --
MR. DWYER: Ooh, right. We did not have that one there. Yes, sir.
MR. SULLIVAN: -- but it's not on your list.
MR. DWYER: That is a particular facility at the Y-12 complex.
MR. SULLIVAN: Okay, yeah. This list is a list of acronyms which are in your slides.
MR. DWYER: Yes, sir.
MR. SULLIVAN: The acronyms I'm throwing out are ones that you said verbally. They're not on your slides. That's why they're not on your list. Okay, so, that's a facility at Y-12 where they store uranium; is that right?
MR. DWYER: Yes, sir, it is.
MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. And CNS?
MR. DWYER: CNS is Consolidated Nuclear Security. That's the contractor that supports Y-12 and Pantex operations.
MR. SULLIVAN: Okay, thank you. So, quickly back to slide 32, which says lessons learned from WIPP,

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so just to clarify, these are -- you're referring here to lessons -- this is DNFSB lessons learned about DNFSB; is that correct?
MR. DWYER: Yes, sir. This is internal to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
MR. SULLIVAN: Okay, because I point out on a later slide, 40, 41, you use similar language, lessons learned from WIPP having to do with U1a, but I think there you're referring to NNSA's applying lessons that the Department of Energy learned from WIPP to U1a; is that correct?
MR. DWYER: Absolutely, sir.
MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. And back on slide 29, so, if I look at the practical impact statement there, when you spoke to this, Mr. Dwyer, you talked about LANL being highest because of the amount of material at risk and its proximity to the public. But you have a statement on there that says, "the current state of operations at LANL make it the highest of these three." So, you didn't actually talk on this slide about operations; you later talked about operations and some of the issues.
So, if you could just clarify, how much of -- you know, the fact that LANL is of your highest concern, how much of that is due to the fact that it simply has material close to the public and how much is due to the

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current state of operations?
MR. DWYER: I would say that the current state of operations to which I was referring was the problems at Area G. And, so, right now, we don't have a good handle on what is the risk, and that's why that one is a higher priority for us.
MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. So, can you explain that a little more, please.
MR. DWYER: Yes, sir. So, in this case, the material of concern is plutonium. In this case, the proximity to the public is almost the shortest of all the sites. The quantities -- I will speak in round numbers -- are in tens of thousands of plutonium-equivalent curies, in sum. And the frequency of the accidents at present remains indeterminate. So, for that reason, the calculus that gets us to the risk to the public, which is basically the frequency times the consequence, could be very high. That's why we're concerned.
MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. Thank you. And my last question actually goes to Dr. Poloski. So, you had a slide in this that referred to issues you're tracking at LANL, and you had another slide, issues you're tracking at Y-12. And as the Chairman explained before, these presentations are not set up exactly in parallel with how our organization internally is set up. So, I think the

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second half of what you pay attention to will come in the next presentation dealing with EM and their facility infrastructure items that you're tracking.
So, what I'm going to ask you is of the things that you've presented so far, is there anything that is of a significant concern? And if the significant concerns are still to come in EM, you can just say that and we'll wait on after that presentation.
DR. POLOSKI: Yes, you're correct that we're going to cover the EM topics in the next presentation for NFDI. You know, in terms of, you know, elements that I think might need some more attention, you know, we have been following the extended life program at the Y-12 facility. Some of those facilities are going to be on the order of 50 to 100 years old at the end of the mission. Well, I guess right now they're 50; they're going to be 100 years old at the end of the extended life mission.
And the process that they go about recertifying that these facilities are safe and can adequately perform their function was kind of mentioned on the direct electrolytic reduction bullet on the slide, and I think that that's an area that probably warrants a little bit more attention from the Board. Does that answer your questions, sir?

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MR. SULLIVAN: It does. I'll just say for the record I hope to be about 100 years old at the end of my extended life.

DR. POLOSKI: Yeah.

MS. CONNERY: Do you have any other questions? Mr. Santos?

MR. SANTOS: Just one observation. Can you go back to the slides of lessons learned on WIPP for us, 20? Yeah, that one right there.

One of the things I observed after WIPP is that how quickly I was able to find Board previous correspondence on topics that had direct connection to the events at WIPP. It's like the Board was able to prophesize a little bit on it. But when I digged on it, there was a lack of followup on the issues. It's like the Board was able to do a review; identify issues years in advance; but then something happened that they weren't really followed up to completion; and events happened that could have been, like the Accident Investigation Board concluded, prevented.

Are any of your efforts associated to looking at some of the already previously issued Board correspondence and how good we do of following up on those identified issues so that we don't have a similar situation on the other sides? For example, I'm referring

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to, like, on the fire hazard analysis as an example that -- on WIPP.

MR. DWYER: If you're speaking to WIPP in particular, I'm going to defer that to John, since --

MR. SANTOS: I'm speaking in general. The observation is that the Board has previously communicated the identified issues, but I think there was a little bit of a breakdown in the followup. So, to me, that's a lesson learned for us.

I was wondering if an element of that is being factored in your efforts for your sites, you know, going back to old Board correspondence, your tracking systems, what items we really don't have a good resolution on, even though they have been already identified. That's all.

MR. DWYER: Yes, sir. Well, so, the -- for WIPP in particular, as I said, I'll tee John up, but for -- yes, sir, for following issues to closure, I would actually submit that if you captured any of my staff in the hallway, they would tell you that they live in terror of me asking them about updates to the tracking system. So, yes, sir, we do that. I know that we follow up on safety issues, even if they're staff safety issues, and they have not risen yet to the level of being subject to Board correspondence. We do follow through with the

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Department, and we do continue to pick at the scab, if you will, until we can be satisfied that the requirements are being met.

MR. SANTOS: Thank you.

MS. CONNERY: Any other questions? I'll take a moment to just ask one, Mr. Dwyer. When you talked about the factors that affect priorities, which I think I understand, you know, the risks, the type and quantity of materials, the process and setting of operations involved, later on in your presentation you talked about specific issues with maintenance and also with infrastructure. And I just wanted to get, if you could, a little bit of an assessment from you as to how much the degradation of infrastructure actually impacts your risk prioritization.

MR. DWYER: Actually, the degradation of infrastructure at Y-12 is a particular aspect that has caused us to raise particular reviews higher in the priority list, so it does impact that. If you look at facilities that are falling down around their ears that are still being used, you find, for example, at Y-12 that they have a real problem there. You find at Pantex, for example, those tend to be facilities that are not used for nuclear explosive operations. They have other operations going on in there that from their perspective

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deserve better protection and they're working on such things, but not that would be within our purview.

