

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 4, 2013

MEMO To: Steven Stokes, Acting Technical Director
FROM: Thomas Spatz, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending October 4, 2013

Fire Penetration Seals Update: This week, the NNSA Production Office (NPO) sent a letter to Babcock & Wilcox Pantex (B&W) regarding the Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) violation and the recovery plan related to the discovery of deficient newly-installed fire penetration seals. (See report for 9/6/2013.) In the letter, NPO stated that B&W's recovery plan was inadequate because it did not provide a schedule of compliance or address the non-compliance of the fire rated walls for staging facilities where nuclear material was not removed. NPO directed B&W to submit TSR recovery plans to NPO for approval in the future. NPO also directed B&W to re-evaluate the manner in which design features are addressed in the TSR. This evaluation should address the Site Representative's concern regarding the lack of a Limiting Condition for Operation related to a degraded passive design feature in the NPO-approved safety basis for the staging of nuclear material in the facility. (See report for 9/6/2013.) B&W was tasked with providing a proposed schedule for this evaluation by October 9, 2013.

Conduct of Operations: This week, B&W held an event critique for an event where a Special Mechanical Inspector left a two-way radio in a nuclear facility personnel interlock. The Special Mechanical Inspector entered the first door of the interlock before realizing he was still carrying the radio. He placed the radio on an electrical panel and proceeded into the facility to perform planned maintenance on the fire protection system. After completing the planned maintenance, the inspector left the facility and forgot to pick up the radio. The following day, the facility mode was changed from maintenance to production. Production Technicians entered the facility and noticed the radio.

At the event critique, B&W Nuclear and Explosive Surety personnel stated that this event was not a Nuclear Explosive Safety violation because the radio was confined to the personnel interlock and it was not on. The Authorization Basis personnel determined that this event did not result in a TSR violation because these two-way radios are covered in the supplemental equipment program. The Authorization Basis personnel also stated that, while these two-way radios are covered by the supplemental equipment program, the program only covers their use by the Fire Department and the Security Police Officers, but not maintenance personnel. The Fire Department and the Security Police Officers previously submitted use control documents to the Authorization Basis Department to specify how they will use the radios in the presence of nuclear explosives. However, the Maintenance Department and all other departments have not submitted use control documentation and are not authorized to use two-way radios on transportation routes or in nuclear facilities. B&W Authorization Basis personnel determined that this was not a programmatic breakdown of the supplemental equipment program because it only involved one piece of equipment.

B&W has paused the use of two-way radios by personnel other than the Fire Department and the Security Police Officers. At the event critique, B&W determined that this event would be handled in the Problem Evaluation Request program.