So, for example, at Pantex, they've just designed and built a new high explosive pressing facility. They needed to do that for those very reasons, but it's not something that we were pursuing. Same thing at Los Alamos. They've had an ongoing struggle with how will they maintain plutonium operations now and into the future, given the facilities that they have there. So, they've been wrestling with that problem. Their decisions actually have a huge impact on what it is we're looking at.

So, when Adam spoke to looking at the plutonium infrastructure at Los Alamos, that's a direct result of the fact that they have to get out of CMR, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility, Mr. Sullivan. And in order to do that, you have to -- you have to make operational room for the mission. And, so, they are struggling with: How do we do that? Where can we put these things? What design and construction projects have to be executed? What refurbishment can take place. So, that's kind of a roundabout answer, but that's the best I can do.

MS. CONNERY: That's perfect. Thank you so much.

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Any other questions?
(No response.)
MS. CONNERY: If not, we'll ask Mr. Pasko to join us. Let me get my script out.
So, I'm going to recognize Mr. John Pasko, the Board's Group Lead for Materials Processing and Stabilization, who will join Dr. Poloski at the presenters table and they will report to the Board on the OTD's work -- Office of Technical Director's Work Plan Activities for Fiscal Year 2016 related to the Department of Energy's Environmental Management Program issues. Mr. Pasko.
MR. PASKO: Good afternoon, Madam Chair, Madam Vice Chair, members of the Board, members of the staff, members of DOE and the public. Good afternoon, and thank you for the opportunity to present to you today the plan for the Nuclear Materials Stabilization and Processing Groups work in Fiscal Year 2016.
Before I get started, I think a partial answer to your question about how do we track, you know, outstanding issues. My understanding is the Board would like us to, on a rotating basis, do a kind of deep dive each month on different sites throughout the year. So, we haven't heard yet what the Board's desires are, but we're planning on either starting off with Savannah River

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or Los Alamos.
And I'm surprised Tim didn't mention this, but Tim and I and the site cogs and the site reps have gotten together and tried to put together a plan what that deep dive would consist of. And one of the things is a review of the outstanding items at IACTS and another is a review of previous correspondence to see if we can identify any issues. So, I think we're going to do what you have in mind.
MR. SANTOS: I appreciate that. Thank you.
MR. PASKO: And I think Mr. Dwyer owes me a big thank you for handling that for him.
MR. SANTOS: Before Sean jumps at you, what's IACTS stands for?
MR. PASKO: Oh, it's the issues and concerns tracking system. It might be on a sheet up there. I do have a couple that didn't make my list of -- of abbreviations, but I'll -- I promise you I'll cover them verbally before I use them.
I guess at this time we ought to go to the next slide. This is very similar to slides you've seen before. The NMPS work plan flows from the agency's objectives as outlined in the strategic plan. Our intent is to improve the safety of operations at the six DOE environmental management sites under the Board's purview,

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as you can see on the slide. The plan is an effort to perform independent and timely oversight, thereby strengthening the safety posture. Next slide, please.
NMPS utilizes just under a quarter of the Board's assets, the technical staff's personnel resources. And once I discuss what the why's and the what's are for next year, I'll show you a pie chart that shows you how we break that down amongst those EM sites. Next slide, please.
What? Well, the safe start of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant is of paramount concern. The restart's necessary to relieve the risk associated with the transuranic waste holdup at the various generators sites. There also exists the possibility of increased schedule pressure as the calendar year 2016 progresses and we approach the proclaimed startup date.
And, finally, we have and will continue to play a key role in the review and revision of their safety basis documents. So, that's basically the background on the WIPP. We also will continue an effort that we began last year, and it's in keeping with what Chris talked about as one of his -- with the crosscutting issues, but we want to continue to review the adequacy of safety basis based on risk to the public and workers, complexity of operations, and time since last reviewed. I'll

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mention the specific targets in just a moment. Next slide, please.
We also intend to continue to focus on safety management programs as an indicator of how strong the foundation is at each of the various sites and facilities. As you'll see, there's a bias this year towards WIPP. In order to ensure our reviews take place in a timely enough manner to support their restart efforts, we have three safety management programs I'll list later that we intend to follow closely.
There's also an effort this year to continue to follow the major new construction projects to ensure safety is included in the design and that safety issues are identified early in the process. Dr. Poloski will discuss those. I didn't put them on separate slides. They're at the bottom of my individual site slides, so I'll let Adam speak to those. Next slide, please.
This slide shows the breakdown of the work amongst EM sites. As you can see, WIPP gets about a quarter of our effort, and Hanford/Savannah River combined is about half. Again, we shifted the emphasis a little bit from Savannah River to Hanford this year to -- and I'll discuss why we did that here in a minute.
And before I get into -- next slide, please. Before I get into details, I'd like to take a moment and

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highlight what I think is particularly important. I'm very proud of what the NMPS Group accomplished in 2015. And I believe we've made a measurable improvement in safety at several of the EM sites. First of all, following on the heel of the risk rankings that we completed at Savannah River in 2014, we went and risk-ranked the facilities at Idaho and Hanford. And the results of those have been used to inform initially last year's plan and then going forward this year's plan.

Additionally, group review identified four potential inadequacies of safety analysis that resulted in positive unreviewed safety questions at Idaho's -- I don't believe this makes my acronym list -- Idaho's Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project, AMWTP, and Savannah River's Defense Waste Processing Facility.

At AMWTP, safety basis concerns regarding assumptions made regarding fires and propane explosions were not adequately developed. We strengthened the actual safety basis, but also I think we challenged the site office at Idaho to how come those -- you know, those concerns hadn't been previously identified. So, I think we had an overall -- a factor of improvement there at the site.

At Savannah River, the two PISAs were identified with the Defense Waste Processing Facility in

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the flow that essentially would associate the amount of flammable gas buildup and explosive hazards. Again, they both resulted in positive USQs, and I think we've made -- not only identified weaknesses that will strengthen their safety basis, but we identified a process problem with the way they use models to predict their flow sheet. So, I think we've got that -- we made some positive impact there, as well.

Moving on, I'll talk specifically site by site. Next slide, please. WIPP, I also wanted to let you know that I put pictures on these because I thought it would be the end of the day, things might be slowing down a little bit, that they might help distract you. But at WIPP, we've got a couple things at WIPP we're doing. One is the consolidated evaluation of safety. There are numerous ESSs that were produced since the February 2014 events that have some difficult and technical safety requirements and sometimes conflicting.

In late April, there had been six TSR violations identified, which led the site to commit to revising that -- the ESS into a combined ESS. Also, their planned revision five to their documented safety analysis is a big requirement. It's a step that needs to be done to strengthen that safety basis, and it's a key part of their restart activities. We have actually

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completed reviews on both of those and submitted our comments and agenda items to the Department of Energy.

Next on the list is the oversight of generator sites. This is something we're going to take a look at this year. We know that the National TRU Program checks and balances was obviously a fragile system because one error at one site resulted in a breakdown that essentially took WIPP offline. So, I've not yet seen strong evidence that this problem has been solved. And there are plans to do reviews at the generator sites and to make changes to the true waste program. I have a little bit of a concern that I don't have a lot of visibility on what that is yet, so that's an area we promise to focus on.

Again, as I mentioned, we're going to continue our look at the -- those three safety maintenance programs. And as a result of that, kind of biases SMPs to WIPP. My resources are kind of focused at WIPP. I don't have -- you know, in order to be able to support readiness activities towards the end of the year, I need to make sure that these get done. So, you'll see I'm biased at looking at safety programs at WIPP versus the other sites.

Again, readiness activities are on the schedule to be supported, and I'll let Adam talk about the

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permanent ventilation system.

DR. POLOSKI: Yeah, so, at the WIPP facility, they're currently undergoing a major modification process to add a new underground ventilation system. The NFDI group will focus in on performing reviews as they transition from a conceptual design into preliminary design.

MR. PASKO: Okay, next slide, please.

At Hanford, with greater stability with my cognizant engineers in an effort to rebalance the efforts between the two sites, I've shifted the effort in Hanford's favor this year. Key areas include the demolition of the plutonium finishing plant, which is slated to complete -- to be on slab at the end of September 2016. We also intend to do two consolidated reviews, consolidated between the Hanford and Savannah River sites, one on tank farms and one on site transportation.

We hope to utilize the same teams to conduct reviews at both sites to be able to gain from the knowledge of comparing one to the other. They're both -- those tank farm DSAs are pretty extensive, and it's a stretch -- I think it's a stretch to try and think I'll get them both done this year, but I intend to get them both started.

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Also, we're going to look at the Redox and the Purex facilities at Hanford. Adam?

DR. POLOSKI: The Waste Treatment Plant at Hanford is a big focus for the NFDI Group. We're going to be changing direction from the baseline design to focusing in on direct feed of low-activity waste into the facility and the low activity waste pretreatment system capability that the Department of Energy is planning to build to start operations as early as possible to clean up the tank waste.

And we're also focusing in on outstanding Board issues and resolutions of those issues at the Waste Treatment Plant. There are several right now that have been open for several years, and we're -- the Department is making progress in resolving those, and we're trying to keep track of that progress.

MR. PASKO: Next slide, please. Savannah River. We intend to complete reviews begun in 2015 on both the Savannah River National Laboratory safety basis and criticality safety at H-Canyon/HB-Line. Please excuse my error. The "intend to use same teams" bullet should be under tank farm safety basis as it is under transportation. I apologize. I noted the error after they'd been posted.

NFDI -- well, I think we intend to start the

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transportation review at Savannah River. That's been a -- that's been a pet peeve of one of the site reps down there, Dan Burnfield, so we're going to try and take a look there. And we weren't able to get to that last year, so that's a carryover into Fiscal Year 2016.

Adam, you want to talk a little bit about salt waste?

DR. POLOSKI: Sure. So, at the Savannah River site, one of the main areas of NFDI focus is the salt waste processing facility or SWPF. They're finishing construction of that facility right now, and they're going to be transitioning it into operations here within the next year or two, and they will be generating a documented safety analysis that we will plan to review in the near future.

MR. PASKO: I am in the process of developing an information paper to outline for the Board's -- for your use how we intend to do that transition, what we intend to look at. Construction should complete next year; we expect the operations to follow two years later. So, we're a little early in the game yet, but I want to put together a plan and I have several options with personnel moves I might make to identify a lead, but I'm not ready to commit to that yet. But we are working on that, on the operational plan to support startup.

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Next slide, Idaho. Idaho focus areas, the group will continue to closely follow the startup of the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit. The facility's currently about one week into a three-week effort to complete simulated testing. After that, they'll do a shutdown to verify plant alterations performed, as predicted. And if all continues to go well, it should be processing radioactive waste in early 2016. Every time I say that, I get a text message saying, hey, something else -- we had another problem out there, but -- they recently had problems with the filter housings. It turns out there wasn't a gap and the expansion of the filters inside the housings caused cracking. They think they have that solved, and they've been back up for about a week now.

We have already this year completed a review of the instrumentation and control at IWTU; did not find any significant issues. And we are gathering documents now in support of a review of the Radioactive Waste Management Complex documented safety analysis. This ranked out is number two of our risk -- when we performed our risk ranking last year. So, we hope to get that done this year. Next slide, please.

Oak Ridge National Laboratory. We are looking at the Transuranic Waste Processing Center. As I'm sure

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you're aware, the contractor changed out recently, and we've been out looking at conduct of operations as the new contractor has taken over. We also are preparing a safety basis agenda or to review that safety basis. And, lastly, we're --

DR. POLOSKI: Yeah, they're performing a major modification of that facility called the Sludge Buildout Project. And they're in preliminary design. We're going to be reviewing design documents as they're produced on that effort.

MR. PASKO: Right. Next slide.

A couple of additional focus areas. We also look at open Board recommendations. We have both 2012-1, where we intend to closely watch the work on the -- that they've commenced on the four least contaminated plutonium cells, cells six through nine. We were down there last week. In fact, they had the windows off -- the outer windows off.

And we're conducting some NDA -- improved NDA measurements to hope they can -- they can prove their technique out and, you know, identify where the hot spots are prior to turning around to cells one through five. And we have -- we will be closely following the response to recent Board correspondence on what their plan is through Fiscal Year 16 and 17.

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At Hanford, we'll continue to closely follow the open recommendation, 2012, on flammable gas controls at the tank farms. We've recently received contractor submittal of Implementation Plan Deliverable 2-1. We owe you a brief when we're complete our review of that. And DOE is also on track to provide the Board a brief. It will probably be in early January 2016. Next slide.

Uncertainties. In keeping with the direction that I received last year, I'll comment on the things that lead to uncertainty in our plan. They're similar to what you've heard from Tim. Much of our plan is contingent on EM's progress in areas such as WIPP's restart, IWTU, and PFP. So, if they slide, we slide.

We've been able to successfully -- at least at IWTU -- take those assets and roll them back into the plan. So, I think we -- you know, they're doable do's. We also face challenges associated with EM's resources and the potential for a continuing resolution. Many of the things that we are looking at, though, aren't contingent on Environmental Management, either their schedule or their budget.

And, so, I believe the lion's share of what we have we'll conduct as planned. I will also say that there are some -- there's some potential for things to change as the various sites fail to meet milestones and

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they have interactions with their regulator groups. It might impact our workload. For instance, if the Board's asked to comment on a delay in one area or another.

Cascading impacts can result in resource conflicts. And, again, emergent things could always take precedence of what we have planned.

Subject to my -- to your questions, this completes my prepared remarks. Thank you again for the opportunity to tell you what we're trying to do in 2016 and for publicly letting me get on the record how proud I am of the NMPS Group efforts and results in 2015. Thank you.

MS. CONNERY: Thank you, Dr. Pasko. So, shall we start with the acronym, please, Mr. Sullivan?

MR. SULLIVAN: Sure. I had high hopes based on your promising start that you would do better than Mr. Dwyer, and my hopes were dashed. So, the National TRU program, is that the opposite of the National False Program? What is --

MR. PASKO: The National Transuranic Waste Program, sir.

MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you very much. TSR, ESS, you --

MR. PASKO: TSR are technical safety requirements, and ESS -- I think it was on the slide.

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That combined is an evaluation of safety situation.

MR. SULLIVAN: All right, so we'll give you half credit for that. Redux and Purex?

MR. PASKO: Are -- they're the acronyms that two of the canyons at Hanford are the process used to dissolve fuel and --

MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. Neither one of those are currently in service; is that correct?

MR. PASKO: No, sir, they're both -- they're both shut down.

MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. And you said NDA measurements.

MR. PASKO: That's --

MR. SULLIVAN: Nondestructive assay?

MR. PASKO: Nondestructive assay. I was having trouble with the D. I was going to look over at Rich, who played a big role in getting my acronyms.

MR. SULLIVAN: So, explain to the public what is that. What is nondestructive assay?

MR. PASKO: It's a use of instrumentation to take measurements to be able to predict what -- what material is in the location and where it's located. It's pretty important when, you know, you're talking about trying to de-inventory and then, you know, take down a structure like PFP. You need to know where the materials

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are and --

MR. SULLIVAN: It's a hard business to do without acronyms, isn't it? Okay. So, if nobody else had an acronym.

MS. CONNERY: You passed.

MR. SULLIVAN: If we can go back to slide 52 for a minute.

MR. PASKO: Fifty-two.

MR. SULLIVAN: Yeah.

MR. PASKO: Okay.

MR. SULLIVAN: So, you have oversight of generator sites up here. Are we looking -- are we going to apply assets at WIPP for that? Or are we going to apply assets in other places because --

MR. PASKO: Yes.

MR. SULLIVAN: Let me just -- let me just finish my question. So, let's go back two slides to slide 50. So, on slide 50, you've got up there, you've got a little tiny sliver of the pie that says LANL, 0.1. So, that was the site where they actually generated waste that led to the WIPP accident. So, are we going back to LANL to look, as well as other places?

MR. PASKO: Well, we'll have to look at LANL, what LANL -- upgrades LANL does to their program, but I'm involved in LANL because of the -- there's a bridge

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contract in place now between NNSA and EM with respect to Area G and the transuranic waste facilities. And, so, as you know, the sister drum of the drum that caused the February 14th event in 2014 is still there at Area G. And, so, I am in -- I have personnel involved in the oversight of their planning to remediate those drums and the impact on the safety basis until those drums are remediated. So --

MR. SULLIVAN: Okay, so -- but for clarity, on slide 52, where it says we're going to look at oversight of generator sites, we're looking at the oversight of generator sites that's done by the folks at WIPP? Is that -- that's what we're looking at as --

MR. PASKO: No --

MR. SULLIVAN: -- opposed to ourselves directly looking at the --

MR. PASKO: -- we're going to look at it from a national -- from the national transuranic program's perspective. Now, you know, they're -- Idaho is a generator site. They've got -- they've got hundreds of shipments in abeyance waiting for WIPP to reopen. Hanford hasn't sent anything to WIPP in years, but they will have transuranic waste shipments. We have waste accumulated at Oak Ridge National Lab, and I want to make sure that the changes to the transuranic waste program

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that are put in place to preclude another event like the Area G WIPP event that they actually are -- that they actually are robust enough to give us confidence and that they are actually at the various generator sites, are actually being -- you know, we've looked at them close enough to have confidence that they're being implemented properly.

So, the question is it's from a trans -- it's from a programmatic side, but we're going to have to look at the individual sites. Does that answer your question?

MR. SULLIVAN: It does. Specifically with respect to Los Alamos, those individuals made errors -- technical errors -- that resulted in procedures that said mixed waste with an absorbent that was organic when it should have been inorganic. So, has anybody -- whether it's us, DOE, you talked about a bridge contract -- oversight of that or responsibility for that is shifting from NNSA to EM? Who's gone back to the Los Alamos folks and looked and said whatever their problem was, they fixed their problem. Do we know?

MR. PASKO: That was -- that will be contingent upon LANL being able to ship waste, but at this time, it will probably -- it will be NNSA that does that. They're still responsible for the -- during the run of the bridge contract, which they expect to run about a year and a

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half. That's still NNSA is the prime responsible party for the -- for what's taking place at Area G.

MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. Has that happened yet or are they --

MR. PASKO: No, sir. I don't think it's happened.

MR. SULLIVAN: -- are they mixing any waste out there? Or are they currently still --

MR. PASKO: I believe they're essentially shut down, based on the four pieces that are open out there; they have some significant issues to work through before they're handling waste. I think the first site that's going to get scrubbed will be Idaho. And as you may or may not be aware, as part of the 5506 effort, there was an -- there was a request that went out to the various generator sites to discuss any nitrated waste that they had processed.

And I've seen the response come back on half of the complex. There are 133 drums, I believe, that contain some nitrates at the Oak Ridge site. And we're looking at that data, but apparently they were all lab quantities of nitrates and deemed not to be necessarily a concern to WIPP.

MR. SULLIVAN: All right. And for the public, what did you mean by the 5506 effort?

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MR. PASKO: It's a standard that the transuranic manual essentially tells you how to -- how to build a safety basis, what kind of material at risk assumptions to make, and what kind of factors to use in determining what the dose consequence from various size transuranic waste arrays --

MR. SULLIVAN: So, the effort you referred to was in light of the accident at WIPP. DOE went back and looked at what their own standard told them they should be doing, and they found some areas that they needed to go figure out.

MR. PASKO: For example, the ARFRF that they're using at WIPP is .205 as opposed to one-time standardized fourth. There's a significant change there. That's one -- that's the subject of one of the open PISAs at Area G at Los Alamos. They're also -- they plan to -- I know -- they're going to enter into one of your favorite -- one of your favorite processes, RevCom. We're waiting for the statement that precludes that opening of that standard for revision. But we expect that to happen within the next month or two.

MR. SULLIVAN: All right, thanks.

Dr. Poloski, same question I had before for you. So, you've had several things mentioned in here, but in terms of priorities, what are you worried about

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here in the construction world of the environmental management at DOE?

DR. POLOSKI: So, we had a bullet that talked about the Waste Treatment Plant at Hanford. I believe that cleaning up the tank waste at Hanford, the tanks are degrading, going to be releasing into the environment. So, from an environmental standpoint, I think it's important to clean it up. It also introduces new hazards as the -- as those systems degrade over time.

So, cleaning up the waste effectively and efficiently and starting up the low-activity waste pretreatment system and the direct feed, I think, should be, you know, a priority, make sure that that's done safely.

MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you.

MS. CONNERY: Other Board Members? Ms. Roberson?

MS. ROBERSON: Two questions. Slide 51, Mr. Pasko. When we talk about risk-ranking the DSAs at Idaho and Hanford, did you have a different risk criteria or a subset of what Mr. Stokes went through early on?

MR. PASKO: No, ma'am. We use essentially the same --

MS. ROBERSON: The same criteria, okay. And, then, on 52, when we talk about the safety maintenance

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programs, maybe I misunderstood, but I understood your resources are kind of getting sucked up in looking at these safety management programs for WIPP.

MR. PASKO: Right.

MS. ROBERSON: How -- first -- a two-part question. One is who would be second? What site would be second? And number two, how are we making sure that we benefit from the investment we're putting at WIPP when we go to the other sites to look at similar programs? Does that make sense?

MR. PASKO: Yes, ma'am.

MS. ROBERSON: Okay.

MR. PASKO: Conduct of operations at Savannah River would be high on the list that we may not cover. I'm also interested in electrical safety and aging infrastructure of the electrical network at Hanford. They would be my next two. And I have limited ability to use our electrical folks, so we're going to look at electrical distribution here.

Fire protection is one that's in demand everywhere, but we're going to -- again, I think we need to -- we need to focus here so that we get a review done in support of the readiness activities when -- you know, as the year 2016 comes to an end and they want to do -- they want to do startup activities. So, that's why I

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biased them here.

Now, your second question is a little bit more challenging to answer. You know, that's something that applies everywhere, you know? How do -- you do a review; how do you -- how do you then take credit for what you learned at this place and be able to add it into the -- to what you're looking at going forward. I mean, that's exactly what we're trying to do with the combined tank farm review and transportation DSA.

From the safety maintenance programs, these -- we do a pretty good job of capturing the lessons learned and reapplying them to site, but this crosses over into the NPA area, and I guess the best way I can tell you to do that is we tend to try to keep key members at our reviews focused on these areas. You know, Tim Hunt does maintenance; and Don Owens does conduct of operations. So, we try to -- I think that's probably how we best capture that. I don't think we have a formal process, though.

MS. ROBERSON: Okay.

MR. PASKO: That may be something that you might want us to look at. Does that answer your question, ma'am?

MS. ROBERSON: Yes. Thank you.

MR. PASKO: Thank you.

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MS. CONNERY: So, can I just clarify your answer to Ms. Roberson? So, because of the resources that you're putting into WIPP, you're saying that you're not going to be able to conduct reviews of conduct of operations at Savannah River?

MR. PASKO: We are going to do conduct of operations at TWPC at Oak Ridge, and I have -- I don't have the assets to really cover that.

MS. CONNERY: It's not like kind of fighting the last war?

MR. PASKO: Excuse me, ma'am?

MS. CONNERY: Isn't that a little bit like fighting the last war? Disregard.

MR. PASKO: I hope that -- that the fact that they've been paused for three months and bringing themselves back into deliberate operations will -- you know, their own look would supplement our site. And we always have the site reps there, so it's not like we're totally ignoring it. But as far as it goes to those areas, again, I think it's in order to not be a delay and a roadblock in the startup of WIPP, we need to do these reviews as a priority.

MS. CONNERY: So, that leads me into my next question, which was actually helpfully brought up by you, which is the site reps. So, when you guys do your pie

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charts, and I should have asked Mr. Dwyer this, as well, do any of those resources also represent your site reps? Or how are they calculated into the resource --

MR. PASKO: We don't add the site reps in because -- so, they don't show up in the pie charts. They're not assigned in the work plan. So, they would be an addition to -- I guess we include them and you'd see the manned sites, Savannah River and Hanford, grow a little bit in size. Does that answer your question, ma'am?

MS. CONNERY: Yes. You mean the staffed sites? Any more questions for Mr. Pasko?

MR. SANTOS: Yes. I just want to say for the record that hope is not a strategy I like. This meeting is not about WIPP, so I'm not going to make it about WIPP and help me out. So, I guess I'm trying to ask, as you know, there are still sub-spectrums in the underground. The potential for a fire still exists. They have taken some actions in the interim, and there's a lot of effort focused on ESS, DSA, safety programs, a lot of paper exercises and training.

Can you comment on how effective have you and your staff been in influencing some of the compensatory measures that have taken or need to be taken now at WIPP?

MR. PASKO: Well, I think right off the bat we

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made a huge impact on their ability to conduct drills. You know, we observed a drill in December and February last year and provided feedback to say you're not adequately assessing your own performance. And I think they took that to heart.

I think we've, as promised, I promised you last year, I'm trying to -- and I've met the goal and then some at WIPP of two man-weeks per month of oversight. We've had -- we've identified numerous problems with procedures, conduct of operations through those weeks of oversight that we've supplied, and more recently in the review of the consolidated ESS and Revision 5 to the DSA, we found some problems with the sites -- now, these are preliminary; they haven't signed these documents out -- but their ability to demonstrate with a sound technical basis the protection of workers in the underground due to the materials that are behind incomplete closures at Room 7, Panel 7, and at -- and at Panel 6.

And as you're aware, I wasn't at the meeting last week, but it's our -- our efforts have resulted in them formalizing the basis for air monitors and the alarm set points, which is the one protective feature that, you know, those alarms would be used to protect the workers. Does that answer your question, sir?

MR. SANTOS: Yes.

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MS. CONNERY: Any other questions?

(No response.)

MS. CONNERY: Seeing none, thank you, Mr. Pasko and Mr. Poloski.

MR. PASKO: Thank you.

MS. CONNERY: So, we've got about an hour left, and our next order of business is a Board discussion on program issues and priorities, and then there will be time for public comment. So, in order to meet our timetable, I would suggest that we look at perhaps having our Board discussion between now and 3:45. If we need to go longer, we can, but that's my preliminary estimation of the time schedule.

So, with that, I know this is a lot of information to -- that's been presented to us, so I will turn to my fellow Board Members to see if they would like to start commenting. Ms. Roberson looked eager. Oh, sorry.

Anyone? Mr. Sullivan?

MR. SULLIVAN: Never bashful. We've got a lot of information here. What we don't have are a lot of recent recommendations to the Secretary of Energy providing advice on what we think may need to be done. So, just I've heard an awful lot about concerns. There's a whole slide that was given here, slide 35, concerns at

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Los Alamos, that talked about continuing seismic concerns at PF-4. We do have a recommendation on that, although it's six years old and a bit out of date, in my view.

We sent them a technical report on material at risk that essentially said the vast majority of the material that they have in that building, they don't actually need to have in that building. But we haven't made any formal recommendations to the Secretary on what to do with that.

There is -- there's issues at the Area G where they store waste there, and this is the place where the workforce actually made the error that led to the accident at the -- at WIPP. So, there's a lot there, and I'll just summarize by saying I'm concerned about it and I'm trying to get my hands around what, if anything, I should be making -- advising the Secretary of Energy.

So, I'm going to just implore the staff to come forward if they have any such things and provide those. I encourage the rest of the Board Members -- I mean, we can talk about such things in a closed format, and I hope that we will at some point in the future, to the extent that we'd be talking about making actual recommendations. I'm just trying now to simply say that I think there is -- I think there is work there that we need to do as an agency that we haven't done yet.

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In addition to the issues at Los Alamos, there's concern with the aging facilities at Y-12 and still in the recovery from the accident at WIPP, you know, whether or not the generator sites -- waste generator sites actually have good quality assurance of their procedures so that we don't have future problems similar to the one that occurred at Los Alamos, leading potentially to a future accidents like the ones at were experienced at WIPP last February.

So, again, I'm simply mentioning that I see a lot of things that sound to me like significant safety issues. I compare those to what we have for outstanding recommendations. We're not allowed to talk publicly about recommendations that we might make until we actually make them. I'm just taking this opportunity to implore the staff to bring forward suggestions to the Board that they might have on that. And I look forward to having such discussions in an appropriate forum in the future with my fellow Board Members. Thank you.

MS. CONNERY: Thank you, Mr. Sullivan.

Comments from other Board Members?

MR. HAMILTON: I do.

MS. CONNERY: Mr. Hamilton.

MR. HAMILTON: Thank you, Madam Chairman. First of all, I want to thank Mr. Stokes and his staff

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for putting together a very robust and complex set of work plans. Underlying almost everything that was contained in our staff's work plans is the prioritization of the use of limited resources to evaluate the consequences and likelihood of postulated accidents.

As the newest member of our Board, I've been working hard to understand which defense nuclear facilities demand our greatest attention. It's a complex process as demonstrated by the staff effort on display here today.

When I transitioned to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board from the commercial nuclear power industry, one of the first questions I had was whether there existed a dashboard of safety status similar to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Reactor Oversight Process. Apparently, there is not.

It took years for the NRC to develop the Reactor Oversight Process, and I'm under no illusions that building a dashboard for defense nuclear facilities would be a simple effort. Nevertheless, I'm inclined to think that a dashboard-type tool would be helpful to our staff in harmonizing and stacking our priorities. I would encourage each of us on the Board and our staff, as well, to consider how such a product could begin to take shape between now and the development of next year's work

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plans.

This could be -- this could facilitate greater unification in the prioritization of work and the development of recommendations, as well as in providing greater transparency to the public. So, I welcome your comments and thoughts on that topic. Thank you.

MS. CONNERY: Thank you, Mr. Hamilton. I look to my other Board Members to comment. Ms. Roberson?

MS. ROBERSON: Okay, I'll comment. I like the idea. Mr. Hamilton's raised it before. I think it helps us act in a unified way and it ensures, I think, one of the lessons we learned from -- we learned as an agency from the WIPP accident and the lessons-learned assessment done by the staff was to ensure that we are not just paying attention to the big bouncing balls. It's sometimes those activities we consider lower risk can create big problems. And, so, having the opportunity to look from a risk perspective from the Board, I think would be a unifying exercise, both for the Board and for the staff.

MS. CONNERY: Thank you, Ms. Roberson.

Any other comment?

Well, I'd like to thank Mr. Hamilton for his thoughtful commentary. He's been thinking about this for a while. He's talked to each of us separately, and

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recognizing that it is a big undertaking but probably an important one that we have to consider, as well as how it would fit in with some of the activities that we already have ongoing with the work plan, how to balance that out, clearly from our perspective, having an understanding of all of the activities that our staff is looking at, all at the same time, would be beneficial if possible, but it is also, like I said, a big undertaking.

So, I would encourage Mr. Hamilton, since he suggested it, if he would like to consider whether or not he would take the lead in working with the staff to see how that could be done and what resources it would take. Obviously, we're not in a situation here where we could take any kind of action, as this is a discussion and not a deliberation. I just offer that up for future consideration.

Other Board Member comment?

(No response.)

MS. CONNERY: Thank you, sir.

Any other points of discussion? I think I had a couple of comments based on the last two presentations. One theme that I've heard in various places that wasn't considered a crosscutting issues is fire protection. It seems that a lot of the hazards that are facing the nuclear facilities happen to start with fire. And fire

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suppression seems to be a very important element in preventing release and harm to the public, as well as the collocated worker, but we don't consider it as far as crosscutting issues. It's taken site by site.

So, I guess one of the comments that I would make based on the presentations I have is whether or not we need to be looking at some of these issues and doing some comparison across the Board or lessons learned. I think Mr. Sullivan mentioned something similar with other aspects, as well, but that was one of the notes that I would make based on some of the presentations that we've gotten.

And then the other issue was with regard to staffing resources and onboarding specific individuals and how long that takes because I think, then, that goes to Mr. Sullivan's point about resource allocation. When budgets come out, I think that we have to be cognizant of the fact that bringing people onboard takes time for those people to get up to speed to be contributing members, but it also takes time from our staff to help those people become contributing members of the team.

So, any significant onboarding of personnel actually takes staff time away from doing their other work. And, so, I think that just has to be something that we recognize when we are looking at how we're

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allocating staff resources across these different functions and how we're bringing people onboard in which areas.

MS. ROBERSON: Since we have time, I'll keep talking. Bruce and I got a balanced table down here. I guess the -- this is the second year that we've done this, and I think it is a good exercise. I think there's been dramatic improvement.

I guess I'd say to my other Board Members, I mean, each one of us have to have our own thermometer as to what we're looking for. For me, when I look at the work plan, I'm trying to conclude whether what the staff has laid out is going to give me enough information to be comfortable that there is an assurance of adequate protection across the complex. So, I'm kind of looking at not just the big activities; what they're looking at when it comes to safety management programs and other things.

But I'm not sure that -- I mean, that's me. I'm not sure that that's consistent across the Board Members. So, I guess I'm interested in what do the other Board Members get out of the work plan. We've got half an hour. We're talking here. Okay.

MR. SULLIVAN: So, to respond to your question, well, I do look at the work plan as it's generated for

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this -- the specific types of things that were either brought here directly or were on questioning, such as when we hear that there will be a focus on emergency preparedness at various sites, you know, the question is, well, where. And does that line up with my understanding of where we haven't looked yet, plus where we may have some other data that suggests there might be weaknesses, such as data from our own site representatives who have reported that they've watched some drills or exercises at the site, plus the other factors that have been discussed, including location to the public, just the nature of Hanford, for example, is a very big place where many of the facilities are located very far away from the public. And then we have other places like Lawrence Livermore where the public is literally next door to the site.

So, to my knowledge, we've not identified significant issues at Livermore, but if we had identified significant issues at emergency preparedness at Livermore, for example, that would elevate my concern, simply because the public is so very close to the facilities there.

So, I do look at these issues as they are presented in the work plan and try to make sure that they either align with the same way that I would factor those

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various elements together, and if they don't then suggest changes. I think we've done that in that process, and much of what we've had today and the discussion is -- is in the nature of informing the public about work that I think has already happened largely behind the scenes.

MS. ROBERSON: Thank you.

MS. CONNERY: Does anyone else want to respond to that? How do you -- how does the work plan work for you, Dan? Sorry, Mr. Santos.

MR. SANTOS: No, I want to echo the Vice Chairman's word. I look at it from a high level. Is this a collection of activities that we can look at to get confidence and provide confidence to the public that given our limited resources we are at least bringing good coverage for adequate protection.

But having said that, one thing I want to get a better understanding is what's the link to improvements to safety? The staff is applying their expertise, their experience to come up with work activities they feel that are important, but not -- and everywhere I can see a direct link of, well, how is this activity going to lead to what improvement of safety.

I'm not looking for metrics, necessary quantitative, but it would be good for me to understand, we're spending these efforts doing these sort of reviews

because this is the improvement to safety we are deriving. And we're not doing that as explicitly as I would like to see. So, I look forward to work closely with the staff to brainstorm to see if there's other areas.

To Mr. Hamilton's point, having worked at the NRC -- sorry, a little biased to support that -- but as you know, the staff already has a risk scheme they're applying. So, I think as any change, we have to be careful as we develop a new risk scheme and how will that merge so it's not too disruptive to what the staff considers adequate today.

Also, it's not clear to me in the work plan -- and maybe it's a question I should have asked Mr. Stokes -- how open are we to other inputs to areas of risk. Right now, I think our activities are derived by the staff only. It's not clear to me whether we're asking the public, DOE, other stakeholders, hey, we feel the Board should be also be looking at this area. Again, I'm just looking for ways to leverage and expand our capability.

So, to me, getting input from other stakeholders for future work plans could be beneficial. Obviously, they can -- will have to be in context and screened through whatever risk scheme we have. So, those

are some of the comments I look forward to discuss individually and I will just -- any observations on that?

MS. CONNERY: So, Mr. Santos, I just -- on your last point --

MR. SANTOS: Yes.

MS. CONNERY: -- I understand the desire to bring in other viewpoints. The only caution I would make is that the work plan shouldn't be in place of the work. It's a tool to facilitate the work; it's guidelines to give us an idea of where the staff is going but shouldn't necessarily be a day-to-day indicator of what they're going to be doing. And, so, I would not want it to end up being a handcuff -- handcuffs on the staff to not be able to respond or be as flexible as they need to be based on the circumstances they have.

I also don't want them to spend an inordinate amount of time creating the work plan, which is, at this point, fairly elaborate as it is. So, if you factored in other inputs, I think it would -- it might get a little bit more unwieldy and complicated. That's just my viewpoint.

MR. SANTOS: No disagreement. And I wasn't necessarily referring to the work plan. I was just referring to input to our work.

MS. CONNERY: Okay.

MR. SANTOS: In whatever form it comes.

MR. SULLIVAN: So, to clarify what I said a few minutes ago about the work plan and what I get out of it, I was only addressing what I get out of it as opposed to trying to address how that sausage was made before I commented on it. And, so, we have a bottom-up process. We have the staff puts together something and then brings it to us for our comment, as opposed to a top-down process, where we might gather in the beginning and provide some specific direction to the staff for the development of their work plan.

And I'm not sure which would be most efficient or effective. I do understand that there's a lot in -- that this is a lot of work, as the Chairman said, that goes into the creation of this plan. And like anything else, we want to make sure that the work is commensurate with the value that we get out of it.

And I would hate to see us get to be like the United States budget where it takes years to develop a one-year budget and one year to spend all the money. And just so we don't -- we don't want to have something that becomes onerous to the staff and I think there's -- it wouldn't surprise me to find out that we currently actually have some staff members who think the current process is, in fact, onerous.

So, I was only addressing what we got out of it because I thought that was the question. And I'll just say it doesn't mean we can't -- could not or should not look at trying to improve the process. As you said, this is only the second year that we've done this. It's better this year than it was last. That doesn't mean we've reached nirvana, by any stretch, on where we are.

Being a small agency, we generally have the problem where virtually everybody is busy. So, when you ask the question, well, how do we take some manpower to go look at something in order to make ourselves better or more efficient, well, we find out that there's no manpower available because we're all busy trying to do the mission. So, I don't have easy answers to some of these things that I know we're talking about here. Nevertheless, if there's any way I could be part of any effort to try to make it better, I'd be happy to do that. Thank you.

MS. CONNERY: We're all for continuous improvement. Other comment?

I think maybe that Mr. Hamilton's suggestion of a dashboard may help in that regard. I'm not quite sure how I see those two things fitting together, but somewhere in the back of my head, based on the comments that both Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Santos put forward, I'm

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thinking that there might be synergies, to use an overused word, with the dashboard that you're thinking of.

Please note that Mr. Hamilton is nodding.

Any other comments from the Board? Any other issues that you guys want to discuss with each other, with me, with the public? Any hamming for the camera you want to be doing?

(No response.)

MS. CONNERY: Okay, seeing none, I want to move to the next agenda item, which is to actually ask for public comment. And I'm going to make sure I turn to my trusty General Counsel to have -- to make sure I have this right. We haven't, at this point, received any public comment from email or from the internet; is that correct?

MR. BIGGINS: That's correct.

MS. CONNERY: That's correct, okay. So, then, I will ask the public who is in the room if they would like to make comment, and then is there a procedure by which they need to make the comment?

MR. BIGGINS: They should come to the microphone to make the comment on the record.

MS. CONNERY: And identify themselves and their affiliation, I would assume?

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MR. BIGGINS: Yes.

MS. CONNERY: Okay, so, is there any such desire on the part of the public? Or staff? You're public. Doo, doo, doo, doo.

Now, seeing none, okay, we've failed to receive any public comment. So, our last order of business is to get closing remarks or parting shots, whatever you want to call it from our -- my fellow Board Members before we can declare this a success. So, I will turn to -- there's an order here. I'll turn to my colleagues, starting with Ms. Roberson, for closing remarks.

MS. ROBERSON: Thanks. That's it. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.

MS. CONNERY: Pithy. Very pithy.

Mr. Sullivan.

MR. SULLIVAN: So, I do want to thank all the members of the staff who've put together these presentations, all the work that went into creating the plan that underlies the presentations, as well as the staff members who did what needed to be done in order to have this public meeting. Thank you very much.

I do have, as I discussed here earlier, two primary thoughts. One is that in looking at the advice that we provide the Secretary I personally would like to be as specific as possible with issues that are in the

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complex at particular places because I generally feel that going forward that might lead most directly to measurable improvement that we could hopefully track on the short order.

And, secondly, I do think that there are some areas that -- where the staff themselves have expressed concern that we need to seriously think about what advice we might want to provide the Secretary on those areas. And I look forward to appropriate discussions with other Board Members on those issues.

So, with that said, thank you very much.

MS. CONNERY: Thank you, Mr. Sullivan.

Mr. Santos.

MR. SANTOS: I want to echo the words of Mr. Sullivan. Thank you to staff, support staff, and including our site reps that put a lot of effort, not only in the plan but the actual work itself. That's at the bottom -- at the end of the day, that's what matters.

My comment is that I do like the discipline of having a work plan and the traceability it provides and as a communication tool; however, I look forward to also giving insight of this agency for it to be flexible to our needs and the needs of the complex.

And Sean, Mr. Sullivan, talked about the bottoms-up approach, and I think there's also room to try

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a little bit of the top-down where the Board itself wants to drive some of the work items. And understanding how that's going to play out and how flexible we can adapt to that, I think that's very important whether it's the suggestion brought up by Mr. Hamilton that's going to be like a top-down approach and how will that fit to the work or some initiatives that myself I might have regarding potential Federal oversight.

And that synergy between an existing process and how do we coordinate all that is something I -- is yet to be tested out. And I look forward to work closely with other Board Members and staff to be seamless. So, again, thank you for the opportunity. No further comments.

MS. CONNERY: Thank you, Mr. Santos.

Mr. Hamilton?

MR. HAMILTON: Thank you, Madam Chairman. Again, I'd like to echo the comments of my fellow Board Members in thanking you for putting together a great product and in thanking you in advance now for the much heavier lift of actually carrying out the plan. So, we'll be here to help you in doing that and try not to confuse things too much in the process. Thank you very much.

MS. CONNERY: So, I'm last. I'd like to say

thank you, as well, to everyone. Thanks for going easy on me for my first public meeting. I'd also like to note Mr. Tontodonato, because he's been here but silent, as part of our senior staff. He's been a talented slide flipper. With 59 slides, it's not always that easy, so thank you.

So, just a couple of substantive comments, and I agree with Mr. Sullivan that we need to be specific to convey our concerns and our recommendations or advice to the Secretary of Energy. I do feel, however, that there are a number of ways that we can do that. And sometimes it is helpful and beneficial to resolve issues at a lower level, if at all possible, than necessarily always going up to the higher level of a recommendation.

So, I think we have a lot of tools in our toolkit that we could use in order to focus on the outcome rather than the process. And I think that's where we all here on the Board, coming from our different backgrounds, agree that's what it is that we need to do. This is the first time in a long time we've had a full complement of five Board Members. We all come from different backgrounds, and we all have something unique to contribute.

I also would like to say that I'm looking forward to an improved relationship with the Department

of Energy. We've seen some of those dividends already in the past -- at least in my short tenure, and I hope to see that continue because I would like to be able to, as a Board, influence the decisions of the Department of Energy and not just become pen pals with them so that safety is something that we can work on together going forward.

So, once again, I'd like to thank everyone for their participation in the meeting, the support staff that has made this happen, the legal staff for keeping us legal, and we will see you shortly. This concludes the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's business meeting, and this meeting is adjourned.

(Whereupon, the public meeting was adjourned at 3:43 p.m.)

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, LINDA METCALF, the officer before whom the foregoing testimony was taken, do hereby certify that the proceeding was digitally recorded by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under my direction; that said testimony is a true record of the event; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this proceeding was taken; and, further, that I am not a relative or employee of any of the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

LINDA METCALF